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This thesis consists of three self-contained experimental studies focusing on con-
formity behavior in the leader appointment process, self-group risk preferences of
elected leaders and performance feedback mechanisms.
In Chapter 1, I investigate discrimination against women in election settings
and whether group dynamics undermine women’s chances to become leaders. I
conduct a voting experiment which tests the effect of the candidate’s gender on
voting behavior, and the role of conformity. Consistent with the predictions of
a simple model, subjects tend to vote for candidates who exhibit similar (risk)
preferences. Information on the gender of the candidates mitigates proximity
concerns of the voter especially in favor of the male candidate. Yet, there is no
conclusive result for the gender bias. The results also confirm that conformity is
a significant factor in group decision-making.
In Chapter 2, I analyze the mechanism which induces the difference between
self and group risk attitudes of elected leaders. I focus on two motivations: a
“leadership effect”, that is created by the competition and the sense of responsibil-
ity of the leadership status, and a “group concern” of the leader. The results show
that elected leaders significantly become more risk-seeking when deciding on be-
half of a group compared to their individual decisions. Meeting the expectations
of group members seems the main driver of this observed behavioral change.
In Chapter 3, in a setting where feedback is given strategically by a supervisor,
we theoretically and experimentally analyze how employees interpret the received
feedback in forming beliefs of themselves and whether feedback communicates the
iv
actual performance information truthfully. We found that information transmis-
sion occurs only in verifiable feedback mechanisms and private-verifiable is the
most informative mechanism. We observed lying-aversion among principles: the
results indicate a lying cost, and there is a tendency to send the true information
where lying is profitable.
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1Chapter 1
Absence of Female Leaders: Do
group dynamics play a role?
Abstract
It is well-known that the proportion of women in executive positions is sub-
stantially lower relative to men. I investigate whether group dynamics undermine
women’s chances to become leaders since leader positions are generally appointed
by group decision. This experimental study aims to shed light on determinants
of voting behavior and the impact of candidate gender on the voting decision in
a group setting, with a focus on conformity behavior. Consistent with the pre-
dictions of a simple model based on spatial proximity, subjects tend to vote for
candidates who exhibit similar (risk) preferences. Information on the gender of
the candidates mitigates proximity concerns of the voter especially in favor of
the male candidate. Yet, there is no conclusive result for the gender bias. The
results also confirm that conformity behavior is one of the leading determinants
of group decision making. Although not conclusive, there is evidence for women
being more prone to conform. Conformity is more likely to be motivated by taste
than social learning.
Keywords: Conformity, Voting, Discrimination, Lab experiments.
JEL Classification: C91, C92, D71, D72, D81, J16.
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1.1 Introduction
It’s no secret that there are fewer women in executive positions than men. A census
by Catalyst (2012) documents that women held only 14.3% of the executive officer
positions and 16.6% of the board seats in Fortune 500 firms. Moreover, more than
25% of those firms have no woman in an executive officer position.
A popular supply-side explanation is the gender-specific differences in individ-
ual preferences, such as differences in the willingness to occupy leadership posi-
tions, differences in risk preferences, women’s distaste for competition and men’s
overconfidence as nominees for leadership positions (Ertac and Gurdal (2012),
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Gneezy et al. (2003) and Reuben et al. (2012)).
Yet, despite being fewer in number, there are many women who are willing to
take on leadership positions. A recent Catalyst (2013) survey among the alumni
of top MBA programs shows that those high potential women and men “in the
pipeline” are equally likely to aspire to an executive position. This suggests that
individual preferences may not be the sole factor involved.
To investigate the demand side for the lack of women in top positions, one
needs to consider appointment procedures. The strategic decisions in companies
and organizations about who should take on certain leadership roles such as ex-
ecutive positions are often made in small committees such as executive boards.
In the committee decision-making process, there may be group dynamics which
undermine women’s chances to be appointed.
In this paper, I examine this conjecture. In particular, I focus on conformity
behavior as a potential factor hindering women to be selected by the group. In
a group decision-making process, conformity may cause contagion of individual
bias over the group. Even though a group member has no gender bias on her
own preferences over candidates, the choice of a biased majority might affect her
both psychologically and strategically, which in turn leads her to change the prior
decision in favor of the popular candidate. Therefore, conformity may amplify the
effect of gender bias on a group’s decision.
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My experiment is designed to proxy the committee decision setting in order
to test this effect. Clearly, the committee decisions are made after a deliberation
process. I, rather, use a simple voting model to proxy this setting for simpli-
fication. I conduct a lab experiment that emulates a voting environment with
two candidates, where voters cast a vote for the candidate who will make a risky
decision on behalf of the group. The voting decision is based on the information
about individual risky decisions of both candidates. I also collect data on the
perceptions of voters about risk preferences of candidates. Across treatments, I
manipulate the revelation of (1) candidate gender, (2) polling information.
I propose a simple voting model based on the proximity theory (Downs (1957)).
The model predicts subjects voting for the spatially closer candidate on the spec-
trum of (risk) preferences. The model is tested via historical and perceptional
approaches that claim voters care about the proximity of the candidate in the
voting decision. Consistent with the predictions of this stylized model, subjects
tend to vote for the candidate who exhibits similar risk preferences.
An important result from the paper is that revealing the candidate’s gender
shifts the vote distribution in favor of male candidates. The analysis of the same-
sex and opposite-sex votes also shows that both female and male voters favor
the male candidate only. Information on the gender of the candidates mitigates
proximity concerns of the voter especially in favor of the male candidate. Yet,
there is no conclusive result for the gender bias.
I further find support for the conformity hypothesis. Minority status, defined
as voting for the less popular candidate, increases the propensity to conform.
Subjects are willing to give up some proximity to their ideal point on the risk
spectrum in order to conform with the ideal point of others in the committee.
While there is some support for women being more prone to conform, the evidence
is not conclusive.
I also conduct additional treatments to explore the motivation behind the
conformity behavior. In particular, I aim to discriminate between the taste-based
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conformity as opposed to the informational conformity. In the former motivation,
one may converge to the majority’s decision in the committee since noncompliance
may incur disutility. The latter motivation is based on the social learning within
the committee. Under an information asymmetry across voters, the convergence
to the majority may occur due to a voter updating her belief about candidates
based on the majority’s choice. To test this conjecture, I compare the propensity to
conform under symmetric and asymmetric information cases. The results indicate
conformity behavior being more likely to be motivated by taste than learning from
the committee.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 1.2 reviews the related
literature, 1.3 describes the design and the procedures, section 1.4 reviews the
theoretical model of the voting behavior, section 1.5 provides the hypotheses of
the study, section 1.6 explains the empirical strategy followed in the analysis,
section 1.7 presents the results and checks the robustness of the provided evidence
and section 1.8 provides a discussion and conclusion.
1.2 Related Literature
The glass ceiling for women in both politics and the business world has been
considered in the literature from various dimensions. I focus specifically on im-
pediments to women breaking the glass-ceiling. There is substantial evidence of
a bias1 against female leaders/politicians both at the individual and group level
(see Fox and Smith (1998), Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015)). According to the World
Values Survey2, around 28% of European respondents believe men make better
political leaders and 26% of them perceive men to be better business executives
than women. Economics studies explain the bias by two reasons: the taste-based
1Note that the term gender bias is defined as an unfair treatment to men or women because
of their sex. Here, the bias refers to the case whereby the appointment to certain positions in
workplaces and politics is affected by the applicant’s or the candidate’s gender.
2World Values Survey Wave 6 2010-2014. www.worldvaluessurvey.org Note that the data
is aggregated over all European countries (Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Slovenia,
Poland, Romania, Cyprus and Turkey) which are included in Wave 6.
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discrimination and the statistical discrimination. In the former, individuals may
have a taste for discrimination whereby hiring a female executive incurs a disutil-
ity (Becker (1957)). In the latter, individuals may not prefer a female executive
due to the limited information about women’s executive ability which is a result
of the fewer number of women in such positions (Aigner and Cain (1977)). The
focus of this paper is not to investigate the motivation behind the bias, but rather
identify the bias.
To address this issue, affirmative action in politics, business and academia
has been introduced in several countries3. Although evidence on the effectiveness
of these policies is mixed (Ford and Pande (2011), Bagues and Esteve-Volart
(2010), Jones (2004)), exposure to women in such positions reduces the effect of
stereotypes (Beaman et al. (2009), Finseraas et al. (2016) and Gangadharan et al.
(2016)).
This paper contributes first and foremost to the literature trying to identify
the demand-side reasons behind the lack of female leaders4. This strand of the
experimental literature predominantly explains the phenomenon with the preju-
dice against female leaders which is formed due to the conflict of gender role in
the society and the perceived role of leaders (Eagly and Karau (2002) and Garcia-
Retamero and López-Zafra (2006)). With a focus on discrimination in STEM
fields, in a lab experiment, Reuben et al. (2014) show that women are perceived
as less talented for an arithmetic task and therefore are half as likely to be hired
as their men counterparts. This paper adds to the demand-side of leadership
literature by investigating the potential mechanisms that cause discrimination in
the leader appointment process.
As shown in several empirical studies, group dynamics seem to play an impor-
3For more information, please refer to Jones (2004) for parity law in politics, Ford and
Pande (2011) for an overview of gender quotas for corporate boards and Bagues and Esteve-
Volart (2010) for gender quotas in scientific committees.
4In the literature, leadership has been extensively used in the leader-follower contexts. Note
that this paper does not contribute to that strand of the literature. As in Ertac and Gurdal
(2012), I, rather, focus on leadership as an executive role in workplaces where leader acts as the
decision-maker for the company.
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tant role in the phenomenon. An election study by Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015)
shows that despite their higher vote potential, women are less likely to be nom-
inated by the party, which suggests a party bias in the candidate appointment.
Similarly, Jones (2004) documents that the legislated gender quota on political
parties became effective only when the placement of women in electable positions
is mandated in Costa Rica. This indicates that the impact of the positive action
depends on the willingness of the political party to include female candidates in
their list. While existing studies suggest that group dynamics is an important
factor, there is no study up to date attempting to identify them. This study aims
to fill this gap.
Group dynamics cannot be considered separately from the formation of norms
within groups (see Bettenhausen and Murnighan (1985), Friedkin (2001) and
Sherif (1936)). In a recent study, Bagues et al. (2015) find that unanimous deci-
sions are prevalent in scientific committees in which there is an interaction between
committee members before voting. This indicates that the deliberation process
may induce convergence. Consequently, I investigate conformity as a social mul-
tiplier of a bias in a group decision-making process.
Conformity behavior refers to the act of changing one’s behavior to match with
others’ responses (Cialdini and Goldstein (2004)). It has been explored in different
contexts both in psychology and economics. Neuroscientists point out a natural
instinct to conform under group pressure since any conflict with group opinion is
perceived as a punishment by the brain (Berns (2008), Klucharev et al. (2009)).
Besides, economics demonstrates it as a normative behavior such as herding, the
threat against social status and ingratiation (Banerjee (1992), Akerlof (1980),
Robin et al. (2014)). Yet, there is no study up-to-date focusing conformity in
committee decisions. This study contributes to the literature by opening the
black box of group decision-making with a focus on conformity.
This paper also adds to recent experimental literature focusing on the relative
importance of conformity-inducing mechanisms. In economics and psychology,
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some conformity studies motivate the behavior with the preference mechanism
in which taste drives the behavioral convergence (Festinger (1954)), and others
explain it with the belief mechanism in which social learning constructs a shared
norm (Zafar (2011), Krupka and Weber (2009), Carpenter (2004)). Interestingly,
the relative importance of the two mechanisms has been investigated by very few
studies. Robin et al. (2014) and Bernheim and Exley (2015) attempt to disentan-
gle these two mechanisms. Although they cannot significantly differentiate the
motive, Robin et al. (2014) find the tendency to conform being as more strate-
gic in ingratiation context of employer-employee relations. Bernheim and Exley
(2015), on the other hand, find equal importance of both mechanisms in a broader
setting. Their group treatment provides a somewhat similar setting to my design.
Participants choose an effort level in advance of being selected as a leader, while
the effort level of each group member is publicly observable. They find more sup-
port for the preference mechanism than the belief mechanism and they attribute
the behavior to an identity concern due to the public announcement. Although
the social image is not a motive in my design, my results are consistent with their
findings.
Finally, this paper also contributes to the experimental literature on the po-
litical economy by exploring voting behavior. There are two leading theories on
voting behavior in political sciences. The proximity theory (Downs (1957)) de-
scribes the voting decision as casting the vote for the spatially closer candidate
on the political spectrum, whereas the directional theory (Rabinowitz and Mac-
donald (1989)) proposes voting for the extreme candidate on the same ‘side’ with
the voter. Lacy and Paolino (2010) attempt to discriminate between these theo-
ries with an experiment. Although the results are not conclusive, they find more
support for the proximity theory. To understand the effect of group dynamics
in voting behavior, I investigate a proximity-type voting. My study provides ev-
idence for proximity voting in a two-candidate election, thereby contributing to
the voting literature with experimental evidence.
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1.3 Experimental Design
The experimental design aims to shed light on the role of candidate gender in
the voting decision and the impact of conformity behavior on the magnitude of
gender bias in group voting. Information about candidate gender and the polling
information about votes of other group members are the treatment variables which
are applied between-subject and within-subject respectively.
In order to clearly investigate the proposed questions, I focus on only one
leadership characteristic in my design. Since leadership positions generally involve
decisions with risk and uncertainty, I employ a risk elicitation task by Gneezy and
Potters (1997). Each participant is initially endowed with 100 ECU5 to allocate
between two options: a riskless option, i.e. bond option and a risky option, i.e.
stock option. The risky multiplier, kt, is randomly chosen from [1.5,3] for each
round t and is applied as a common multiplier for all subjects. The amount
allocated to the risky option, X2, yields ktX2 with the probability of good state
0.5 and 0 otherwise, whereas riskless option secures the allocated amount. So the
expected payoff is:
E[Ut|kt] = (100−X2) + [0.5(ktX2) + 0.5(0)] ,
where kt denotes the risky multiplier, at round t, kt  [1.5, 3].
The experiment consists of two stages: the individual stage and the group
stage. The aim of the individual stage is to collect data for risk preferences of
participants which is utilized as the “candidate information” in the group stage
election. The participants individually perform the investment task for a randomly
selected risky multiplier in each 9 round6. I additionally use a strategy method
in round 10 of the individual stage, the strategy method round, where subjects are
expected to state their own investment decisions for a list of risky multipliers that
5ECU refers to Experimental Currency Unit. The exchange rate is set as 1 ECU= ₤0.04,
i.e. 4p.
6The investment task is repeated for design concerns. The reasons are explained with the
corresponding parts of the design.
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include 1.5, 2, 2.5 and 3. (see Figure A.6 in Appendix A). This is used in the
perception analysis which is explained in detail in Section 1.6.2.
The group stage is the main part of the experiment in which all within-subject
treatments are implemented. At the beginning of each round, 7-person groups
are randomly formed. A stranger matching protocol is used in group formation
in order to prevent reciprocity. In each round, 2 candidates, 1 female and 1
male, are exogenously appointed. In order to guarantee that each group has at
least one female and one male member for candidacy, stratified randomization by
gender is applied in group formation. The appointed candidates are represented
anonymously as candidate A and B. Also one of the individual stage rounds is
randomly selected as the information round. On the voting screen, the risky
option allocations of both candidates for the corresponding risky multiplier of
chosen information round is displayed (refer to Figure A.7 for the voting screen).
With the given information, voters cast their votes for the desired candidate.
The leader is elected with majority rule and she performs the investment task on
behalf of the group. The payoff of all group members is determined by the leader’s
decision.
Additionally, voters are asked to guess the risky option allocations of both
candidates in strategy method round with a reference to the given information
(refer to Figure A.8 for the guess screen). Since the candidate information is a
signal of their risk preferences, the guesses are used as a tool to observe the percep-
tion of voters about candidates’ risk behavior. Note that guesses are monetarily
incentivized7.
Due to the scope of the paper, I focus on the following treatments (for other
treatments, see Appendix A.2): :
• Between-subject:
– Gender treatment: In order to identify a potential gender bias, i.e.
7The guess is regarded as correct when it is in the ∓3 interval of the actual allocation of the
candidate. Each correct guess for each candidate is rewarded with 5 ECU bonus.
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whether a candidate’s gender affects the voting decision, revelation
of the gender of the candidates is altered across sessions8. Unlike in
the control group, gender treatment group candidates are additionally
represented with icons that indicate their gender (see Figure A.7 in
Appendix A.3.).
• Within-subject:
– Baseline treatment: The explained group stage procedure is applied.
– Conformity treatment: A pre-election stage, i.e. a poll, is employed.
The poll result represented in terms of vote share of each candidate.
After observing the poll result in their group, the participants are al-
lowed to vote again in the second stage of the election (see Figure A.9 in
Appendix A.3). Note that all group members observe the poll results.
In order to incentivize the decisions in both stages of the election, the
final vote is randomly selected from the poll and second stage votes of
the subject.
Note that to collect more data from participants, each within-session treat-
ment is repeated for 3 rounds. To eliminate potential wealth effects, one of
the individual and group stage rounds is randomly chosen for payment and
subjects are paid according to their payoffs in the chosen round.
1.3.1 Procedures
The experiment was programmed using z-Tree experimental software (Fischbacher
(2007)) and implemented at the ESSEXLAB, University of Essex, in June 2014.
The data is collected from 196 subjects in total (112 subjects were in gender
treatment and 84 subjects were in gender control group) who are recruited via
hroot (Bock et al. (2014)). The experiment is conducted in 11 sessions, with
8In the gender treatment sessions, the gender information of the candidates is provided in
all group stage rounds of the session. In gender control, the information is withheld throughout
the session.
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6 gender treatment and 5 gender control sessions. The sample consists of 99
female (55 in treatment, 44 in control group) and 97 male (57 in treatment,
40 in control) participants, who are mostly undergraduate students. Since the
student population is diverse in various terms at the University of Essex, a survey
is conducted at the end of each session to collect demographic data such as age,
ethnicity, major, siblings and annual personal income. The duration of the sessions
were 50 minutes, and subjects earned ₤9.91 on average, including a show-up fee
of ₤2.50.
An extension experiment for checking the robustness of findings is implemented
at the ESSEXLAB in June 2016. 140 subjects (69 female, 71 male) participated
in the extension experiment and they earned ₤7.1 on average9. The extension
experiment is conducted in 7 sessions and each session took 50 minutes. Note
that the participants of the main experiment are excluded from the recruited
sample of extension experiment sessions.
1.4 Theoretical Model
In the design of the experiment, voter’s utility depends not only on the self risk
preference but also on the risk preference of the leader, u(rself , rleader), since the al-
location decision is made by the leader in the group stage. Similar to the Downsian
proximity theory (Downs (1957)), a voter’s decision is based on the minimization
of the distance between the self and leader’s risk aversion rates
min
CA,CB
| rself − E[rCi ] |,
where i = A, B,
Ci: candidate i,
rself : risk aversion index of the voter,
rCi : risk aversion index of candidate i.
9Earnings ranged between ₤4.10 and ₤17.40 in the main and ₤3.50 and ₤14.10 in the
extension experiment, including the show-up fee.
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Note that the minimization of distances depends on the expected risk prefer-
ence of candidates E[rCi ] since the risk indices of candidates are unobservable.
The design of the experiment allows to validate this model in two ways:
• Historical proximity: Based on the observed information from the cho-
sen information round, voter minimizes the difference between the self and




||Xselft −XCit | kt||
where kt: the risky multiplier in the information round t,
Xselft : voter’s allocation to risky option in the information round t,
XCit : Candidate i’s allocation to risky option in the information round t.
• Perceptional proximity: The observed information from the information
round is regarded as a signal of the candidate’s risk behavior. Therefore,
the voting decision depends on the minimization of the distance between
the self risk preference and the perceived risk preference of the candidate.
min
CA,CB
|rself − µ(XCit ) |,
where µ(XCit ) is the signal about the risk behavior of the candidate i, based
on the risky allocation of the candidate in information round for a given
risky multiplier.
1.5 Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1.1. Individuals vote for the candidate whom they believe to have
closer risk behavior to their own risk preferences.
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Following the proximity theory of Downs (1957), I expect voters vote for the
spatially closer candidate. Consider two candidates CA and CB with corresponding
risk aversion rates rCA and rCB , such that
| rjself − E[rCA ] |<| rjself − E[rCB ] | .
Then CA  CB for the voter j since uj(rjself , rCA) ≥ uj(rjself , rCB). Therefore I
expect voter j vote for CA with a higher probability,
Prob(Vj = CA) > Prob(Vj = CB),
where Vj: the vote of the voter j.
Hypothesis 1.2. Gender bias prevails in voting decisions of individuals.
Considering the evidence presented by Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015), the voting
decision is expected to be affected by the gender of the candidate. Comparison
of the baseline stage voting pattern in gender-blind (gender control group) and
gender revealed (gender treatment group) elections provides information about the
effect of the candidate’s gender on voting decisions. Any difference in the voting
behavior between gender treatment and control groups is regarded as "bias".
Following the discrimination literature, the change in the voting pattern be-
tween gender treatment and control group may occur due to the following reasons:
• Taste-based bias: Choosing a woman as a leader may give a disutility which
in turn creates a tendency not to vote for the female candidate when gender
is observable.
• Statistical bias: Several studies provide evidence for women being more
risk-averse (see Croson and Gneezy (2009) for an extensive review of gender
differences in risk attitudes). Also, other studies indicate that women are
predicted as being more risk-averse (see Eckel and Grossman (2002) and
Daruvala (2007)). Therefore, the gender of the candidates may provide
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more information about the risk attitudes which may cause a difference in
gender treatment and control voting patterns.
Note that the purpose of this study is not distinguishing the type of the bias.
Rather, I aim to identify the bias.
Hypothesis 1.3. There is conformity behavior under group pressure, i.e. revela-
tion of the preferences of the group majority.
Following the literature on conformity, I expect to observe a high propensity
to conform in a group decision-making process. Consider that the voter j voted
for candidate A which indicates CA  CB according to the preference of voter j.
Under the expected voting behavior by the first hypothesis, the presented share
of votes has nothing to do with voter’s own preference. Therefore any switch from
the poll stage vote indicates a conformity behavior. The analysis of the direction of
conformity provides information whether conformity causes a contagion of gender
bias over the group.
Hypothesis 1.4. Women are more likely to conform.
In light of the results of Eagly et al. (1981), the propensity to conform among
women is expected to be higher relative to men.
1.6 Empirical Strategy
With the proposed hypotheses, I am interested in estimating the impact of dis-
tance to both candidates on the voting decision. The hypothesis about the voting
behavior is analyzed by the following model.
1.6.1 Historical proximity
Consider that di is the absolute distance between the risky allocations of the voter
and the candidate i in the information round t, for a given risky multiplier kt.
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dhistoricali = ||Xvotert −XCit | kt||,




A − dhistoricalB .
1.6.2 Perceptional proximity
The perceptional distance is formed by averaging the absolute distances between
the risky allocation of the voter in the strategy method round (SMR) and the
voter’s guess about candidate’s allocation for each risky multiplier in the same
round.
dkSMR=1.5i = ||XvoterSMR − guessCi | kSMR = 1.5||
dkSMR=2i = ||XvoterSMR − guessCi | kSMR = 2||
dkSMR=2.5i = ||XvoterSMR − guessCi | kSMR = 2.5||
dkSMR=3i = ||XvoterSMR − guessCi | kSMR = 3||



















A − dperceptionalB .
1.6.3 Empirical Model
With the formed difference in distances variables, DD, the following model is
applied.
Pr(V = 1) = β0 + β11(DD > 0) + β2DD∗1(DD > 0) + β3DD∗1(DD < 0) + ,
(1.1)
where
V : vote dummy; V =1 if the voter casts his/her vote for the candidate B, 0
otherwise,
1(DD > 0): the indicator for positive difference in distances, 1(DD > 0)= 1
if dA > dB, i.e. candidate B has closer risky allocation, 0 otherwise,
DD∗1(DD > 0): the interaction term of difference in distances and the posi-
tive DD indicator,
DD∗1(DD < 0): the interaction term of difference in distances and the neg-
ative DD indicator.
Note that DD∗1(DD > 0) (and DD∗1(DD < 0)) captures the impact of DD,
i.e. relative absolute distance with reference to candidate B, when candidate B
has the closer risky allocation (and when candidate A has closer risky allocation).
Besides accounting for the impact of the proximity of the candidates indepen-
dently, this model incorporates the relative proximity of the candidates into the
voting analysis.
In order to account for the individual specific correlation due to the multiple
observations within each treatment, random effects model10 is employed through-
10Note that random effects model is used due to its suitability. With the fixed effects model, a
great part of the variation is lost. Since Hausman test failed to reject the null for each regression,





First I provide some summary statistics on the risk behavior of the participants.
On average, female participants allocated 41.8 ECU, while male participants put
46.3 ECU to the risky option where the average risky multiplier is 2.26. Con-
sistent with the literature, male participants are generally less risk-averse than
their women counterparts (p= 0.0006 in a Mann-Whitney test). Yet, the sample
is generally risk-averse since even male subjects allocate less than half of their
endowment to the risky option for a high risky multiplier.
Figure 1.1 displays the allocations to the risky option in individual and group
stages regarding the gender. Considering the impact of the candidates’ risk behav-
ior in the voting process, the elected male leaders are more risk-loving than their
female counterparts both in the individual and group stages. More interestingly,
leaders are more risk-seeking when making decisions on behalf of the group, re-
gardless of their gender11. There is evidence for the difference between self-group
risk preferences in the literature (see Charness and Jackson (2009), Harrison et al.
(2013), Ertac and Gurdal (2012)). This result is consistent with their findings.
11The average risky multiplier is higher in the group stage, 2.32, where it is 2.18 in the
individual stage. Although an increase is expected, the change in risky allocation between the
group and individual stages is slightly higher regarding the proportions of increase in the risky
multiplier and the risky allocations.
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1.7.2 Voting behavior and the Gender Bias
One of the major goals of this paper is to understand the voting behavior. I first
analyze12 the distributions of the votes in the baseline treatment with respect to
the distance and absolute distance to the voted candidate. As it is displayed in
Figure 1.2a and 1.2b, the votes are accumulated in the closer distances whereas
the frequency of votes diminishes as the distance increases.
In order to identify a potential gender treatment effect on voting patterns,
the distributions are compared between treatment and control groups (see Figure
1.3a and 1.3b). The distributions both in absolute distance and distance cases
are significantly different between gender treatment and control groups (p= 0.026
and p= 0.016 respectively in a Mann-Whitney test). According to the results of
the Mann-Whitney test, the average distance and average absolute distance to the
voted candidate in the treatment group is higher. This means the voting decision
12Note that the complete analysis is also executed by excluding the candidates from the
sample. The results are robust to the exclusion of the candidates. Please refer to Appendix A.1
for the corresponding tables and graphs.
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is less sensitive to the “proximity” of the candidates when the candidates’ gender
information is revealed.
Figure 1.2: Vote Distribution with the Absolute Distance/Distance to the Voted
Candidate
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Figure 1.3: Comparison of Vote Distributions over Gender Treatment and Control
Groups
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Delving deeper, the distribution analysis is decomposed as votes for female
and male candidates in order to observe whether the shift in distribution is biased
towards a specific gender (see Figure 1.4a and 1.4b for votes for female candidate
and Figure 1.4c and 1.4d for votes for male candidate). In the votes for the female
candidate, there is no significant difference in distributions across gender treat-
ment and control groups in either absolute distance or distance cases (p= 0.427
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and p= 0.576 respectively in a Mann-Whitney test). However, a Mann-Whitney
test confirms that the distribution of votes for the male candidate significantly
differs between the treatment and control groups both in the absolute distance
and the distance cases (p= 0.025 and p= 0.004 respectively). Moreover, the aver-
age distances, both in absolute and net terms, are higher in the gender treatment
group. Hence the revelation of the candidate’s gender shifts the vote distribution
favorably for the male candidate.
Figure 1.4: Comparison of Female and Male Vote Distributions over Gender Treat-
ment and Control Groups
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The same analysis is conducted for the same-sex and the opposite-sex votes.
Both in the same-sex votes (the cases where a female voter votes for a female
candidate and a male voter votes for a male candidate) and in the opposite-sex
votes (the cases where a female voter votes for a male candidate and a male voter
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votes for a female candidate), the revelation of the candidates’ gender creates an
impact only on the male votes13, 14. Therefore, both female and male voters favor
the male candidate when they observe the candidates’ gender.
In order to check the theoretical model for voting behavior, the vote pro-
portions are analyzed by the proximity of the candidates both historically and
perceptionally. In the historical analysis, the column for the overall results in
Table 1.1 shows that 74% of the votes for the male candidate are used when he
is closer to the voter than the female candidate, while 70% of the votes for the
female candidate are used when she has closer risky allocation.
The perceptional analysis results are similar to the historical ones. The overall
results in Table 1.2 point out that voters consider the proximity of the perceived
risk behavior since 70% of the votes for the male candidate and 67% of the votes
for the female candidate are cast in favor of the corresponding candidate when he
or she is believed to have a closer risk behavior. The results indicate that both
historical and perceptional proximity of the candidate is important in the voting
decision.
The proportions of votes in both analyses are compared over the gender treat-
ment and control group in order to identify a potential treatment effect on voting
pattern. According to the test of proportions, they do not differ across the gender
treatment 15 (p= 0.354 when the male candidate and p= 0.646 when the female
candidate is historically closer; p= 0.357 when the male candidate and p= 0.369
when the female candidate is perceptionally closer).
13For the graphs, please see Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 in Appendix A.1.
14According to a Mann-Whitney test, the results are as following: p= 0.354 in absolute
distance and p= 0.267 in distance case for female to female votes; p= 0.050 in absolute distance
and p=0.013 in distance case for male to male votes; p= 0.847 in absolute distance and p=
0.891 in distance case for male to female votes; p= 0.048 in absolute distance and p=0.136 in
distance case for female to male votes.
15The proportions in male and female columns of Table 1.1 and 1.2 are tested by a test of
proportions across gender treatment.
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Vote Male Female Equal distanced Male Female Equal distanced Male Female Equal distanced
Male Candidate 206 84 10 117 46 8 89 38 2
(73.84) (29.89) (35.71) (71.78) (31.08) (32.00) (76.72) (28.57) (66.67)
Female Candidate 73 197 18 46 102 17 27 95 1
(26.16) (70.11) (64.29) (28.22) (68.92) (68.00) (23.28) (71.43) (33.33)
Number of votes for each candidate, percentages in parentheses




Vote Male Female Equal distanced Male Female Equal distanced Male Female Equal distanced
Male Candidate 134 64 14 75 32 12 59 32 2
(70.16) (32.65) (42.42) (67.57) (29.91) (54.55) (73.75) (35.96) (18.18)
Female Candidate 57 132 19 36 75 10 21 57 9
(29.84) (67.35) (57.58) (32.43) (70.09) (45.45) (26.25) (64.04) (81.82)
Number of votes for each candidate, percentages in parentheses
Table 1.3: Model (1.1)- Historical proximity
Logit
(robust std. errors)
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3)
Vote for Candidate B (Male candidate) Control Treatment Overall
1(DDhistorical > 0) 0.345*** 0.461*** 0.373***
(0.083) (0.070) (0.078)
DDhistorical*1(DDhistorical > 0) 0.002 -0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
DDhistorical*1(DDhistorical < 0) 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Gender Treatment X 1(DDhistorical > 0) 0.059
(0.096)
Gender Treatment X (DDhistorical*1(DDhistorical > 0)) -0.004
(0.003)
Gender Treatment X (DDhistorical*1(DDhistorical < 0)) -0.0004
(0.002)
N 252 336 588
χ2 35.795 39.055 75.247
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
GLS Regressions for the impact of distances to the voting behavior
Gender Treatment X 1(DDhistorical > 0), Gender Treatment X (DD ∗ 1(DDhistorical > 0))
and Gender Treatment X (DD ∗ 1(DDhistorical < 0)) are the interaction terms of variables
with the gender treatment.
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To understand the impact of proximity on the voting decision, Model (1.1) is
applied both in historical and perceptional proximity contexts. Note that through-
out the analysis, candidate A and B are set as the female and male candidates,
respectively. The results in Table 1.3 show that in the gender control group,
when candidate B (male candidate) has a closer risky option allocation histori-
cally, the voter casts a vote for him 35 percentage points more (see the estimate of
1(DDhistorical > 0) in column 1). When the gender of the candidates are revealed,
the male candidate is voted 46 percentage points more under the same condition
(see the estimate of the same variable in column 2). Consistent with the vote pro-
portions analysis in Table 1.1, this shows that historical proximity has a significant
effect on the voting decision. In order to check the effect of the gender treatment,
the interaction of Gender Treatment with the main variables is analyzed. Even
though the tendency to vote for the male candidate is 6 percentage points higher in
the treatment group, it is not significantly different between gender treatment and
control groups (see the estimate of Gender Treatment X 1(DDhistorical > 0) in
column 3). Therefore, the gender treatment does not seem to create a significant
difference in the voting decision. Both in gender treatment and control groups,
the relative distance does not have a significant effect on the voting decision in the
historical proximity context (see estimates of DD∗1(DD > 0), DD∗1(DD < 0)
and their interaction with Gender Treatment in column 3).
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Table 1.4: Model (1.1)- Perceptional proximity
Logit
(robust std. errors)
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3)
Vote for Candidate B (Male candidate) Control Treatment Overall
1(DDperceptional > 0) 0.246∗∗ 0.173∗ 0.207∗∗
(0.104) (0.090) (0.098)
DDperceptional*1(DDperceptional > 0) 0.007 0.002 0.008
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
DDperceptional*1(DDperceptional < 0) 0.003 0.014∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Gender Treatment X 1(DDperceptional > 0) -0.003
(0.110)
Gender Treatment X (DDperceptional*1(DDperceptional > 0)) -0.006
(0.007)
Gender Treatment X (DDperceptional*1(DDperceptional < 0)) 0.007
(0.005)
N 180 240 420
χ2 20.995 23.444 44.199
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
GLS Regressions for the impact of distances to the voting behavior
Gender Treatment X 1(DDperceptional > 0), Gender Treatment X (DDperceptional*1(DDperceptional > 0))
and Gender Treatment X (DDperceptional*1(DDperceptional < 0)) are the interaction terms of variables
with the gender treatment.
The results of the perceptional proximity analysis are similar to the histori-
cal proximity case. When candidate B (male candidate) is perceived as having
closer risk preferences, the voter prefers to vote for him 25 percentage points more
in the control and 17 percentage points more in the treatment group (see Table
1.4, column 1 and 2). In line with the results of the vote proportions analysis in
Table 1.2, perceptional proximity significantly affects the voting decision. As in
the historical proximity case, the tendency to vote for the male candidate is not
significantly different between the gender treatment and control groups (see the
estimate of Gender Treatment X 1(DDperceptional > 0) in column 3). Differing
from the historical results, the relative distance has a significant impact, espe-
cially in the treatment group. When the female candidate is perceived as having
a closer risk behavior, as DD increases, i.e. the perceived risk preferences of both
candidates are getting similar, the voter casts a vote for the male candidate 1.4
percentage points higher (see the estimate of DDperceptional ∗ 1(DDperceptional < 0)
in column 2). In other words, as the voter becomes indifferent between the candi-
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dates, even though the female candidate is perceived with a closer risk behavior,
voters prefer the male candidate.
The results of distribution analysis indicate that the provision of the can-
didates’ gender relaxes the proximity principle especially in favor of the male
candidate. However, the proportion and regression analyses do not show any sig-
nificant effect of the gender treatment. Therefore, there is no conclusive result for
the gender bias. The findings can be summarized as:
Result 1.1. Voters cast a vote for the candidate who exhibits similar risk pref-
erences. This result confirms the prediction of Hypothesis 1.1.
Result 1.2. Information on the gender of the candidates mitigates the proximity
concerns on the voting decision. Yet, there is no conclusive evidence for the gender
bias.
1.7.3 Conformity behavior
In the conformity treatment, the poll vote represents the true preference of the
voter over candidates. Therefore, one would expect a voter not to deviate from
her prior choice upon receiving the information on poll results. Yet, the results
on Table 1.5 present that being in the minority according to the poll results, i.e.
voted for the candidate who has a lower vote share, increases the probability to
change the prior vote by 17 percentage points.
As a deeper analysis of conformity behavior, the frequency of switches is evalu-
ated by focusing on the proximity of the candidates. The results show that 70.37%
of the switches occur from the closer candidate to the further one, where 71.05%
of those switching their vote are in the minority according to the poll results.
Thus, the minority notion has a significant influence on the voting pattern where
proximity principle becomes redundant.
In order to investigate the role of conformity on the impact of gender bias,
the direction of switches among minority voters is analyzed. 49% (20 out of 41)
of the “conformists” deviate to the male candidate. Due to the small number
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of observations and the close margin, the direction of the conformity behavior is
inconclusive.
A gender-specific tendency to the conformity behavior is also analyzed. Female
voters are 5.5 percentage points more likely to change their prior votes compared
to their male counterparts (see second column of Table 1.5). The joint effect of
Female and Minority X Female (in the third column of the same table) gives the
relative tendency of female voters to conform with respect to their male counter-
parts. Female voters who are in the minority switch their votes 8.5 percentage
points more and the difference is significant at 1% level. The results suggest
women are more likely to conform.




Dependent var: Switch Switch Switch
Gender treatment 0.006 0.004 0.001
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022)




Minority X Female 0.093*
(0.048)
Period YES YES YES
N 588 588 588
χ2 52.053 54.969 61.902
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
GLS Regressions for the analysis of the switch behavior
Average marginal effects are presented in the table.
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Dependent var: Switch Switch Switch
Difference on Poll Shares (∆share) 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Minority 0.176*** 0.068 0.073
(0.025) (0.047) (0.046)
Minority X ∆share 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
Absolute distance to the voted candidate 0.001***
(0.000)
Period YES YES YES
N 588 588 588
χ2 52.309 55.124 58.865
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
GLS Regressions for the analysis of the switch behavior
Average marginal effects are presented on the table
Additionally, the factors which potentially affect the conformity behavior are
investigated. According to the results presented in the second column of Table
1.6, any increase in the difference between the poll shares of candidates leads to
0.3 percentage points increase in probability to switch only when the subject is
in minority according to the poll results. Hence, the gap on the poll shares has
an impact only among minorities since it potentially increases the strength of
the “minority” feeling. The third column of the same table shows that a rise in
the absolute distance to the originally voted candidate causes a 0.1 percentage
point increase in the probability to switch. In other words, as the candidate
satisfies the proximity condition to a lesser extent, the voter is less willing to
commit to the prior decision.
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1.7.4 Robustness checks
1.7.4.1 Robustness of the conformity behavior
Since majority rule is applied in the election, poll results might make minority
voters feel as not pivotal on the final outcome. This casts doubt on the evidence
of the conformity behavior. In order to remove this confounder, an extension
experiment with a change in the election mechanism is designed. Rather than
majority rule, a random voter system, i.e. a randomly selected voter’s final vote,
is implemented for the leader appointment16.
Before the conformity analysis, the voting behavior in the new election mech-
anism is checked. As in the old version, the proportion of votes is higher for the
spatially closer candidate both in historical and perceptional proximity analysis
(see Table 1.7). This ensures the comparability of both versions.
Although the magnitude is smaller, conformity behavior is still significant in
the new version. Being in the minority according to poll results significantly
increases the probability to change the prior vote by 6 percentage points (see
Table 1.8). In comparison to male voters in the minority, minority female voters
are 4 percentage points more likely to change their votes. However, the difference
is not significant as in the results of the main experiment.. Therefore, the evidence
for gender difference on the tendency to conform is not clear. The findings can be
summarized as follows:
Result 1.3. Conformity behavior is a significant factor in the group voting setting.
Subjects are willing to give up some proximity in order to conform with others in
the group. This result confirms the prediction of Hypothesis 1.3.
Result 1.4. Female participants are more prone to conform. Yet, the result
depends on the election mechanism. This result partially confirms the prediction
of Hypothesis 1.4.
16Except election mechanism, the design of the main experiment is kept same for the com-
parability reasons. Note that only gender treatment version of the design is implemented in the
extension experiment. For more information, please refer to Appendix.
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Table 1.7: Voting behavior in Random Voter System
Closer Candidate
Historical Proximity Perceptional Proximity
Treatment only Treatment only
Vote Male Female Equal Male Female Equal
Male Candidate 187 74 22 118 58 20
(80.60) (26.06) (50.00) (75.16) (28.57) (50.00)
Female Candidate 45 210 22 39 145 20
(19.40) (73.94) (50.00) (24.84) (71.43) (50.00)
Number of votes for each candidate, percentages in parentheses




Dependent var: Switch Switch Switch




Minority X Female 0.078*
(0.041)
Period YES YES YES
N 560 560 560
χ2 13.891 13.902 16.617
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
GLS Regressions for the analysis of the switch behavior
Average marginal effects are presented in the table.
1.7.4.2 Inconsistent behavior
In the investment task, some of the participants exhibit some non-standard
behavior. As expected, the subjects are supposed to respond the increasing risky
multiplier with either constant or increasing risky allocations. The participants
who do not follow this pattern in the strategy method round are classified as
“inconsistent”. As a robustness check, the same analyses are held with dropping
those inconsistent observations.
The results of the analyses, in general, are robust to the exclusion of inconsistent
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observations. Since those inconsistent responses are effective especially on the
perceptional proximity analysis, I focus on those findings. Considering the vote
proportions, voters prefer the male candidate 72% when they perceive him as
having closer risk behavior, while the female candidate is voted 68% when she is
perceived to have a closer risk behavior (see Table 1.9). The gender treatment
does not significantly affect the final vote: the vote proportions in the gender
treatment and control groups are not significantly different (p= 0.785 when the
male candidate and p= 0.225 when the female candidate is perceptionally closer,
in a two-sample test of proportions).




Vote Male Female Equal distanced Male Female Equal distanced Male Female Equal distanced
Male Candidate 95 46 11 54 22 9 41 24 2
(71.97) (31.72) (45.83) (71.05) (27.50) (56.25) (73.21) (36.92) (25.00)
Female Candidate 37 99 13 22 58 7 15 41 6
(28.03) (68.28) (54.17) (28.95) (72.50) (43.75) (26.79) (63.08) (75.00)
Number of votes for each candidate, percentages in parentheses
Unlike the results with the full sample, the perceptional proximity of the can-
didate has a significant impact only on the treatment group when the inconsistent
observations are excluded (see Table 1.10). When voters perceive the male can-
didate to have a closer risk preference, they are 19 percentage points more likely
to vote for him (see column 2). In the gender treatment group, when the female
candidate is perceived to be closer, as the voter becomes more indifferent between
the candidates, she chooses the male candidate 12 percentage points more (see the
estimate of DDperceptional ∗ 1(DDperceptional < 0) in column 2). As in the general
findings, the gender treatment has no significant impact on the voting decision
(see the estimate of Gender Treatment X 1(DDperceptional > 0) in column 3).
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Dependent var: (1) (2) (3)
Vote for Candidate B (Male candidate) Control Treatment Overall
1(DDperceptional > 0) 0.200 0.192** 0.164
(0.135) (0.098) (0.118)
DDperceptional*1(DDperceptional > 0) 0.009 0.003 0.008
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
DDperceptional*1(DDperceptional < 0) 0.003 0.012** 0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Gender Treatment X 1(DDperceptional > 0) 0.054
(0.131)
Gender Treatment X (DDperceptional*1(DDperceptional > 0)) -0.006
(0.008)
Gender Treatment X (DDperceptional*1(DDperceptional < 0)) 0.008
(0.005)
N 129 172 301
χ2 14.158 20.689 34.915
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
GLS Regressions for the impact of distances to the voting behavior
Gender Treatment X 1(DDperceptional > 0), Gender Treatment X (DDperceptional*1(DDperceptional > 0))
and Gender Treatment X (DDperceptional*1(DDperceptional < 0)) are the interaction terms of variables
with the gender treatment.
1.7.5 Motivation of Conformity Behavior: Taste-based or
Social Learning
With the evidence, conformity behavior can be regarded as an important compo-
nent of the group decision-making. In the current design, this behavior can only
be motivated by a taste for conformity. However, social learning that is induced by
an election result may also lead to the conformity behavior. Under an information
asymmetry across voters, convergence to the majority may occur due to a voter
updating her belief about candidates with the poll result. For example, the voter
who has less information about the candidates (compared to the information that
other committee members have) may regard the poll result as an information of
candidates. As a result, she may change her prior vote simply due to updating
her belief of the candidates.
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To investigate the phenomenon, Imprecision treatment, which creates informa-
tion asymmetry across voters, is introduced in the extension experiment. Rather
than a single round, voters observe multiple information rounds from the individ-
ual stage. The observed number of rounds, Precision of Information 17, is varied
across voters and subjects are informed accordingly (see Figure B.12 and Figure
B.13 for the screens of subjects who receive different precision of information).
The propensity to conform is greater among the voters who receive information
with low precision: switch rates are 22% for low and 15% for high type minority
voters (see Table 1.11). However, the difference is not significant (p=0.228 accord-
ing to the test of proportions). The motivation of observed conformity behavior
in imprecision treatment might be both taste and learning. The sole effect of
learning is analyzed by comparison of conformity behavior in the conformity and
the imprecision treatments. As it is displayed in Table 1.12, the social learning is
not a significant factor on the observed conformity. Therefore, rather than belief,
preference mechanism is more likely to be dominant in conformity behavior. In
summary, the findings are:
Result 1.5. Conformity behavior is more likely to be motivated by taste than
social learning.
Table 1.11: Switch Rates among Minority with the Precision of Information
Precision of Information
Low High
Switch 20% 40% 60% 80% TOTAL (20% &40%) (60% & 80%) TOTAL
NO 36 33 48 33 150 69 81 150
(76.60) (80.49) (84.21) (86.34) (81.97) (78.41) (85.26) (81.97)
YES 11 8 9 5 33 19 14 33
(23.40) (19.51) (15.79) (13.16) (18.03) (21.59) (14.74) (18.03)
TOTAL 47 41 57 38 183 88 95 183
Number of votes for each candidate, percentages in parentheses
17Precision level refers to the number of information rounds observed by the voter. i.e. If
the precision of information is 80%, corresponding voter observes 8 out of 10 individual stage
rounds. Higher precision level means more information about both candidates. Note that four
precision levels, 20%, 40%, 60% and 80%, are employed in the design. For more information,
please refer to Appendix.
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Table 1.12: Comparison of Switching Behavior among Minority Voters in Confor-










Standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
GLS Regressions for the analysis of the switch behavior
Average marginal effects are presented in the table.
Imprecision Treatment = 1 if Imprecision treatment
0 if Conformity Treatment
1.8 Conclusion
The under-representation of women in top positions is a well-known problem.
The literature focuses more on the supply-side explanations such as
gender-based differences on individual preferences in explaining the
phenomenon. However, the leader appointment process is an important
component of the issue in investigating the demand-side of the phenomenon.
This study provides a comprehensive explanation how people vote and whether
candidate’s gender affects it, and how and with what motive the group influences
the voting decision of individuals. The design of the paper offers a novel
approach to the literature in two ways. First, the factors involved in the voting
decision are identified in a two-candidate election setting. Second, conformity
behavior is regarded as an influencing group dynamic on the voting decision.
The results suggest that voters cast their votes for the candidate who presents
similar risk preferences to their own. The information on the candidates’ gender
relaxes the proximity concerns in the voting decision. Yet, there is no conclusive
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evidence for the gender bias. Regarding the findings, conformity behavior is an
important determinant of group voting in which “minority” feeling is detected as
one of the driving factors in convergence. Although it depends on election
mechanism, there is evidence for the female being more prone to conform. As
the mechanisms that induce the conformity behavior, taste-based and social
learning motivations are investigated. Rather than learning, taste for conformity
is more likely to be dominant on conformity behavior.
Although the results do not provide conclusive evidence for the gender bias,
the role of gender information seems to influence the voting decision. Regarding
the evidence for the conformity behavior in group decision-making, the multiplier
effect of conformity is likely to be relevant in the workplaces. Policy makers and
political parties should be more careful to ensure gender bias does not affect group
decision making. A gender-blind voting with a restriction on the information
exchange in the committee would allow women to compete against men in an
unbiased environment.
Several studies highlight risk-taking as a predominantly male characteristic.
In my design, there should not be any disadvantaged group in leader appointment
since the voting decision is based on the subjective risk preferences and proximity
of the candidate on the risk domain. Yet, I cannot rule out a potential perception
of participants about risk-taking regarded as a leader characteristic. This study
clearly provides evidence for the risk-based settings.
35
Chapter 2
Self and Group Risk Preferences of
Elected Leaders: An Experimental
Approach
Abstract
Existing studies that compare the risk behavior for oneself and for others in-
dicate a shift in risk preferences, but the evidence is mixed on the direction of
this shift. Moreover, the mechanism driving this change in preferences remains
unexplored. This experimental study aims to uncover this mechanism by inves-
tigating individual and (on behalf of) group risk behavior of an elected leader. I
focus on two motivations that may cause the risk in leader’s risk preference: a
“leadership effect”, that is created by the competition, i.e. election, and the sense
of responsibility of the leadership status, and a “group concern” of the leader.
Elected leaders significantly increase their allocation to risky option when acting
on behalf of a group compared to their individual allocations. The results provide
support for both motivations, yet the concern for the group’s preference induces
a stronger effect. The perceptions of elected leaders on their competitors indicate
that leaders who believe being more risk-seeking than their unsuccessful competi-
tor take more risk when acting for the group. The leadership effect creates a small
change in risk behavior. The motivation for the shift in risk attitude seems driven
by the leadership effect among male leaders, whereas it is due to concerns about
the group’s preference among female leaders.
Keywords: Risk, Group decision-making, Leadership, Emotions, Altruism,
Gender, Lab experiments.
JEL Classification: C91, C92, D71, D81, D91.
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2.1 Introduction
A large group of friends is trying to pick a restaurant for dinner. Everyone states
their own preference according to his or her taste. In most groups, one friend
either volunteers or is delegated to take the action on behalf of the group. Does
she choose her favorite restaurant in town or favor the preferences of other group
members?
In modern society, there are various contexts similar to this case which require
individuals to take risky decisions for the well-being of others. The question of
whether the decision-maker (DM) deviates from her individual preference in such
settings has been investigated by several studies in economics and psychology. In
different experimental contexts, Chakravarty et al. (2011), Agranov et al. (2014)
and Sutter (2009b) find that subjects tend to take more risk on behalf of oth-
ers than themselves, while Charness and Jackson (2009), Reynolds et al. (2009),
Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) and Ertac and Gurdal (2012) find evidence for more
risk-aversion. Moreover, there is limited evidence for the mechanism behind this
risk shift.
The present experimental study aims to uncover this mechanism by examining
elected leaders’1 risk preferences in individual and group settings. In particular,
I focus on two potential motives which may cause a difference between self and
group risk preferences: a "leadership effect", the effect of being an elected leader,
and a "group concern" stemming from the group’s expectation from the leader.
In the former motivation, leadership effect contains the effect of two elements:
competition, i.e. election, and a sense of responsibility. Competition may trigger
a risk-seeking behavior which causes a risky-shift on the DM’s risk preference.
In contrast, leadership naturally brings a sense of responsibility which may lead
to a cautious behavior. In the latter motivation, the DM may take into account
her prediction of the group’s expectation. She may evaluate the election outcome
as a signal about the risk behavior that the group expects from the DM. As a
1Throughout the paper, the term leader refers to the decision-maker of the group.
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result, when deciding on behalf of the group, the DM may behave based on her
perception of the group’s desire.
In a setting where a group member is appointed as the DM, Ertac and Gurdal
(2012) find that subjects tend to take less risk on behalf of the group than them-
selves. If the delegation is based on a competition, would it affect the DM’s risk
behavior in a different way? Although being in a setting where the DM does not
bear the risk, Agranov et al. (2014) show that competition increases risk-taking.
Based on their finding, if the DM is delegated as a result of an election, the DM
may exhibit more risk-seeking behavior.
Similar to Ertac and Gurdal (2012), Charness and Jackson (2009) also find a
cautious shift in the DM’s risk attitude. They motivate the cautious shift with a
sense of responsibility. Therefore, the sense of responsibility coming along with
leadership position may cause DM to be more risk-averse on behalf of the group.
Following the argument of Charness and Jackson (2009), a sense of responsi-
bility may also lead to a more risk-seeking behavior if the DM believes that the
group prefers a more risk-loving leader. Daruvala (2007) and Chakravarty et al.
(2011) show that DM uses a combination of her own risk preferences with her pre-
dicted risk preference of the person or the group that is affected by DM’s decision.
This indeed indicates that the expectation of the group may be a motivation for
the DM on the group risk context.
To test these two motivations behind a potential risk shift, I conduct a lab
experiment that involves making a risky decision for the subject and on behalf of
the group which affects the payoff of all group members including herself. Across
treatments, at the election stage, I manipulate the revelation of information about
the risk preferences of candidates. The information-blind election is designed to
investigate the effect of being the "winner" of the election. In the information-
revealed election setting, the candidate information accompanied with the election
outcome provides the signal for the socially preferred risk preference in the group.
Therefore, the information-revealed election analyzes whether leaders respond to
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this information. I collect data on leaders’ perceptions of the risk preferences of
their unsuccessful competitors. The perception data is used to create a proxy for
leaders’ belief about the desired risk attitude in the group. Moreover, I check the
gender difference in the shift of risk preferences and whether motivations differ
between female and male leaders.
Consistent with the evidence provided in the literature, leaders tend to ex-
hibit different risk attitudes when making choices for themselves and on behalf of
the group. They are more risk-seeking when deciding on behalf of the group in
comparison to deciding only for themselves. The results provide support for both
motivations, yet the concern for the group’s preference induces a stronger effect.
Meeting the expectations of group members seems the main driver of the observed
behavioral change. The perceptions of elected leaders about their competitors in-
dicate that leaders who believe being more risk-seeking than their unsuccessful
competitor take more risk when acting for the group. Therefore, the change of
risk attitude seems to occur due to the other-regarding concerns of the leader
wanting to comply with the group’s desire. The leadership effect caused by com-
petition creates a small change in risk preference. Moreover, the motivation for
the shift in risk attitude is based on leadership effect among male leaders, whereas
it is driven more by other-regarding concerns for the group among female leaders.
The qualitative evidence also supports the aforementioned findings.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2.2 provides a review of the
related literature, section 2.3 explains the design and procedures of the experiment
and states the hypotheses of the study, section 2.4 presents the results and section
2.5 concludes the paper.
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2.2 Related Literature
In daily life, some settings allow or oblige a DM to reach a decision for someone
else or for a group where the DM is not a member such as policymakers, CEOs
and portfolio managers. In other contexts, the DM is part of the group and bears
the risk with other group members such as when the DM is a head of household
or a politician representing voters. Studies in both contexts consistently provide
evidence for a shift in risk behavior. However, the evidence for the direction of the
shift is mixed. In the context where the DM decides for other(s),Chakravarty et al.
(2011), Pollmann et al. (2014) and Agranov et al. (2014) find that DM taking more
risk on behalf of other(s) than herself, while Kvaløy et al. (2014) and Reynolds
et al. (2009) find evidence for more risk-aversion. In the latter context where DM
decides on behalf of other(s) as well as herself, Sutter (2009b) finds a risky shift,
whereas, Charness and Jackson (2009), Bolton and Ockenfels (2010), Ertac and
Gurdal (2012) and Pahlke et al. (2015) observe a cautious-shift. Yet, there are
very few studies exploring the mechanism behind the shift in risk behavior. This
study contributes specifically to the self-group risk behavior literature by focusing
on the mechanism behind the shift.
While Ertac and Gurdal (2012) find a cautious shift in a similar setting, the
leaders tend to become more risk-seeking when they decide on behalf of the group
in Ozdemir (2017). What may have created this difference in the direction of the
risk change? There are two main differences: the appointment mechanism of the
leader and the timing of the risk decision for the group. Ertac and Gurdal (2012)
use a setting where the leader is appointed (not elected) among the candidates who
prefer to be leaders and the leader makes the risky decision for the group before the
actual appointment. In Ozdemir (2017), on the other hand, the leader is elected
by the group from two exogenously selected candidates and makes the decision
on behalf of the group after the election outcome is announced. Therefore, being
an elected leader or an appointed leader may potentially affect the preferences for
the group in a different way. A “leadership effect” as a result of being elected may
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be a potential motive behind the observed change in a leader’s risk preference.
In an experimental study based on portfolio manager-investor setting, Agranov
et al. (2014) find that competition increases risk-taking of the portfolio manager.
They also investigate the case where portfolio manager shares the risk with the
investor. Although risk sharing substantially decreases risk-taking, it does not
reduce it completely. The evidence indicates that competition induces risk-seeking
behavior. The present study adds to this strand of the literature by studying the
effect of the election on risk behavior of the DM when she is part of the group.
Why does the competition trigger a more risk-seeking behavior? One explana-
tion may be the effect of power and emotions created by competition on the risk
behavior. In the psychology literature for power, it is presented that emotions
influence judgments and decisions which in turn affect the risk-taking behavior.
Lerner and Keltner (2001) show that emotions like happiness and anger affect
perceptions of risk and raise subjective probabilities of positive outcomes. Follow-
ing their finding, Anderson and Galinsky (2006) find that people with a higher
sense of power have more optimistic risk perceptions and powerful individuals
prefer risky behavior due to these optimistic perceptions. Anderson and Galinsky
also find that a sense of responsibility reduces the effect of power on risky be-
havior. Therefore, a psychological effect created by being an elected leader may
influence the risk perceptions and result in leaders deviating from their own risk
attitude. Yet, these studies are based on subjects’ general happiness and percep-
tions for risk, sense of power and responsibility related to their occupations in
their daily life. Although they are good proxies for the behavior of powerful indi-
viduals, they do not provide clear evidence. Emotions, rather, seem to influence
risk perceptions when there is an external shock altering the emotional state of
the individual. Also, a significant correlation between general sense of power and
risk attitudes cannot provide a clear causal inference. This paper aims to fill this
gap by satisfying these terms in the analysis of power/leadership effect on risk
behavior.
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While the psychology literature predominantly argues that power causes more
risk-seeking behavior, Ertac and Gurdal (2012) and Charness and Jackson (2009)
find a cautious shift in leader’s risk attitude. In a stag-hunt game where DM
decides on behalf of himself as well as his partner, Charness and Jackson (2009)
observe DM playing more cautiously in the pair setting than in an individual
baseline. They explain the cautious shift as a sense of the DM’s responsibility.
Similarly, Pahlke et al. (2015) provide evidence for a cautious shift under the re-
sponsibility of deciding on behalf someone else. One of the main contributions of
this paper is the investigation of responsibility effect in the presence of competi-
tion.
In the setting of Charness and Jackson (2009) where the DM does not have
information on risk preference of the person who is affected by the decision, they
define responsibility as the leader/DM making cautious decisions on behalf of
someone/a group of people in comparison to self-decision. Yet, a sense of respon-
sibility may also induce a leader to have more risk-seeking behavior if she believes
that the group expects her to do so. In a team decision-making context, Sutter
(2009b) shows a risky shift between self-team decisions where each member of
the team sequentially becomes the DM of the team. In the treatment where DM
receives non-binding messages from other team members, the DM becomes even
more risk-seeking than in the no-message case. In a similar respect, Harrison et al.
(2013) find a cautious shift when the DM has information about the group’s risk
preference, while they found no difference in self-group risk preferences in the no
information case. These findings indicate the importance of the group’s preference
in the group decision-making process. Therefore, when evaluating the difference
in self-group risk behavior, it is essential to understand the leader’s perception of
the risk preference of the group.
In the context where the DM decides for others, Daruvala (2007) and Chakravarty
et al. (2011) investigate the role of the leader’s beliefs in her choice on behalf of
the group. The results of both studies indicate that the leader/DM uses a combi-
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nation of her own risk preference and her predicted risk preference of the targeted
group. Although the choice of DM who is part of the group involves a risk for the
DM herself as well as a social risk, the factors influencing the DM’s decision may
be similar.
Moreover, economics and psychology literature consistently show women being
more risk averse in many contexts (see Croson and Gneezy (2009), Eckel and
Grossman (2008) and Charness and Gneezy (2012) for an extensive review of
gender and risk preference studies). However, the literature focusing on the gender
difference in self-other and self-group risk preferences is scarce. Ertac and Gurdal
(2012) focus on this aspect, finding that women are more risk averse both in the
individual and in the group context.
Arch (1993) argues that the gender difference in risk behavior is formed due
to different motivations between genders rather than differences in ability or ea-
gerness to perform the task well. A similar argument is valid for the differences in
self-group risk preferences: if women and men have different motivations causing a
difference in their risk behavior, then their motivations when making risk-involving
decisions for others/group may differ, too. One of the main explanations of Cro-
son and Gneezy (2009) for the gender difference in risk behavior is emotions.
Departing from Loewenstein et al. (2001) “risk as feelings” theory, they argue that
the differences in emotional reactions to risky situations may be one of the rea-
sons creating the gender differences. Following their argument, if women are more
emotionally responsive to risk conditions, their emotional reaction to risk in social
contexts may be stronger as well. Additionally, a vast majority of studies agree
on women being more other-regarding (Eckel and Grossman (1998), Andreoni
and Vesterlund (2001) and Croson and Gneezy (2009)). If this is the case, then
women may also respond more to group’s preferences. In consequence, different
motivations may lead to a difference between female and male risk behavior for
the group. The present study aims to disentangle this conjecture.
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2.3 Experimental Design
The experimental design aims to investigate the motivations that lead to a change
in risk preferences of the elected leaders. The group decision making as an elected
leader and the information availability to candidates are the treatment variables
which are applied within-subject. The control treatment in which each subject
decides for herself is used as a benchmark for detecting the behavioral change
when elected.
I employ the Gneezy and Potters (1997) risk elicitation task. Each participant
is initially endowed with 100 tokens2 to allocate between two options: a riskless
option (bond) and a risky option (stock). The risky multiplier, kt, is randomly
chosen from [1.5,3] for each round t and is applied as a common multiplier for
all subjects. The amount allocated to the risky option, X2, yields ktX2 with
probability 0.5 and 0 otherwise, whereas the riskless option secures the allocated
amount. So the expected payoff is:
E[Ut|kt] = (100−X2) + [0.5(ktX2) + 0.5(0)] ,
where kt denotes the risky multiplier, at round t, kt  [1.5, 3].
The experiment consists of two stages: the individual stage and the group
stage. The individual stage is the baseline treatment which serves as a bench-
mark for detecting the behavioral change when elected. In the individual stage,
participants perform the risk task for themselves: for randomly appointed risky
multipliers in the first 9 rounds and for a list of risky multipliers composed of 1.5,
2, 2.5 and 3 in round 10. The single risky-multiplier decision case is repeated in
order to collect data on individual risk preferences which is utilized as the “candi-
date information” in the group stage election. The strategy method is additionally
used in round 10 of the individual stage, which is referred to as the strategy method
round, for direct comparison of individual decisions of the leaders with their group
2The exchange rate is set as 1 token= ₤0.04.
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decisions and their guesses for their unsuccessful competitors.
The group stage is the part of the experiment in which all within-subject
treatments are applied. 7-person groups are randomly formed at the beginning of
each round. Stranger matching protocol is used in grouping in order to prevent
reciprocity motivations. In each round, 2 candidates, 1 Female and 1 Male, are
exogenously appointed 3. In order to guarantee that each group has at least one
female and one male member for candidacy, stratified randomization by gender
is applied in the group formation. The appointed candidates are represented
anonymously as candidate A and B. Also one of the individual stage rounds is
randomly selected as the information round. On the voting screen, the risky
option allocations of both candidates (for the corresponding risky multiplier) in
the information round is displayed (see Figure B.4 for the voting screen). With the
given information, voters cast their votes for the desired candidate. The elected
leader performs the investment task on behalf of the group. The payoff of all
group members is determined by the leader’s decision.
Additionally, all participants are asked to guess the risky option allocations
of both candidates in the strategy method round. The guess of the leader about
her unsuccessful competitor provides information about how the leader associates
risk preferences with her role and how she evaluates the election outcome in terms
of expected risk preference (see Figure B.7, B.8 and B.10 in Appendix B.3 for
guess screens of non-candidates and candidates in different treatments). Note
that guesses are monetarily incentivized. The guess is regarded as correct when it
is in the ∓3 interval of the actual allocation of the candidate. Each correct guess
for each candidate is rewarded with a 5-token bonus.
The group stage contains the main treatment manipulation: 4
• NO INFO treatment: Two candidates are exogenously appointed. While
3Note that the appointment procedure is random.
4There are five treatments in total implemented during the experiment. Due to the scope of
the paper, I only focus on aforementioned treatments. The instructions for each treatment is ex-
plained at the beginning of the corresponding period. Also, the excluded treatments were always
applied after the focused ones. Therefore, the results are not affected due to this exclusion.
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non-candidates observe the information about both candidates, candidates
observe their candidacy status and whether they are elected as a leader
without receiving any information about their competitors (see Figure B.4
and B.5 in Appendix B.3 for Non-candidate and Candidate screens in the
NO INFO treatment). The leader makes the investment decision on behalf
of the group.
• INFO treatment: The setting is the same as in the NO INFO. Unlike
in the NO INFO treatment, candidates observe the information about their
competitors’ risk preference and gender (see Figure B.4 and B.9 in Appendix
B.3 for Non-candidate and Candidate screens in the INFO treatment).
Note that to collect more data from participants, each treatment is played for 3
rounds. The payment was done based on one of the randomly chosen individ-
ual and group stage rounds. The payment scheme has implemented in order to
eliminate wealth effects.
2.3.1 Procedures
The experiment was programmed using z-Tree experimental software (Fischbacher
(2007)) and implemented at the ESSEXLAB, University of Essex, in June 2015.
The data collected from 189 subjects in total who were recruited via hroot (Bock
et al. (2014)). The participants of the study described in Ozdemir (2017) are
excluded from the recruited sample. The experiment was conducted in 9 sessions.
The sample consists of 95 female and 94 male participants, who are mostly un-
dergraduate students. Since the student population is diverse in various terms at
the University of Essex, a survey is conducted at the end of each session to collect
demographic data such as age, ethnicity, major, siblings and annual personal in-
come. Also, qualitative data is collected about the motivations of a potential risk
attitude change (refer to Appendix B.3.3 for the survey) The duration of the ses-
sions was 70 minutes, and subjects earned ₤8.10 on average, including a show-up
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fee of ₤2.505. For the purpose of increasing the comprehension level of the task,
a quiz was conducted before the experiment6 (see Appendix B.3.2).
2.3.2 Hypotheses
With the evidence provided in Ozdemir (2017), I expect participants to vote for
the candidate who exhibits similar risk behavior. For the other treatments, my
hypotheses are as following:
Hypothesis 2.1. There is a shift in risk behavior between individual and (on
behalf of) group decisions.
Based on the findings in the literature, I expect a shift in the risk behav-
ior of leaders between their individual and group decisions. Any change in the
investment decisions of leaders between their individual stage and group stage
allocations will indicate a risk shift and its direction.
Hypothesis 2.2. The risk shift is motivated by the leadership effect.
If there is any shift between individual and group decisions, the motivation
is observable with the design. Any difference between the individual stage and
the NO INFO stage allocations indicate the effect of being an elected leader.
The shift may occur in different directions by the effect of election and a sense
of responsibility. As Agranov et al. (2014) found in the self-other risk behavior
context, competition may trigger a more risk-seeking behavior which would cause
a risky-shift. On the other hand, regarding the evidence presented by Charness
and Jackson (2009) and Pahlke et al. (2015), a sense of responsibility may lead to
a cautious shift.
Hypothesis 2.3. The risk shift occurs due to the leader’s concern on meeting
the expectations of the group members.
5Earnings ranged between ₤4.10 and ₤17.40, including the show-up fee.
6The responses of subjects to quiz questions do not affect subjects’ payoffs. After their
response, subjects observed the detailed solution of each question.
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Based on the findings of Daruvala (2007) and Chakravarty et al. (2011), the
prediction about the group’s expectation may cause the shift in risk preference
of the DM. In the INFO treatment, the observed information and the election
outcome will provide the signal to the leader about the preferred risk behavior
in the group. Therefore, the change in risk attitude of the leader in the INFO
stage may arise due to a leadership effect as well as a concern about group’s
expectations from the leader. The comparison of the change in risk behavior of
the leader in the INFO and the NO INFO stages provide the sole effect of the
revealed candidate information and, therefore, the concerns of the leader about
group members’ expectations.
2.4 Results
The main focus of this paper is to determine whether the risk preferences in a
decision for self and for a group of people differ and to identify potential mecha-
nisms creating this difference. In what follows, I first analyze a potential change
in the risk attitudes of leaders and then focus on two motivations behind this
preferential change. Following the quantitative analysis, Section 2.4.3 provides a
supporting qualitative evidence for understanding the mechanism.
2.4.1 Analysis of Leaders’ Risk Attitude in Individual and
Group Stages
In order to observe a change in the risk behavior of the elected leaders, the risky
allocations are analyzed over individual and group stages. Figure 2.1 displays
the allocations to the risky option for different return levels in the individual
and the group stages. As expected, participants respond to the risky multiplier
(k) both in the individual stage and in the group stage: the amount invested
in the risky option is higher for the high multipliers. Elected leaders allocate
significantly higher amounts to the risky option in the group stage with respect
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to their individual stage allocations for each return level (p= 0.046 in k=1.5, p=
0.075 in k=2.0, p=0.114 in k=2.5 and p= 0.055 in k=3.0 in a Mann-Whitney
test). The regressions also confirm that the leaders allocate 3 tokens higher in
the group stage for each return level (see Table 2.1)7. These results are consistent
with the findings of Ozdemir (2017). The findings can be summarized as:
Result 2.1.
(a) There is a shift in risk attitudes of elected leaders. This result confirms the
prediction of Hypothesis 2.1.
(b) The elected leaders become more risk-seeking when deciding on behalf of
the group.























k=1.5 k=2.0 k=2.5 k=3.0
Individual (All) Leader (Individual stage)
Leader (Group stage)
7The regressions are also conducted with the control whether the leader has lost in a previous
election. The results are robust to the inclusion of controls.
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Risky Allocation of Leaders in Individual and Group
Stages for Different Return Levels (All Treatments)
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Risky allocation k=1.5 k=2.0 k=2.5 k=3.0
Group stage 3.443∗∗ 3.173∗∗ 2.364∗ 3.885∗∗
(1.532) (1.370) (1.211) (1.589)
Being leader more than once 3.713 4.138 6.328 6.762
(3.686) (3.519) (3.928) (4.307)
Constant 37.653∗∗∗ 46.842∗∗∗ 57.375∗∗∗ 64.578∗∗∗
(5.823) (5.551) (6.174) (6.788)
Session YES YES YES YES
N 345 345 345 345
χ2 20.096 24.320 15.518 23.070
Standard errors in parentheses
GLS Regressions for the impact of group period on riskiness
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
2.4.2 Motivation Behind the Risk Attitude Change: A Lead-
ership Effect or A Group Concern
In the current design, the observed change in risk behavior may be induced by two
factors: the leadership effect and the concern to satisfy the group’s expectation.
In order to investigate these two motives, the change in the risk behavior of leaders
is analyzed for NO INFO and INFO treatments separately.
In the NO INFO treatment analysis (see Figure 2.2), the results show that there
is no distributional shift on risky allocations at any of the return levels (p= 0.190
in k=1.5, p= 0.275 in k=2.0, p=0.671 in k=2.5 and p= 0.435 in k=3.0 in a Mann-
Whitney test). As it is displayed in Table 2.2, there is a small significant increase
in the means of the group stage allocations at k= 1.5 and k= 2.0 cases. Therefore,
the leadership effect seems to induce a small change only at low-return levels. Also,
as the results show a risky shift in leader’s risk behavior, the competition seems
to have a significant effect on the risk behavior of the leader.
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Result 2.2.
(a) The leadership effect creates a small change in the magnitude of the leaders’
risky allocations. This result confirms the prediction of Hypothesis 2.2.
(b) Competition seems to have a significant effect on the risk behavior of the
leader.
























k=1.5 k=2.0 k=2.5 k=3.0
Individual (All) Leader (Individual stage)
Leader (Group stage)
Table 2.2: Risky Allocation of Leaders in Individual and NO INFO Stages for
Different Return Levels
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Risky allocation k=1.5 k=2.0 k=2.5 k=3.0
Group stage 2.710∗ 2.555∗∗ 0.330 1.335
(1.479) (1.261) (1.042) (1.527)
Being leader more than once 3.902 6.429 5.429 9.427
(6.023) (5.348) (6.023) (6.537)
Constant 42.101∗∗∗ 49.397∗∗∗ 60.470∗∗∗ 63.221∗∗∗
(7.949) (7.051) (7.903) (8.618)
Session YES YES YES YES
N 193 193 193 193
χ2 13.312 16.863 4.669 13.381
Standard errors in parentheses
GLS Regressions for the impact of group period on riskiness
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
2.4. RESULTS 51
Moreover, the INFO treatment analysis points out an increase in risky alloca-
tions for high-return levels (see Table 2.3 and Figure 2.3). A Mann-Whitney test,
additionally, confirms that the distributions of risky allocations are significantly
different at high-return levels (p= 0.115 in k=1.5, p= 0.135 in k=2.0, p=0.098 in
k=2.5 and p= 0.061 in k=3.0).
























k=1.5 k=2.0 k=2.5 k=3.0
Individual (All) Leader (Individual stage)
Leader (Group stage)
Table 2.3: Risky Allocation of Leaders in Individual and INFO Stages for Different
Return Levels
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Risky allocation k=1.5 k=2.0 k=2.5 k=3.0
Group stage 3.571 3.033 3.796∗∗ 6.128∗∗
(2.331) (2.084) (1.888) (2.415)
Being leader more than once 2.625 4.390 7.476 9.378
(4.699) (4.998) (5.547) (5.953)
Constant 38.585∗∗∗ 48.649∗∗∗ 60.677∗∗∗ 70.946∗∗∗
(7.031) (7.414) (8.169) (8.820)
Session YES YES YES YES
N 190 190 190 190
χ2 19.431 17.726 15.117 21.039
Standard errors in parentheses
GLS Regressions for the impact of group period on riskiness
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Besides the concern for the group, the leadership effect also plays a role in
the impact created by the INFO treatment. To isolate the marginal effect of the
revealed information in the INFO treatment, the relative effect of INFO treatment
(with respect to the NO INFO treatment) on the difference between leaders’ group
and individual stage allocations is analyzed. As it is displayed in Table 2.4, the
marginal effect of the INFO treatment is significant only at k=2.5 and k=3.0 cases.
Therefore, the results imply that the observed information significantly influences
the leader’s risk attitude when the return is high.
Table 2.4: The Marginal Effect of INFO treatment on Risky Allocations of Leaders
for Different Return Levels
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Igroup − Iindividual k=1.5 k=2.0 k=2.5 k=3.0
INFO 0.129 0.227 3.412∗ 4.752∗
(2.502) (2.286) (1.964) (2.543)
Being leader more than once -2.961 -3.531 -3.488 -2.173
(2.698) (2.465) (2.117) (2.742)
Constant -3.217 -2.571 -4.069 -3.378
(4.388) (4.009) (3.443) (4.460)
Session YES YES YES YES
N 216 216 216 216
R2 0.079 0.075 0.104 0.092
Standard errors in parentheses
OLS Regressions for the marginal effect of INFO on risk behavior change
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
INFO is a dummy where, INFO= 1 if INFO treatment
0 if NO INFO treatment
2.4.2.1 The Role of Leader’s Perception on the Risk Attitude Change
In order to identify the channel through which the observed information affects the
risk attitude, one needs to examine the perception the leader has about the group’s
expectation. Here, the belief that leader has on her unsuccessful competitor’s risk
attitude serves as a good proxy. It indicates the leader’s belief in the type of risk
behavior that the group prefers from the leader. So the leader’s perception of her
competitor’s risk attitude is included in the INFO stage analysis (see Figure 2.4).
A Wilcoxon signed-rank test indicates that leaders perceive their unsuccessful
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competitors as having the same risk attitudes as themselves at the low-return
levels, and as being more risk-averse than leaders in the high-return levels (p=
0.672 in k=1.5, p= 0.760 in k=2.0, p=0.002 in k=2.5 and p= 0.007 in k=3.0).



























k=1.5 k=2.0 k=2.5 k=3.0
Individual (All) Leader (Individual stage)
Guess of Leader Leader (Group stage)
In order to understand the role of leader’s belief on his/her risk attitude with
the impact of each treatment, the following model is employed.
∆i(group, individual) = β0 + β11(Prrai ≥0) + β2Prraix1(Prrai ≥ 0) + β3Prraix1(Prrai < 0)
+ β4INFOx1(Prrai≥0)) + β5INFOx(Prraix1(Prrai ≥ 0))
+ β6INFOx(Prraix1(Prrai < 0)) + i,
(2.1)
where
∆i(group, individual) : the change in risky allocation between group stage and
individual stage for leader i where ∆i(group, individual) = Igroup,i − Iindividual,i,
Prrai : the perceived relative risk aversion of leader i with respect to her
competitor −i where Prrai = Iindividual,i −Guess−i,i,
1(Prrai≥0): the indicator for positive Prra, i.e. the leader i who believes
having similar risk behavior or being more risk-seeking than her competitor,
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Prraix1(Prrai ≥ 0): the interaction term of perceived gap in risk attitude
and the positive Prra indicator,
Prraix1(Prrai < 0): the interaction term of perceived gap in risk attitude
and the negative Prra indicator,
INFOx(1(Prrai≥0)) : the interaction term of INFO treatment with the pos-
itive Prra indicator,
INFOx(Prraix1(Prrai ≥ 0))&INFOx(Prraix1(Prrai < 0)) : the interaction
terms of INFO treatment with Prraix1(Prrai ≥ 0) & Prraix1(Prrai < 0).
Note that Prraix1(Prrai ≥ 0) (and Prraix1(Prrai < 0)) captures the impact
of the perceived risk gap with the competitor among leaders who believe being
more risk-seeking or having similar risk preference with their competitors (and
among leaders who believe being more risk-averse than their competitors). The
interaction of all variables with INFO treatment displays the marginal impact
of the observed information on the corresponding variables. Therefore besides
incorporating the leaders’ beliefs into the risk change analysis, this model also
distinguishes the marginal impact of “leadership” and the information about the
unsuccessful competitor.
The results of Model (2.1) indicate that the belief of the leader is important
on the risk shift both in information-blind and in information-revealed settings,
yet its impact on the information-revealed case is stronger (see Table 2.5). The
estimate of 1(Prra≥0) shows that, in the NO INFO case, belief type of the leader
does not have a significant effect on the change in risk behavior of the leader.
Rather, the leader’s perception of the risk gap with the unsuccessful candidate
creates a significant impact: the more risk-seeking (the more risk-averse) the
leader perceives herself compared to her competitor, the lower (the higher) the
deviation from her individual allocation (see estimates of Prrax1(Prra≥0) and
Prrax1(Prra<0))). In the INFO case, on the other hand, both belief types
and the perceived risk gap significantly affect the difference between group and
individual allocations of leaders. Consistent with the findings provided in Section
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2.4.2, the sole effect of observed information is significant only in high-return
levels. The joint effect of INFOx1(Prrai≥0) and INFOx(Prrax1(Prrai≥0))
in the high-return level case shows that the difference between the group and
individual risky allocations of leaders who believe being more risk-seeking than
their unsuccessful competitor or having same risk attitude is 4.532 tokens higher
than the leaders who perceive themselves as more risk-averse in the INFO stage8.
The effect of the leader’s perceived risk gap with the unsuccessful candidate in
the INFO stage is similar to its impact in the NO INFO stage. Therefore, leaders
seem to follow a strategy in response to their ’informed’ prediction about the
group’s preferences on a leader: they exhibit their individual risk preferences in
the lower returns, while they become more risk-seeking in the higher returns since
they believe their unsuccessful competitor is more risk-averse than themselves in
the higher returns.
Table 2.5: Model (2.1)
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3)
∆(group, individual) Overall klow khigh
1(Prra≥0) -1.749 0.167 -2.853
(1.708) (2.273) (2.353)
PrraX1(Prra ≥ 0) -0.214∗∗∗ -0.361∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗
(0.060) (0.107) (0.069)
PrraX1(Prra < 0) 0.237∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗
(0.067) (0.080) (0.107)
INFOX(1(Prra≥0)) 2.702 1.417 4.752∗∗
(1.729) (2.379) (2.181)
INFOX(PrraX1(Prra ≥ 0)) -0.196∗∗∗ -0.198 -0.219∗∗
(0.074) (0.122) (0.087)
INFOX(PrraX1(Prra < 0)) 0.167∗∗ 0.075 0.396∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.078) (0.109)
Constant 2.522 1.785 3.124
(2.725) (3.308) (3.630)
Session YES YES YES
N 864 432 432
χ2 265.345 170.549 151.394
Standard errors in parentheses
GLS Regressions for the impact of leader’s perception on risk shift
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
8Note that the observed information in the election screen and the leader’s belief about
relative risk aversion are highly correlated.
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The findings can be summarized as:
Result 2.3. The risk shift occurs due to the leader’s concern for satisfying the
group’s expectation. This result confirms the prediction of Hypothesis 2.3.
2.4.2.2 Do Motives for the Risk Behavior Change Differ for Female
and Male Leaders?
To investigate whether female and male leaders have different motives behind
the change in their risk preferences, the same analysis is conducted by restricting
the leader’s gender. As it is shown in Table 2.6 (NO INFO stage), there is an
increase in the male leaders’ risky option allocations for the low level of returns,
while female leaders do not change their risky option allocation. In the INFO
stage, on the other hand, the risky option allocations of female leaders drastically
increases in each return level while the male leaders’ allocations are not affected
(see Table 2.7). The results indicate that the change in risk attitudes on behalf
of the group is motivated by the leadership effect among male leaders, whereas
the main motivation of female leaders is to comply with the group’s expectation.
The findings can be summarized as:
Result 2.4. The risk shift is motivated by the leadership effect among male
leaders, while it is driven by the group concerns among female leaders.
Table 2.6: Risky Allocation of Female and Male Leaders in Individual and NO
INFO Stages
Dependent var: Female leader Male leader
Risky allocation k=1.5 k=2.0 k=2.5 k=3.0 k=1.5 k=2.0 k=2.5 k=3.0
Group stage 0.513 1.783 -0.018 1.023 6.036∗∗∗ 3.718∗∗ 0.845 1.782
(1.968) (1.774) (1.435) (2.058) (2.128) (1.651) (1.464) (2.265)
Being leader more than once -0.802 0.292 9.247 15.418∗∗ 10.498 14.049 7.459 7.879
(7.860) (6.151) (5.779) (6.277) (13.189) (13.143) (16.640) (18.750)
Constant 42.712∗∗∗ 47.640∗∗∗ 51.178∗∗∗ 54.166∗∗∗ 44.982∗∗∗ 56.391∗∗∗ 69.327∗∗∗ 70.234∗∗∗
(11.294) (8.853) (8.303) (9.054) (11.246) (11.150) (14.060) (15.898)
Session YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 118 118 118 118 75 75 75 75
χ2 5.220 6.068 7.192 17.458 21.130 22.977 9.116 8.341
Standard errors in parentheses
GLS Regressions for the impact of group period on riskiness
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2.7: Risky Allocation of Female and Male Leaders in Individual and INFO
Stages
Dependent var: Female leader Male leader
Risky allocation k=1.5 k=2.0 k=2.5 k=3.0 k=1.5 k=2.0 k=2.5 k=3.0
Group stage 6.183∗ 7.677∗∗ 5.639∗∗ 7.880∗∗∗ 1.351 -0.902 2.202 4.626
(3.652) (3.209) (2.790) (3.021) (2.960) (2.596) (2.576) (3.686)
Being leader more than once 4.117 7.376 9.084 9.718 -2.084 1.942 4.774 12.058
(6.984) (6.824) (6.869) (7.992) (6.243) (7.679) (9.618) (9.701)
Constant 31.557∗∗ 37.362∗∗∗ 51.858∗∗∗ 64.449∗∗∗ 43.213∗∗∗ 54.193∗∗∗ 64.910∗∗∗ 72.555∗∗∗
(14.323) (13.960) (14.012) (16.282) (7.275) (8.758) (10.873) (11.131)
Session YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 88 88 88 88 102 102 102 102
χ2 9.242 11.467 10.562 15.678 25.051 18.587 10.085 14.168
Standard errors in parentheses
GLS Regressions for the impact of group period on riskiness
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
2.4.3 Qualitative Analysis
As a supporting analysis, the motivation for the risk attitude change is also exam-
ined via survey answers. According to the survey results, being a leader influences
44% of the participants’ investment decisions. Participants are asked to explain
briefly their objectives for being affected/not being affected by the leadership
status9. The responses reveal three different types of leaders:
1. Selfish leaders: This participant type states that her investment decisions
have not been affected by their leadership status. The objective is to maxi-
mize own utility for this participant type. Subject 29, for instance, explains
it as “because I was already trying to do the best decision for myself”.
2. Other-regarding leaders: This participant type predominantly states that
their investment decisions are affected by their concerns for the group’s
expectations. As an example, Subject 51 explains it as “I was trying to
make decisions the others expected from me”. The prevalence of this type
of leader supports my findings for the motivation of risk attitude change.
3. Selfish/Other-regarding leaders: This participant type regards her status of
9For more information about the questions, please refer to question 10 and 11 in Appendix
B.3.3. Note that question 11 is a short answer question where participants write a brief expla-
nation as an answer. The rest of the questions are multiple-choice questions.
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being elected as having the desired risk attitude in the group. Therefore,
she prefers not to change her risk attitude. As an example, Subject 182’s
response is as follows: “People chose me based on my investment decisions.
Thus why should I change it?”. Although it is unclear whether this leader
type is selfish or other-regarding, she clearly makes her decision based on
the implications of the election result.
All participants are classified based on their verbal reports in question 1110. The
percentage of subjects in each type is as follows: 37.04% of the subjects are selfish,
38.10% of the subjects are other-regarding, 6.35% of the subjects are selfish/other-
regarding and 18.52% of the subjects are unclassified. The assignment is also
made by restricting the sample to the subjects who are elected as leaders: the
other-regarding type is more prevalent among female leaders (45.38% of them are
other-regarding and 40.34% of them are selfish), while the selfish type is more
common among the male leaders (43.30% of them are selfish and 30.93% of them
are other-regarding).
Table 2.8: Type of Leaders
Female Male
Type Leaders Leaders Total
Selfish 48 42 90
40.34% 43.30% 41.67%
Other-regarding 54 30 84
45.38% 30.93% 38.89%
Selfish/Other-regarding 10 6 16
8.40% 6.19% 7.41%
Unclassified 7 19 26
5.88% 19.59% 12.04%
Total 119 97 216
In order to observe whether there is a selection in terms of the prior belief
about relative risk aversion, the belief of leaders in each type is analyzed in the
NO INFO treatment. The results ensure that there is no dominant belief among
any type of leaders. In the INFO treatment, on the other hand, both selfish
10After reading the answers, I classified each participant as selfish, other-regarding,
selfish/other-regarding and unclassified.
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and other-regarding leaders believe themselves to be more risk-seeking than their
unsuccessful competitors in the high-return levels (see Table B.1 in Appendix B.1
).
In addition, I run the Model (2.1) by splitting the sample as selfish and other-
regarding leaders based on this classification (see Table B.2 in Appendix B.1).
The results show that only other-regarding leaders respond to their belief which
is formed by the observed information in the INFO stage: the other-regarding
leaders who perceive themselves as being more risk-seeking or having the same risk
attitude with their unsuccessful competitors (based on the observed information)
become more risk-seeking at the group stage.
2.5 Conclusion
In daily life, many settings require economic decisions that involve social risk
affecting the well-being of others. There is evidence for a change in risk preferences
when making a decision on behalf of a group in comparison to a decision for himself
or herself. However, the mechanism that creates this change is still unclear.
This paper is the first experimental study that provides a comprehensive anal-
ysis of the potential factors causing leaders to deviate from the individual risk
when deciding for a group. Specifically, I focus on the effect of being an elected
leader and the leader’s concern for satisfying the group’s expectation. The results
provide some interesting insights. One important finding is that leaders become
more risk-seeking when deciding on behalf of the group. This risk shift is more
likely to be motivated by the tendency of the leader to meet the expectations of
the group members than the leadership effect. Another important result is that
the female and male leaders have different motives behind this observed shift in
risk attitudes: it is motivated by the leadership effect among male leaders, while
it is driven by the group concerns among female leaders.
Although this study provides evidence for the proposed questions, a few issues
need to be addressed in order to provide a clear insight. In the INFO treatment,
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in addition to the risk information, the information of candidates’ gender is also
provided. This may confound the impact that risk information has on the risk
attitude of the leader. In order to eliminate the confounder, the INFO treatment
should be conducted without the gender information and the robustness of the
results should be checked. Additionally, I do not have information for checking
whether being the “winner” of the election affects the risk perception of the leader.
This may be relevant in explaining the effect of competition on the risk behavior.
Therefore, it would be beneficial to collect data about the leader’s risk perception
before and after the election result. In an extension study, I am planning to
address these two issues.
In the current design, the election result is not as informative about the group’s
expectation due to the two-candidate setting. In an election with multiple can-
didates, the leader may deviate in the vicinity of her own position with respect
to the other candidates. Therefore, the magnitude of the change (and possibly
the direction) in risk attitude may be different than the current results. It is
worthwhile to investigate it as a further study.
With the current setting, one of the reasons for the change in DM’s risk be-
havior seems to be other-regarding concerns of the DM. In a setting where re-
election and reputation-building are allowed, the change may be strategic as well
as other-regarding. As an extension, it will be interesting to explore the dominant
motivation in the revised design.
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Chapter 3
The Role of Verifiability and
Privacy in the Strategic Provision of
Performance Feedback: Theory and
Experimental Evidence
Abstract
We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of verifiability and privacy
in strategic performance feedback using a “one principal-two agent” context with
real effort. We confirm the theoretical prediction that information transmission
occurs only in verifiable feedback mechanisms and private-verifiable feedback is
the most informative mechanism. Yet, subjects also exhibit some behavior that
cannot be explained by our baseline model, such as telling the truth even when
this will definitely hurt them, interpreting “no feedback” more optimistically than
they should, and being influenced by feedback given to the other agent. We show
that a model with individual-specific lying costs and naive agents can account for
some, but not all, of these findings. We conclude that although agents do take
into account the principal’s strategic behavior in forming beliefs in a Bayesian
fashion, they are on average overly optimistic and interpret positive feedback to
the other agent more pessimistically than they should.
Keywords: Lab experiments, Performance feedback, Strategic communication,
Cheap talk, Disclosure, Persuasion, Multiple audiences, Lying.
JEL Classification: C72, C92, D23, D82, D83, M12, M54.
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3.1 Introduction
This paper provides a theoretical and experimental study of the role of verifiabil-
ity and privacy in the strategic communication of interim performance informa-
tion. Performance feedback (also known as performance review or performance
appraisal) is one of the most commonly used management practices. Almost ev-
ery organization, be it a major corporation, a small company, a high school, or a
hospital uses some form of performance feedback.1 Although it is considered an
indispensable part of any organization, performance feedback has also been the
object of a heated debate. Employees usually dread it and many business experts
and consultants are fierce opponents. One of the most critical voices, Samuel
Culbert, states that “[i]t’s a negative to corporate performance, an obstacle to
straight-talk relationships, and a prime cause of low morale at work.” (Culbert
(2008)).
Ideally, performance feedback gives an unbiased report on past performance
and provides guidance regarding how to improve future performance. This aspect,
i.e., accuracy or unbiased communication, has been regarded as a crucial aspect
of performance feedback. In practice, however, the accuracy of feedback may
be tainted due to various biases that arise from the evaluator’s self-interest. In
particular, supervisors may be vague in their assessments or avoid giving negative
feedback to their subordinates for strategic reasons.2 Forced ranking systems
may overcome this deficiency but they cause problems of their own, potentially
undermining employee confidence and motivation.
1One source estimates that “97.2% of U.S. companies have performance appraisals, as do
91% of companies worldwide” (see “Should Performance Reviews Be Fired?"). Also see evidence
cited in Murphy and Cleveland (1991).
2See Schraeder et al. (2007) for a summary of research in psychology, management, and or-
ganizational behavior. Culbert (2008) claims that “any critique [involved in performance review]
is as much an expression of the evaluator’s self-interests as it is a subordinate’s attributes or
imperfections.” Longenecker et al. (1987) report (interview) evidence that the main concern of
the executives in performance appraisals is not accuracy but rather to motivate and reward sub-
ordinates. Accordingly, they systematically inflate the ratings in order to increase performance.
In the Forbes article titled “Ten Biggest Mistakes Bosses Make In Performance Reviews,” the
number 1 item is ‘Too vague,’ number 2 is ‘Everything’s perfect – until it’s not and you’re
fired,’ while number 8 is ‘Not being truthful with employees about their performance’ (Jackson
(2012)).
3.1. INTRODUCTION 63
Clearly, there are various pros and cons of performance feedback along a mul-
titude of dimensions, but its effectiveness as a tool of communication seems to
be one of the most contentious aspects. In this paper we focus on precisely this
aspect. In a setting where feedback is given strategically by a supervisor, we theo-
retically and experimentally analyze how subordinates interpret the feedback they
receive in forming an opinion of themselves and whether feedback communicates
the actual performance information in a truthful manner.
In our experiment there is a supervisor (called principal) and two subordinates
(called agents) who work for (potentially) two periods. In each period agents per-
form a real effort task and succeed if their performance is greater than a randomly
determined threshold, which plays the role of chance or other unpredictable ex-
ogenous factors such as market conditions and organizational standards. The
principal, and only the principal, observes the first-period performance (i.e., suc-
cess or failure) of the agents and then decides whether and what type of feedback
to provide to the agents. The agents observe the feedback (or lack thereof), up-
date their beliefs about their likelihood of succeeding in the second period, and
choose whether to perform the task again in the second period or not.3
The agents receive monetary payoff from their performances in the two pe-
riods, while the principal receives a payoff only from the agents’ second-period
performances. In addition, the principal’s payoff depends on the minimum of the
two agents’ performances. That is, the principal obtains an extra payoff only if
both agents end up performing in the second-period task. This captures “weakest-
link” type performance settings, where it is important that every agent achieve a
certain level of performance. With such a payoff function, the principal prefers
both agents to have a high perceived likelihood of success in the second-period
task, i.e., to have high self-confidence. This also makes feedback a strategic choice:
if the first-period performance is positively correlated with second-period perfor-
mance, then the principal has an incentive to get the agents to believe that they
3More precisely, subjects state the probability with which they believe they will succeed in
the second-period task, which is elicited using a Becker-De Groot-Marschak type procedure.
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succeeded in the first period task.4
We analyze the effectiveness of performance feedback mechanisms along two
dimensions: (1) verifiability of the feedback; (2) privacy of the feedback. Our
baseline scenario is truthful private feedback, in which each agent privately and
truthfully learns whether he succeeded in the first period task or not. In the veri-
fiable feedback case, the principal has to reveal the true performance or reveal no
information at all, while in unverifiable feedback, she may lie about performance
without incurring any monetary cost. The feedback may be private, in which case
each agent receives feedback only about his own performance, or public, in which
case both agents observe the feedback on each agent’s performance. Therefore, in
addition to the baseline scenario, we have four different treatments: (1) private-
verifiable; (2) public-verifiable; (3) private-unverifiable; (4) public-unverifiable.
In reality, some performance measures are indeed objective and hence veri-
fiable, while others are subjective and unverifiable. For example, a supervisor
may have access to evaluations - by higher ranking administrators, co-workers,
customers, or students - that can be reproduced if needed. Similarly, sales or
productivity figures, customer ratings, exam grades of students, and long-term
mortality rates after surgeries are all objectively measurable and verifiable per-
formance measures. Subjective or judgmental evaluations by supervisors, on the
other hand, are by their very nature unverifiable, i.e., cheap talk. Likewise, feed-
back is sometimes provided in a private manner, as in many performance review
interviews, while in other cases it is public, as in ‘employee of the month’ types
of feedback. The question of whether feedback should be provided publicly is
especially relevant for contexts where it is important to preserve the “morale” of
all agents. Given that most organizations have some freedom in determining their
feedback mechanisms along the lines we consider, our results can have significant
4The experiment is designed so that the likelihood of success for each agent is independent
of the likelihood of success for the other agent. This implies that the performance of the
other agent is not informative about the likelihood of own success. Furthermore, feedback has
no direct payoff consequences, which lets us isolate the communication phase involved in the
feedback process from other strategic considerations.
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policy implications for firms and for educational settings.
In Section 3.4 we analyze a theoretical model and derive several predictions.
Our main prediction is that information transmission occurs only in verifiable feed-
back mechanisms and private-verifiable feedback is the most informative feedback
mechanism. Section 3.5.1 presents strong evidence in support of this prediction.
We therefore conclude that, if effective communication is the main objective, or-
ganizations should try to provide measurable and verifiable forms of feedback and
they would be better off if they do this privately.
We also find that positive and negative feedback have significant effects on
beliefs in all treatments except private-unverifiable feedback, whereas giving no
feedback has no significant effect on beliefs. Since “no feedback” must be in-
terpreted as bad news, especially in verifiable feedback mechanisms, this finding
contradicts the predictions of our model.
Our data provides evidence that when feedback is public, agents’ beliefs about
their likelihood of success are influenced by the feedback provided to the other
agent. More precisely, they become more optimistic if the other agent receives
negative feedback and less optimistic if the other agent receives positive feedback.
We further find that this effect is significant only when own feedback is positive,
and stronger for public-unverifiable than for public-verifiable feedback. Since, in
our experimental design, the other agent’s performance has no informative content
regarding own performance, these findings are also at odds with our model.
Finally, we find a positive effect of beliefs but no significant effect of feedback on
performance. In other words, performance reviews are at most a weak instrument
for boosting employee performance.
In Section 3.5.2, we analyze principals’ behavior and find that, in all the treat-
ments, some (but not all) subjects tell the truth. This goes against our prediction
that in unverifiable feedback mechanisms, principals should always provide posi-
tive feedback. Furthermore, we find that principals expect positive feedback to be
interpreted more optimistically and negative feedback more pessimistically than
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they actually are. In other words, some of them give bad news even though they
actually believe that it will be interpreted as such, which leads us to conclude that
lying imposes individual-specific costs.
In Section 3.6.1 we extend our baseline model to include individual-specific
costs of lying and naive agents. We show that it can account for most of our
empirical findings as well as some of the above discrepancies between the baseline
model and the data. In particular, the extended model predicts that all principals
will report truthfully if the agent is successful, but if the agent has failed, then
some will still report truthfully but the rest will lie if they can, or give no feedback.
Interestingly, the model also shows that in public-unverifiable feedback, it
is indeed rational for an agent who received positive feedback to be influenced
adversely by the other agent’s positive feedback. This is because, in equilibrium,
the principal provides positive feedback to, say, agent 1 and negative feedback
to agent 2 only when the outcome is success for agent 1 and failure for agent
2, whereas she provides positive feedback to both agents after all four possible
outcomes, which includes failure for agent 1. A similar effect, however, does not
exist if own feedback is negative, which is also in line with the evidence. This still
does not explain why this effect also exists in public-verifiable feedback. However,
the fact that it is stronger in public-unverifiable feedback and significant only
when own feedback is positive indicates that agents do consider the principal’s
strategy in forming their beliefs.
We address this issue in more detail in Section 3.6.2 by comparing agents’
actual post-feedback beliefs with hypothetical beliefs that a Bayesian agent would
form if he perfectly predicted the (empirical) strategy used by the principals. Our
analysis suggests that Bayesian updating plays a significant role in the formation
of beliefs, but agents are, on average, overly optimistic in responding to their own
feedback and interpret positive feedback to the other agent more pessimistically
than they should.
Overall, we conclude that private-verifiable feedback is the most informative
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mechanism while unverifiable feedback is not informative, and public feedback
interferes with the informativeness of positive feedback, especially when it is un-
verifiable.
3.2 Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study that explores,
both theoretically and experimentally, the impact of verifiability and audience
on strategic information transmission in a realistic performance feedback con-
text. Previous theoretical and experimental studies of performance feedback have
mostly focused on the effects of truthful feedback on effort decisions and future
performance. Theoretical work has generally used principal-agent models to study
optimal information revelation mechanisms under the assumption of truthful feed-
back, taking into account the effects of the feedback on agents’ actions (see, for
example, Ertac (2005), Ederer (2010), Aoyagi (2010)). The experimental litera-
ture has mostly studied the motivational effects of truthful performance feedback
in both organizational and educational settings and documented varying results.
With flat wages, the majority of papers find that provision of relative perfor-
mance feedback leads to higher effort on average, whereas evidence is more mixed
in performance-pay settings.5 Our major departure from this literature is that we
consider strategic rather than truthful feedback and focus on the communication
aspects.
Ederer and Fehr (2009) is one of the few experimental papers that study strate-
gic performance feedback. They analyze the effect of private-unverifiable feedback
on (induced) effort in a dynamic tournament with two agents. In their setting, the
principal has an incentive to underreport the true performance difference between
the agents. Hence, relative performance feedback should be completely uninfor-
mative and agents should not respond to feedback in equilibrium. In contrast,
5See, among others, Azmat and Iriberri (2010), Azmat and Iriberri (2012), Bandiera et al.
(2010), Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011), Charness et al. (2010), Eriksson et al. (2009), Gerhards
and Siemer (2014), Gill et al. (2015), and Kuhnen and Tymula (2012).
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their results show that even though agents discount the information they receive
from the principal, they still respond to it and some principals provide feedback
that is close to the truth while others consistently underreport.6
In our private-unverifiable feedback treatment, we find a similar result to Ed-
erer and Fehr (2009) in the sense that some principals tell the truth while others
lie; however, in our case, agents heavily discount such feedback, which renders it
uninformative. From a design perspective, our work is distinct from Ederer and
Fehr (2009), as well as from the other papers in this literature, along several lines:
(1) We vary treatments along the dimensions of both audience and verifiability
and study their interaction, while Ederer and Fehr (2009) study only private-
unverifiable feedback. This enables us to compare different feedback mechanisms
along dimensions that may be discretionary in organizational and educational
settings and to draw policy conclusions; (2) We study a non-tournament set-
ting where information about the other agent’s performance is irrelevant. These
two aspects of our research allow us to uncover, both theoretically and experi-
mentally, a novel finding: When feedback is public and the other agent receives
positive feedback, agents interpret their own feedback more pessimistically - ap-
parently by making inferences about the principal’s strategy. Furthermore, this
effect is stronger if feedback is unverifiable and own feedback is also positive; (3)
We measure the impact of feedback directly on beliefs, rather than effort, using an
incentive-compatible mechanism that is also robust to risk aversion. This allows us
to isolate, in a clean manner, the strategic communication aspect of performance
feedback, which is the main focus of this paper; (4) We use a real, rather than
induced, effort setting, which creates an ego-relevant environment that should
contribute to the external validity of our results.7
6In a one principal/one agent setting with unverifiable feedback and induced effort, Mohnen
and Manthei (2006) find similar results: Some principals tell the truth but deception is also
widespread. Rosaz (2012) also studies unverifiable feedback in a one principal/one agent setting,
but limits the principal’s ability to lie. She finds that the principal indeed manipulates the
feedback but the agent increases effort in response.
7This obviously has a cost in terms of control over unobservables and makes the match with
theory more difficult. Since the focus of our work is not the effect of feedback on effort, we
believe that the benefits of using real effort outweigh the costs.
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Gürtler and Harbring (2010) also study the effect of performance feedback on
effort in a tournament setting, but unlike in Ederer and Fehr (2009), feedback
is public and verifiable in their design. The theory, in this case, predicts that
agents should interpret no feedback as bad news and full revelation of relative
performance should occur. They find that although there is evidence that no
feedback is regarded as bad news, the effect on effort is not as strong as the
theory predicts.
Verifiable feedback mechanisms induce a strategic communication game that
is known as a “disclosure” (or persuasion) game in the literature, pioneered by
Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981), while unverifiable feedback mechanisms
induce what is known as a “cheap talk” game, first studied by Crawford and Sobel
(1982).8 Therefore, our paper is also related to the literature that experimentally
tests the predictions of cheap talk and disclosure games. In these strands of
the literature, Dickhaut et al. (1995) and Cai and Wang (2006) find support
for the qualitative predictions of the basic cheap talk model of Crawford and
Sobel (1982), i.e., less information is transmitted as preferences of the sender and
the receiver diverge, and Battaglini and Makarov (2010) find overall support for
the predictions of Farrell and Gibbons (1989), which extends the basic model
to the case of multiple receivers. Blume et al. (2001), Cai and Wang (2006),
and Battaglini and Makarov (2010) find evidence for over-communication, i.e., a
tendency for the senders to reveal more information than predicted by theory as
well as a tendency for the receivers to rely on the information sent by the senders.9
Drugov et al. (2013) test the two-receiver model by using five states rather than
8We discuss the relevant theoretical literature in Section 3.4.
9Cai and Wang (2006) explains this over-communication behavior using level-k behavior
and quantal response equilibrium. Using information from eye-tracking technology, Wang et al.
(2010) shows that senders look at payoffs in a way that is consistent with a level-k model.
However, over-communication that persists over rounds, as in Blume et al. (2001) is difficult
to explain by level-k reasoning. A potential explanation for over-communication on the part
of senders is “lying aversion”. Gneezy (2005) reports experimental evidence that subjects have
a tendency to tell the truth even if it is against their material interests. Gneezy et al. (2013)
study the same question using a new method and find that subjects are heterogenous with
regard to their tendency to lie. See Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Hurkens and Kartik
(2009), Sutter (2009a), Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz (2009), Abeler et al. (2012), and Fischbacher
and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) for further experimental evidence on lying aversion.
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two and, similar to our setting, also run a private communication mode. They
report evidence of a disciplining effect of public communication.10
The experimental literature on the strategic communication of verifiable in-
formation is smaller. Early work on experimental tests of disclosure games has
studied disclosure in the context of markets, where the seller is better-informed
and discloses quality to the buyer(s). Forsythe et al. (1989) find that full informa-
tion revelation is achieved, but only as subjects become more sophisticated over
repeated rounds of play. King and Wallin (1991) analyze a market setting where
the seller may or may not be informed, which is unknown to the buyers, and
find that full disclosure does not occur. Forsythe et al. (1999) find that imposing
“anti-fraud” rules that constrain message sets to include the true state improves
efficiency in comparison to cheap talk messages. More recently, Benndorf et al.
(2015) find, in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where work-
ers can reveal their productivity, that revelation takes place less frequently than
predicted in equilibrium. The experimental context and decision settings used
in these papers (e.g., asset markets, auction context) tend to include elements
that may affect behavior independently of the basic strategic considerations in
verifiable information disclosure. Jin et al. (2015) use a more direct test of the
“no news is bad news” prediction in disclosure games, and find that receivers do
not interpret no information sufficiently negatively. Hagenbach and Perez-Richet
(2015) test the predictions of Hagenbach et al. (2014) by considering payoff struc-
tures for the sender that are not necessarily monotonic in the receiver’s action,
and find that whether the game is cyclic or acyclic matters for the receivers in
forming skeptical beliefs and thereby for information transmission.
While some of our results, such as the tendency to tell the truth with unverifi-
able feedback and insufficient strategic discounting of no feedback with verifiable
feedback are also reported in the existing experimental studies of strategic com-
10See Crawford (1998) for an early survey of experimental work on strategic communication.
There is also more recent experimental work on extensions of the basic cheap talk model to
multiple dimensions and multiple senders, such as Lai et al. (2015) and Vespa and Wilson
(2015).
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munication, our work is distinct along several dimensions. First, we elicit agents’
beliefs and principal’s expectations on agents’ beliefs directly, while previous work
has studied the effect of information on other strategic choices, which may be
confounded by risk aversion or other factors specific to the decision environment.
This allows us to more clearly focus on the motives behind giving feedback and
its interpretation.11 Second, previous work has tested the predictions of cheap
talk or disclosure games usually by varying the preferences of the players, while
we take the preferences as fixed and vary both verifiability and audience. As we
have mentioned before, this allows us to study the interaction between these two
dimensions and leads to novel findings. Third, our main purpose is to test infor-
mativeness of different performance feedback mechanisms in a real-effort context,
while the previous work has either used a neutral framework to test game theoret-
ical predictions or studied other specific environments such as auctions or labor
markets.
3.3 Experimental Design
The experimental design is based on studying interim performance feedback in a
one principal-two agent real effort context. The performance feedback technology
available to the principal is the treatment variable, and we study five treatments
in a within-subject design. Therefore, the experiment consists of five periods
with each period corresponding to a different feedback mechanism, and within
each period there are two rounds. To eliminate potential wealth effects, we use
a random payment scheme, i.e., one of the ten rounds is chosen randomly and
subjects are paid according to their payoffs in the chosen round.
11This feature of the design relates the paper to the experimental literature on the effects of
noisy but non-strategic feedback on beliefs. Our finding that agents respond to feedback more
optimistically than they should is in line with and complements the findings in this literature that
subjects may process information differently and exhibit biases of asymmetry or conservatism
(in comparison to Bayesian updating) when the context is ego-relevant (Ertac (2011), Eil and
Rao (2011), Mobius et al. (2011)). However, we study feedback that is provided strategically,
which makes a difference because, as we will show, many principals indeed act strategically and
agents take that into account in updating their beliefs.
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At the start of the experiment, subjects are randomly assigned to the roles
of either “Principal” or “Agent”, and these roles do not change. In each period,
3-person groups, which consist of one principal and two agents, are formed. We
use a “strangers” matching protocol, where new groups are randomly formed at
the start of every period.
For participants in the role of agents, we use two different real-effort tasks:
an addition task and a verbal task (see Appendix C.2.1 for details). The verbal
task consists of general knowledge questions as well as verbal classification and
number-letter matching questions. The addition task involves adding four or five
two-digit numbers.
In each period, agents are randomly assigned to one of these tasks and perform
the same task in both rounds of that period. For both tasks, subjects are asked
to solve as many questions as possible within a limited time (2 mins.). At the
end of each round, the number of correct answers is compared to a “target score”,
randomly determined for that specific period.12 The same target score is employed
in both rounds of the period. If a subject’s score is greater than or equal to
the target score, the subject is “successful”, and has failed otherwise. Note that
the target score is subject-specific and there is no common shock applied to the
performance of subjects.
3.3.1 Belief elicitation
To elicit self-confidence, we use a crossover mechanism developed independently
by Karni (2009) and Mobius et al. (2011), which is a Becker-De Groot-Marschak-
type procedure for eliciting beliefs truthfully and independently of risk preferences.
In this mechanism, subjects are presented with two alternative lotteries to deter-
mine their second-round payoff. In the performance-based lottery, the reward
is based on the agent’s second-round performance. That is, the agent receives
12The target score is a number which is randomly chosen from the interval [4,13] at the
beginning of each period. The range of the target score was determined based on data from a
pilot session.
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the reward if his outcome is “successful” in the second-round performance stage.
In the chance-based lottery, the agent earns the reward with probability X, re-
gardless of his second-round performance. At the end of the first performance
round, subjects are asked to report the minimum probability of winning in the
chance-based lottery that would make them willing to choose the chance-based
lottery as opposed to the performance-based one. The computer then draws X
randomly. If the randomly drawn X is at least as large as the agent’s stated min-
imum, the chance lottery applies. Otherwise, the agent is rewarded based on his
second-round performance. This mechanism gives agents an incentive to truth-
fully report the subjective probability with which they think they will succeed in
the second round. In order to study the within-person effect of performance feed-
back on beliefs, we ask the subjects to make this decision twice: once before and
once after receiving feedback. To maintain incentive compatibility, we randomly
choose either the pre-feedback or post-feedback beliefs to determine whether the
performance or chance mechanism will be implemented.
The timeline of a period for agents is as follows:
1. Pre-feedback performance: Subjects perform the assigned task within 2 min-
utes.
2. Pre-feedback beliefs: Without receiving any information, subjects state the
minimum probability of winning that would induce them to leave their
second-round payoff to chance.
3. Feedback: Feedback is received, in the form of a message whose content
changes between treatments, as will be explained in Section 3.3.2.
4. Post-feedback beliefs: After seeing the message (or no message), subjects
are allowed to update their previously reported beliefs. (At this stage, the
subjects can see their previously reported beliefs on the screen.)
5. Performance/chance mechanism: If the self-reported probability of winning
(either pre- or post-feedback, depending on which was selected) is higher
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than the probability of winning in the chance mechanism (drawn by the
computer), then the subject performs the same type of task for two minutes
again, as in the first round. Otherwise, they do not perform the task, and
their second-round payoff is determined by chance, according to the winning
probability drawn by the computer.
3.3.2 Feedback mechanism
Note that after the first round, agents do not have exact knowledge of whether
they were successful, although they will have subjective beliefs. Principals, on
the other hand, observe the true first-round outcomes (success or failure) of the
two agents they have been matched with. After stating their priors, agents may
receive a message about whether they were successful in the first round. There are
five types of feedback mechanisms used throughout the experiment, which differ
in the provider, audience, and content of the feedback. In terms of content, we
have the following types:
1. Truthful feedback: In this mechanism, subjects receive an accurate message
(success or failure) from the computer. This is the baseline mechanism in
our design.
2. Verifiable feedback: In this mechanism, performance feedback is reported by
the principal. The principal can choose either to transmit the true outcome
(success or failure), or to withhold the information. Sent messages always
have to be correct, and agents know that there can be no deception.
3. Unverifiable feedback (cheap talk): As in the verifiable mechanism, the feed-
back comes from the principal, but she does not have to report the actual
outcome, i.e., she can lie. In addition, she has an option to send no message.
Within the verifiable and unverifiable mechanisms, we also employ two different
feedback types that differ in the audience of the messages:
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1. Private feedback: In this mechanism, the principal reports the feedback
independently and privately to the agents, and agents only see the message
targeted to them.
2. Public feedback: In this mechanism, the principal has to announce the feed-
back publicly. That is, each agent observes the other agent’s message, in
addition to his own.
This design leaves us with five different feedback treatments, which are imple-
mented within-subject: truthful feedback, private-verifiable feedback, public-verifiable
feedback, private-unverifiable feedback, and public-unverifiable feedback. In the
public-verifiable case, the principal has to decide either to release the truthful out-
come to both of the agents publicly, or to withhold the information. On the other
hand, in the public-unverifiable case, the feedback for each agent is chosen sepa-
rately from the three options explained above (success, failure or no information)
and the messages for both agents are delivered publicly to all.
Finally, in order to get a better insight into the feedback strategy employed
by the principals, they are asked to guess agents’ post-feedback beliefs.
3.3.3 Payoffs
The payoffs of participants in the role of agents depend on their performance
outcomes as well as their decisions. To incentivize performance in the first round,
we use differential rewards based on a performance target: 300 ECU (experimental
currency unit), if the agent succeeds, and 100 ECU, if he fails. (1 ECU = 0.06
Turkish Liras (TL).)
In the second round, if the agent ends up doing the task, his payoff depends
on whether he succeeds or fails, exactly as in the first round. If, however, the
agent ends up with the chance mechanism, then his second-round earnings are
300 ECU with probability X, and 100 ECU with probability (1−X), where X is
the randomly chosen probability of winning.
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The principal’s payoff, on the other hand, depends on the second-round entry
behavior and performance outcomes of the two agents. For the principal, we use
a payoff function in which the performances of the two agents are complements.
Specifically, the payoff function is:
Vt =

100, t = 2n− 1
50 + 10(g1t + g2t) + min{q1t, q2t}, t = 2n
where n ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is the period number, qit is the return from the second-
round performance of agent i in period t, and git is an indicator variable that takes
the value of 1 if the principal’s guess in period t for agent i is correct, i.e., in the
± 5 interval of agent’s actual belief, 0 otherwise. Return from the performance of
agent i in period t is equal to
qit(cit, eit) =

20 ∗ cit, eit = 1
0, eit = 0
where cit denotes the number of correct answers of agent i in period t, while eit
represents the entry of agent i to the performance stage (as opposed to taking
the chance mechanism). In the first round the principal’s payoff is a constant
amount, 100 ECU. The second-round payoff is composed of three elements: a
constant amount, 50 ECU, an extra 10 ECU for each correct guess about the
agents’ beliefs, and the minimum of the returns from both agents. As can be
seen from the above payoff function, for the principal to earn an extra return over
the fixed endowment, both agents must end up doing the task. This, together
with complementarity, implies that the principal should aim to (1) convince both
agents that they are likely to succeed in the second round task, and (2) maximize
the post-feedback performance of the worst-performing agent in the second round.
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3.3.4 Procedures
The experiment was programmed using the z-Tree experimental software (Fis-
chbacher (2007)), and implemented at the Koç University and Bilgi University
computer labs in the Spring term of 2013. We collected data from 132 subjects
in total (72 subjects from Koç University and 60 subjects from Bilgi University).
The experiment was conducted in 13 sessions, with 8 sessions at Koç University
and 5 sessions at Bilgi University. Our sample consists of 68 male and 64 female
participants, who are mostly undergraduates. At the end of each session, we con-
ducted a survey to collect demographic data such as age, gender, major and GPA
(see Appendix C.2.3). In order to mitigate potential order effects, we used 6 dif-
ferent configurations that differ in the sequence of treatments.13 Sessions lasted
about 50 minutes, and subjects earned between 15 TL and 28 TL (on average
20.23 TL), including a show-up fee.
3.4 Theory and Predictions
In this section we will analyze a stylized model of our experimental design and
derive theoretical predictions that will form the basis for the empirical analysis in
Section 3.5. There are two agents, indexed by i = 1, 2, and a principal, denoted
by P . For each agent i, a state of the world θi is realized and observed only
by the principal. In our experimental design, this state corresponds to either
“success” or “failure”, denoted by s and f , respectively. We assume that states are
independently distributed across agents and the probability of success for agent i
is equal to pi ∈ (0, 1). We will also assume for simplicity of exposition that s and
f are real numbers with s > f .
After observing (θ1, θ2), the principal provides feedback to the agents. As
we have explained in Section 3.3, this feedback might be verifiable, in which
case, the principal cannot lie but still choose to give no information, or might be
13The configurations were as follows: TVU, TUV, VUT, UVT, VTU and UTV, where T, V
and U correspond to Truthful, Verifiable and Unverifiable feedback mechanisms, respectively.
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unverifiable, i.e., might be cheap talk, in which case the principal can lie about the
actual state of the world or provide no information. Feedback is either private, in
which case the principal provides feedback on θi to each agent i independently and
privately, or public, in which case both agents observe the common feedback about
(θ1, θ2). After receiving feedback, each agent independently chooses an action and
the game ends. In our experimental design, this action corresponds to the choice
made by the agent in the belief elicitation round. As we have explained before,
our belief elicitation mechanism is designed so that it is optimal for each agent
to choose the probability with which he believes that he will be successful in the
second-round task.
Payoff function of agent i is given by ui(ai, θi), where ai ∈ Ai is the action
choice of agent i and Ai is a compact and convex set of real numbers. Prin-
cipal’s payoff function is v(a, θ), where a = (a1, a2) and θ = (θ1, θ2). We as-
sume that players are expected payoff maximizers. If agent i believes that he
is successful, i.e., θi = s, with probability µi, his expected payoff is equal to
Ui(ai, µi) = µiui(ai, s) + (1 − µi)ui(ai, f). We assume that, for each µi ∈ [0, 1]
there is a unique maximizer of U(ai, µi), denoted a∗i (µi), which is in the interior
of Ai and strictly increasing in µi. From now on, whenever we say that agent i
has high beliefs we mean that µi is high.
We also assume that the principal’s payoff function is strictly increasing in ai,
i = 1, 2. This makes feedback a strategically important choice for the principal
because she has an incentive to induce a high belief by each agent. This, of course,
may render her feedback unreliable in equilibrium and the extent to which this
happens may depend on the feedback technology itself, i.e., whether the feedback
is private or public and verifiable or not. The main theoretical issue we deal with
in this section is the informativeness of the feedback provided by the principal in
these different cases.
Denote the set of states as Θ = {f, s} and the set of messages that can be
potentially sent by the principal asM = {f, s, ∅}, where ∅ denotes no information.
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Let M (θ) be the set of messages that are feasible when the state is θ = (θ1, θ2).
The following describes the set of strategies available to the principal under dif-
ferent treatments:
1. Private Feedback: A pure strategy of the principal is a pair of functions
ρ = (ρ1, ρ2), where ρi : Θ2 → Mi(θ). If feedback is unverifiable, then
Mi (θ) = M , i.e., there are no restrictions on the feasible messages. If
feedback is verifiable, then Mi (θ) = {θi, ∅}, i.e., principal either tells the
truth or provides no information to an agent.
2. Public Feedback: A pure strategy of the principal is a function ρ : Θ →
M (θ). If feedback is unverifiable, then M (θ) = M2, i.e., there are no
restrictions on the feasible messages. If feedback is verifiable, then M (θ) =
{θ, ∅}, i.e., principal either tells the truth or provides no information to both
agents.
After observing feedback r, agent i forms beliefs on the state of the world µi(r) ∈
[0, 1]2 and chooses an action αi(r) ∈ Ai. Let µii denote the probability that agent
i’s beliefs put on the event θi = s and µ−ii the probability on θ−i = s. Let
µ = (µ1, µ2) and α = (α1, α2) denote, respectively, an agent belief profile and
strategy profile. An assessment is composed of a strategy for each player and
beliefs by the agents: (ρ, α, µ).
An assessment is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) if strategies are opti-
mal given beliefs and beliefs are formed by using Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
In what follows we will analyze the set of pure strategy perfect Bayesian equi-
libria of each extensive form game defined by one of the four possible feedback
mechanisms: (1) private-verifiable; (2) public-verifiable; (3) private-unverifiable;
(4) public-unverifiable.
A verifiable feedback mechanism induces a game of strategic communication
known as a “disclosure game”, pioneered by Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981),
while an unverifiable feedback mechanism induces a “cheap talk game”, introduced
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by Crawford and Sobel (1982). These basic models and the main results have
been later generalized and extended in several directions.14 Most relevant for
us are Farrell and Gibbons (1989) and Koessler (2008), both of which consider
a two-receiver, two-state, and two-action model and analyze public and private
communication. Farrell and Gibbons (1989) consider only the cheap talk case,
while Koessler (2008) extends it to verifiable messages. Our model differs from
theirs in that the state is multidimensional (which is formally equivalent to four
states) and there is a continuum of actions. None of our results on public feedback
follows directly from the analyses in these two papers, but the reasoning behind
the existence of partially informative equilibrium in public-verifiable feedback is
similar to the case of the mutual subversion in Koessler (2008), and the partially
informative equilibrium in public-unverifiable feedback resembles the mutual dis-
cipline case in Farrell and Gibbons (1989).15
3.4.1 Verifiable Feedback
Each agent has (or updates) his beliefs regarding the other agent’s type as well
as his own type. However, since types are independent and only own type affects
payoffs, what matters strategically is only beliefs on own type. Accordingly, we
say that an equilibrium is fully informative if each agent can infer his type from
the principal’s report and completely uninformative if agents learn nothing about
their own type.
Our first result shows that if feedback is verifiable, then agents receive perfect
information about their own types.
Proposition 1. If feedback is private and verifiable, then all equilibria are fully
informative.
14For the literature on disclosure games see Seidmann and Winter (1997), Mathis (2008),
Giovannoni and Seidmann (2007), and Hagenbach et al. (2014). The basic cheap talk model in
Crawford and Sobel (1982) has also been extended in many directions. See Sobel (2013) for a
recent survey of this large literature.
15We should also mention Goltsman and Pavlov (2011), which generalizes Crawford and Sobel
(1982) to the case of two receivers with different preferences and compares public with private
feedback. Again, our model’s state space and payoff structure are different in a way that makes
direct application of their results impossible.
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Proof. All proofs are relegated to Appendix C.1.
Proof of Proposition 1 is very easy. If feedback is verifiable and the principal
learns that an agent is successful, then she can simply send the message that he
is successful and induce the best beliefs and the highest action on the part of
that agent. Since feedback is verifiable, the other type of the principal, i.e., the
type who observed that the agent has failed cannot mimic this feedback. This
full revelation result is well known in the literature and follows from two aspects
of our model: (1) every type has a message that only that type can send; (2) the
principal’s payoff is monotonic in each agent’s beliefs.
In public feedback, the principal cannot change her reporting strategy regard-
ing one agent’s performance without the other agent observing this change. This
creates the main difference between private and public feedback for equilibrium
analysis. Indeed, if feedback is public and verifiable, then full information revela-
tion is an equilibrium but, in contrast to private feedback, there is also a partially
informative equilibrium.
Proposition 2. If feedback is public and verifiable, then in equilibrium there is
either full information revelation or ρ(s, s) = (s, s) and ρ(θ) = ∅ for all θ 6= (s, s).
It is easy to construct a fully revealing equilibrium by specifying strategies
ρ(θ) = θ for all θ and beliefs as µi(∅) = 0 for i = 1, 2. The following example
shows that there is also a partially informative equilibrium.16
Example 1. Let s = 7, f = 1, pi = 1/2, and payoff functions be ui(ai, θi) =
θiai − 12a2i and v(a, θ) = a1a2w (min{θ1, θ2}), where w is a strictly increasing
function with w(1) > 0. It can be shown that the following assessment is an
equilibrium: ρ(s, s) = (s, s), ρ(θ) = ∅ for all θ 6= (s, s), µii(θ) = 1 if θi = s and
µii(θ) = 0 otherwise, µii(∅) = 1/3, αi(θ) = θi, αi(∅) = 3. What makes this example
work is the form of the principal’s payoff function, which is similar to the one in
16Results in Milgrom (1981) and Seidmann and Winter (1997) imply that there is an equi-
librium with full information revelation in our game. However, their uniqueness result does not
apply to the public feedback case because the action and the type spaces are multidimensional.
In fact, the example shows that there is an equilibrium with less than full information revelation.
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our experiment and has the property that intermediate beliefs by both agents is
better for the principal than extreme beliefs. It is easy to show that this property
exists as long as principal’s payoff function is symmetric, concave, and strictly
supermodular in a.17
The above results and Bayes’ rule imply the following prediction:
Prediction 1. In verifiable feedback:
1. Beliefs increase conditional on success and decrease conditional on failure;
2. Beliefs increase after positive feedback and decrease after negative or no
feedback;
3. Beliefs do not depend on the feedback provided to the other agent;
4. If feedback is private, the principal reports truthfully to the agent who
succeeds and either reports truthfully or gives no feedback to the agent who
fails. If feedback is public, principal reports truthfully if both agents succeed
and either reports truthfully or gives no feedback if one of the agents fails.
3.4.2 Unverifiable Feedback
If feedback is unverifiable and private, then there is no information transmission
in equilibrium.
Proposition 3. If feedback is private and unverifiable, then all equilibria are
completely uninformative.
Proof of this result is also simple. If some message induces higher beliefs for
some agent, then all types of the principal would have an incentive to send that
message, contradicting the hypothesis that this message induces higher beliefs.
This again simply follows from the fact that principal’s payoff is monotonic in
each agent’s beliefs.
17We should note that the partially informative equilibrium constructed in the example de-
pends on the common knowledge assumption on pi, which may not be satisfied in the experi-
ments. We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out.
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If feedback is public, then there is always a completely uninformative equilib-
rium and never a fully informative equilibrium. Furthermore, in any equilibrium,
types (s, s) and (f, f) must always give the same feedback.
Proposition 4. If feedback is public and unverifiable, then there is a completely
uninformative equilibrium. In any equilibrium ρ(s, s) = ρ(f, f) and hence fully
informative equilibrium does not exist.
Therefore, equilibrium is at most partially informative and whether feedback
provides any information at all, depends on the payoff function of the principal.
For instance, in Example 1 all equilibria are completely uninformative. Since
principal’s payoff function in that example is similar to the one in the experiment,
we expect feedback to be uninformative in the experiment as well.
Since messages have no intrinsic meaning and are completely costless in our
model, there is no precise prediction regarding the principal’s strategy and agents’
beliefs after feedback. However, in our experiment, as well as in real life, reports
have a natural meaning and hence it is plausible to expect that a principal who
observes success always reports success. This implies that, in equilibrium, the
principal who observes failure must also report success. Therefore, we have the
following prediction:
Prediction 2. In unverifiable feedback:
1. Beliefs do not change conditional on actual state;
2. Beliefs do not change in response to positive feedback and decrease or stay
the same after negative or no feedback;
3. Principal always provides positive feedback.
The above analysis also implies the following prediction:
Prediction 3. Private-verifiable feedback is the most informative mechanism and
private-unverifiable feedback is not informative.
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3.5 Results
The main focus of our study is whether performance feedback is informative and
whether this depends on the verifiability and privacy of the feedback. Section 3.5.1
mainly presents our results on this issue. Our model also produces theoretical pre-
dictions regarding the principal’s behavior in different treatments. We therefore
present a summary of the principals’ behavior in Section 3.5.2 and discuss how it
fits with the theoretical predictions.
3.5.1 Analysis of Agents’ Behavior
We start with some summary statistics about task performance. On average (in
both rounds), subjects attempted to solve 8.79 questions in the addition task and
10.47 questions in the verbal task, and correctly solved 7.08 and 7.82 questions,
respectively. The answers to a survey question that asks whether it is important
for subjects to succeed independently of its monetary payoff reveal that a majority
of subjects do care about success per se.18 This shows that we have managed to
create an ego-relevant performance environment for subjects in our experiment,
which is important for analyzing belief updating in a realistic fashion.
We first examine the initial (pre-feedback) beliefs of the subjects who have been
assigned the role of an agent. Pre-feedback beliefs show that most agents prefer
to perform in the second round: Average belief is 0.66 while the median is 0.7.
In other words, on average, they believe that they will succeed with probability
0.66 if they were to perform the task. Since only 51% of the subjects successfully
pass the target score upon entry, we conclude that participants overestimate their
performance, i.e., they are overconfident. This is consistent with results from
other real-effort experiments in the literature (e.g., Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005)),
and highlights the benefit of using real effort, because in reality, overconfidence
or self-serving biases may influence how agents interpret feedback given by the
18The mean assessment of subjects is 3.73 on a 1-5 scale and 75.84% of them choose either




We start by analyzing how beliefs change conditional on the actual performance
outcome of the agent. If there is information transmission, then beliefs should
move up for successful agents and down for unsuccessful ones. Figure 3.1 shows
that there is information transmission in verifiable feedback and no information
transmission in unverifiable feedback cases. Wilcoxon sign-rank tests indicate
that the actual outcome has a significant effect on agents’ beliefs in truthful and
verifiable feedback treatments, while it has no significant impact in unverifiable
feedback treatments.20

































Change in Beliefs with Actual Outcome
Success Failure
19In order to ensure that there is no selection bias, we test whether prior beliefs are indepen-
dent of treatments and order configurations, and find no significant differences. Neither do we
find differences in the prior beliefs of Bilgi and Koç University students. Related regressions are
available upon request
20The p-values of Wilcoxon signed rank test for the hypothesis of a zero change in beliefs in
each treatment is as follows: Truthful with p = 0.0002, private-verifiable with p = 0.0004, public-
verifiable with p = 0.013, private-unverifiable with p = 0.110, public-unverifiable with p = 0.787
for success; truthful with p = 0.0002, private-verifiable with p = 0.023, public-verifiable with
p = 0.017, private-unverifiable with p = 0.696, public-unverifiable with p = 0.148 for failure
cases.
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Likewise, regression analysis shows that private-verifiable feedback is not sig-
nificantly different from truthful feedback under either success or failure, while
public-verifiable feedback is significantly different from truthful feedback only un-
der success (and only at the 10% level). In contrast, both types of unverifiable
feedback lead to a change in beliefs that is further away from the effect of truthful
feedback (see Table 3.1).21
Table 3.1: Information Transmission in Different Treatments
Dependent var: (1) (2)












GLS Regressions, standard errors in parentheses
Baseline is truthful feedback
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Finally, Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 show that private-verifiable feedback is the
closest mechanism to truthful feedback.
We can summarize our findings as follows:
Result 3.1. Verifiable feedback is informative while unverifiable feedback is not.
Private-verifible feedback is the most informative mechanism. These results con-
firm Predictions 1.1, 2.1, and 3.
21Note that we collect data over different rounds from the same subject in all of the treat-
ments. Thus, to account for correlation, we use random effects model in regressions that use
multiple observations from the same subject.
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3.5.1.2 Impact of Feedback on Beliefs
Figure 3.2 and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests show that both positive and negative
feedback have significant (positive and negative, respectively) effects on beliefs in
all treatments except the private-unverifiable feedback treatment.22 On the other
hand, the change in beliefs after no feedback is not significantly different from
zero in any of the treatments.23







































Change in Beliefs after Feedback
Positive feedback Negative feedback
No feedback
The regressions in Table 3.2 further explore the differences in the impact of
feedback on beliefs across treatments. The table shows that in terms of direction,
agents tend to discount the principal’s feedback in all the treatments: positive
feedback is interpreted less optimistically than truthful positive feedback and neg-
ative feedback less pessimistically. However, in response to positive feedback, the
change in beliefs under private-verifiable feedback is not significantly different from
that under truthful feedback, while all the other treatments induce significantly
22The p-values of Wilcoxon signed rank test for each treatment are as follows: Truthful with
p = 0.0002 and p = 0.0002, private-verifiable with p = 0.0002 and p = 0.047, public-verifiable
with p = 0.002 and p = 0.003, public-unverifiable with p = 0.005 and p = 0.090, private-
unverifiable with p = 0.236 and p = 0.487, for positive and negative feedback cases respectively.
23The p-values of Wilcoxon signed rank test for each treatment are p = 0.211, p =
0.980, p = 0.674, p = 0.710, for private-verifiable, public-verifiable, private-unverifiable, and
public-unverifiable, respectively.
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lower beliefs than truthful positive feedback (see column (1)).24 When subjects
receive negative feedback, none of the treatments, except private-unverifiable feed-
back, is different from truthful feedback. Under no feedback, on the other hand,
we find that there is no significant difference across treatments.
Table 3.2: Impact of Feedback on Beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change in belief Change in belief Change in belief Change in belief Change in belief
(Positive feedback) (Negative Feedback) (No Feedback) (Own positive feedback) (Own negative feedback)
Private-Verifiable -2.318 2.391 -1.079 -0.759 2.926
(2.945) (5.519) (4.408) (2.842) (5.460)
Private-Unverifiable -9.383∗∗∗ 12.224∗∗ -0.449 -7.697∗∗∗ 12.116∗∗
(2.599) (5.552) (5.828) (2.479) (5.445)





Other positive feedback -6.090∗ -2.029
(3.565) (5.992)
Other negative feedback -1.170 7.033
(3.524) (7.129)
Public-Unverifiable
Other positive feedback -6.909∗∗ -5.040
(3.143) (8.665)
Other negative feedback 3.376 12.992
(5.078) (9.353)
Session YES YES YES YES YES
N 207 149 91 207 149
χ2 21.788 15.753 . 23.927 18.988
Standard errors in parentheses
GLS Regressions for Different Feedback Mechanisms
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
We can summarize our findings as follows:
Result 3.2. In all feedback mechanisms positive feedback increases and negative
feedback decreases beliefs, but in private-unverifiable feedback these changes are
insignificant. In all mechanisms, no feedback leads to only insignificant changes
in beliefs. Predictions 1.2 and 2.2 are confirmed except that no feedback does
not decrease beliefs in verifiable feedback and positive feedback increases beliefs
in public-unverifiable feedback.
24Note, however, that the coefficient of public-verifiable feedback is only marginally signifi-
cant.
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Change in Beliefs in Public− Verifiable Feedback


































by own and other´s feedback
Change in Beliefs in Public− Unverifiable Feedback
Positive feedback Negative feedback
No feedback
The above findings suggest that public feedback can have quite different effects
than private feedback. To explore this further, we look at whether beliefs are af-
fected by the feedback provided to the other agent in public feedback treatments.
Figures 3.3a and 3.3b show, for each type of own feedback received, whether be-
liefs respond to the other person’s feedback in verifiable and unverifiable cases,
respectively. We can see that in both treatments beliefs are affected adversely
when the other agent has received positive feedback as opposed to negative feed-
back. Secondly, the magnitude of this effect is larger under unverifiable feedback
than under verifiable feedback.
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 3.2 test whether, in public feedback treatments,
the other agent’s feedback makes a difference in belief updating, when own feed-
back is positive and negative, respectively. The results support the conclusions we
have drawn from Figure 3.3 and further show that the adverse effect of the other
agent’s positive feedback is significant only if own feedback is positive as well and
that the effect is significant only at the 10% level in public-verifiable feedback.
Column (4) of Table 3.2 also shows that the less optimistic response to verifiable
positive feedback, i.e., the negative coefficient of public-verifiable feedback in col-
umn (1), comes from observations where own positive feedback is accompanied
with positive feedback to the other agent.25
25These results are robust to taking the dependent variable to be the posterior beliefs and
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Therefore, we conclude that:
Result 3.3. In public feedback, beliefs are affected adversely when the other
agent also receives positive feedback. This effect is stronger if own feedback is
also positive and larger under unverifiable feedback. Therefore, Prediction 1.3 is
rejected.
3.5.1.3 Impact of Beliefs and Feedback on Performance
Although it is not the focus of our study, we also examine how beliefs and feedback
affect second-round performance. Note that in our experiment, only the agents
whose posterior beliefs are larger than a randomly determined threshold perform
in the second round and the rest simply receive a randomly determined payoff. In
order to minimize ability-based selection and to be able to observe the effect of
beliefs on the second-round performance for a relatively unbiased set of subjects,
the random device in the belief elicitation mechanism was skewed toward inducing
subjects to enter.26 Consequently, 87% of the subjects performed in the second
round. Table 3.3 shows that, controlling for the first round performance, higher
beliefs lead to higher second-round performance, and hence the principal has an
additional incentive to induce higher beliefs. We also checked the impact of feed-
back on performance, both overall and in each treatment separately, and found
no significant effect. (These results are available upon request.) Overall, although
our experiment is not designed to analyze this issue, we have the following result.
Result 3.4. Inducing higher beliefs increases performance but interim perfor-
mance feedback is not an effective tool in this respect.
controlling for the prior beliefs as a regressor.
26Note that this does not affect the incentive compatibility of the mechanism.
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GLS regressions, standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
3.5.2 Analysis of Principals’ Behavior
We now turn to explore the principals’ side. We first categorize the messages
sent by the principals under different feedback mechanisms, depending on the
actual outcome (Table 3.4). As expected, if the actual outcome is success and the
principal can privately convey it, a positive message is transmitted in almost all
cases, both verifiable (97%) and unverifiable (94%). The percentage of positive
messages under public feedback when the actual outcome is success is somewhat
lower (82% in verifiable and 85% in unverifiable). This difference between private
and public reporting is statistically significant only in the verifiable case (p =
0.045 in verifiable and p = 0.265 in unverifiable feedback, according to a test of
proportions).
92 CHAPTER 3
Table 3.4: Feedback to Individual Agents under Different Treatments
Private-Verifiable Public-Verifiable Private-Unverifiable Public-Unverifiable
(message) (message) (message) (message)
Actual Info No Info Total Info No Info Total S F No Total S F No Total
S 31 1 32 31 7 38 30 0 2 32 29 2 3 34
(96.88) (3.13) (39.02) (81.58) (18.42) (46.34) (93.75) (0.00) (6.25) (39.02) (85.29) (5.88) (8.82) (45.95)
F 22 28 50 25 19 44 27 17 6 50 15 10 15 40
(44.00) (56.00) (60.98) (56.82) (43.18) (53.66) (54.00) (34.00) (12.00) (60.98) (37.50) (25.00) (37.50) (54.05)
Total 53 29 56 26 57 17 8 44 12 18
(64.63) (35.37) (68.29) (31.71) (69.51) (20.73) (9.76) (59.46) (16.22) (24.32)
Number of agents receiving each message type, percentages in parentheses.
S= Successful, F= Failed and No= No message.
Table 3.4 shows that principals prefer to transmit information 44% of the time
when the outcome is failure in the private-verifiable case, while the frequency of
transmission is 57% under public-verifiable feedback. So in both cases, around
half of the time the bad outcome is revealed. This might be either because in
equilibrium verifiable negative feedback and no feedback are interpreted similarly,
or more likely because some principals have a preference for reporting truthfully.
Similarly, Table 3.4 shows that when the outcome is failure principals lie and
give positive feedback in 54% of the cases in private-unverifiable and 38% of the
cases in public-unverifiable feedback. On the other hand, when the outcome is
success, they report truthfully in 94% of the cases in private-unverifiable and 85%
of the cases in public-unverifiable feedback. This is again consistent with lying
aversion. A Pearson chi-square test shows that reports significantly change accord-
ing to the actual outcome when talk is cheap (p = 0.0003 in private-unverifiable
and p = 0.0002 in public-unverifiable feedback). This confirms that principals
consider the actual outcome in reporting, rather than sending random or always
positive signals regardless of the true state.
Although the number of observations is small, Table 3.5 and 3.6 provide further
detail that may help identify the reporting strategies used by the subjects. It seems
that when the outcome is success principals always report truthfully, whereas
when the outcome is failure, some report truthfully, some lie if they can, and
others report no information.
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Table 3.5: Feedback to Both Agents in Private Feedback
Private-Verifiable (message) Private-Unverifiable (message)
Actual Both Info Info,No Info No Info, Info Both No Info SS SF FS FF No-No SNo NoS FNo NoF
SS 5 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(100.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (100.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SF 7 4 1 0 7 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
(58.33) (33.33) (8.33) (0.00) (77.78) (11.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (11.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FS 5 0 5 0 4 0 5 0 0 2 0 0 0
(50.00) (0.00) (50.00) (0.00) (36.36) (0.00) (45.45) (0.00) (0.00) (18.18) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FF 4 1 0 9 5 1 0 5 1 1 2 0 0
(28.57) (7.14) (0.00) (64.29) (33.33) (6.67) (0.00) (33.33) (6.67) (6.67) (13.33) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of agents receiving each message type, percentages in parentheses
The abbreviations in message part represents message pairs.
S= Successful, F= Failed and No= No message. SNo refers to (Successful, No message) message pair.
Table 3.6: Feedback to Both Agents in Public Feedback
Public-Verifiable (message) Public-Unverifiable (message)
Actual Both Info Both No Info SS SF FS FF No-No SNo NoS FNo NoF
SS 8 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
(100.00) (0.00) (75.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (25.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SF 6 3 4 3 0 1 0 4 0 0 1
(66.67) (33.33) (30.77) (23.08) (0.00) (7.69) (0.00) (30.77) (0.00) (0.00) (7.69)
FS 9 4 7 1 3 0 0 1 1 0 0
(69.23) (30.77) (53.85) (7.69) (23.08) (0.00) (0.00) (7.69) (7.69) (0.00) (0.00)
FF 5 6 1 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0
(45.45) (54.55) (14.29) (0.00) (0.00) (14.29) (71.43) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of agents receiving each message type, percentages in parentheses
The abbreviations in message part represents message pairs.
S= Successful, F= Failed and No= No message. SNo refers to (Successful, No message) message pair.
Our design also allows us to observe the expectations of the principals regard-
ing how agents will update their beliefs. This can potentially give insights into the
rationale behind the principals’ strategy. As shown in Figure 3.4, principals ex-
pect the positive feedback they send to be interpreted more optimistically than it
actually is (although this is not significant in a Wilcoxon test), and negative mes-
sages to be evaluated significantly more pessimistically (p = 0.003 in a Wilcoxon
test). Thus, principals generally overestimate the response of agents’ beliefs to
the feedback, especially when the feedback is negative. The expectation of a pes-
simistic response to negative feedback reveals that at least some principals take
into account its adverse effect on beliefs but provide negative feedback anyway,
which is consistent with an aversion to lying.
94 CHAPTER 3



























Negative Feedback Positive Feedback No Feedback
Finally, we examine principals’ expectations regarding how agents’ beliefs will
be influenced by the feedback given to the other agent. As Table 3.7 shows, prin-
cipals expect that a positive feedback to the other agent will adversely influence
the beliefs of an agent when his own feedback is also positive and when feedback
is public and unverifiable, but expect no significant impact if own feedback is neg-
ative or feedback is verifiable.27 Interestingly, this is a feature of the equilibrium
of the model with lying costs and naive agents, which will be analyzed in Section
3.6.
Table 3.7: Principal’s Expectations in Public Feedback-Extended
Own Positive Feedback Own Negative Feedback
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Guess Guess Guess Guess Guess Guess
(Public-Verifiable) (Public-Unverifiable) (Public-Verifiable) (Public-Unverifiable)
Other Positive Feedback -3.151 3.708 -10.195∗∗ -1.550 -0.333 -3.323
(3.198) (5.692) (4.176) (8.969) (7.903) (17.649)
Public-Verifiable 10.188∗∗∗ 4.722
(2.960) (3.169)
N 75 31 44 37 25 12
χ2 14.735 0.424 5.959 2.250 0.002 0.035
Standard errors in parentheses
GLS Regressions for Different Feedback Mechanisms
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
We can summarize our findings as follows.
27Note, however, that the number of observations is small in some of these regressions.
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Result 3.5. Some principals prefer to tell the truth even when they know that
this might adversely affect their payoff. Prediction 1.4 is confirmed but 2.3 is
rejected.
3.6 Discussion
Overall, our theoretical model in Section 3.4 does a good job in terms of ex-
plaining the relative informativeness of different feedback mechanisms. There are,
however, three major discrepancies between our theoretical predictions and em-
pirical findings: (1) Some principals report truthfully even when they believe that
this may hurt them; (2) Agents do not interpret “no feedback” as pessimistically
as the theory suggests; (3) Positive feedback is interpreted less optimistically if
the other agent also receives positive feedback and this effect is stronger in public-
unverifiable than in public-verifiable feedback.
The finding that some principals have a tendency to tell the truth is in line with
previous empirical studies of strategic communication and suggests that individu-
als suffer from cost of lying and this cost varies among them. The second finding
might be due to naiveté in belief formation, i.e., agents interpret the feedback
literally and when they receive “no information”, they keep their priors more or
less unchanged. Another finding that supports the naive agent hypothesis is that,
even in private-verifiable feedback, a significant fraction of principals provide no
information when the agent has failed. Since “no information” and negative feed-
back must both be interpreted in the same (pessimistic) way in private-verifiable
feedback, this is not rational if there is even a minimal preference for telling the
truth. If, however, principals believe that some of the agents are naive, then this
may be optimal. Indeed, Figure 3.4 and the preceding discussion have indicated
that principals expect agents to respond to feedback in a somewhat naive way.
Therefore, we conclude that at least some agents are naive and that principals
expect them to act naively. The third finding could be due to the fact that agents
make (non-Bayesian) social comparisons in forming their beliefs or they believe
96 CHAPTER 3
that the difficulty of the tasks are correlated in such a way that if the other
agent has succeeded, then probability of own success in the next task is smaller.
Another possible explanation of this finding is that agents are rational and such
beliefs simply follow from the principals’ strategy and Bayes’ rule.
In the next section we extend our theoretical model to allow for individual-
specific cost of lying (and cost of withholding information) for the principals and
naiveté on the part of the agents. We will see that such an extension can account
for most of our empirical findings as well as some of the above discrepancies
between the predictions of the original model and the data.
3.6.1 Cost of Lying and Naive Agents
Suppose that lying or providing no information has an individual specific cost
associated with it. Let c(r|θ) be the cost of sending report r when the state is θ
and assume that it is distributed according to the probability distribution Fr|θ in
the population. Also assume that (1) telling the truth is costless; (2) there are
some individuals for whom the cost of lying is small; (3) there are some who always
prefer to tell the truth; (4) there are some for whom the difference between the
cost of lying and cost of withholding information is small enough; and (5) there
are some who prefer withholding information to lying.28
A fraction η ∈ (0, 1) of agents are naive, i.e., they believe that the state is
exactly equal to the principal’s report and if the report is “no information”, then
they keep their prior unchanged. Let qi(r|θ) denote the fraction of principals with
type θ who send report r to agent i in private feedback, and q(r|θ) denote the
same fraction in public feedback.
Before we present our results, we should briefly discuss the few existing theo-
retical studies of cheap talk games with lying costs and naive agents. Kartik et al.
28These assumptions are equivalent to the following: (1) Fθ|θ(x) = 1 for all x ≥ 0;
(2) Fr|θ(x) > 0 for all r, θ and x > 0; (3) Fr|θ(v(a1(1), a2(1), θ) − v(a1(0), a2(0), θ) <
1; (4) c(s, r−i|f, θ−i) − c(∅, r−i|f, θ−i) is a non-negative random variable with probability
distribution G (.|r−i, θ−i) such that G (x|r−i, θ−i) > 0 for all r−i, θ−i and x > 0; (5)
G (v(ai(1), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i)− v(ai(0), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i)|r−i, θ−i) < 1 for all r−i, θ−i.
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(2007) show that if the message space is not bounded, then there is a fully re-
vealing equilibrium. Our message space is bounded, which makes full information
revelation impossible in the unverifiable feedback case. Kartik (2009) assumes
that the sender has a convex cost of lying and characterizes a class of monotone
equilibria in which low types separate while high types pool. Chen (2011) ana-
lyzes a related model in which the sender is honest and the receiver is naive with
positive probabilities and shows that dishonest senders exaggerate the state of the
world. Our results do not immediately follow from these two studies because we
assume both cost of lying and naive agents and allow cost of lying to differ among
senders. Also, we allow sending “no information” and analyze verifiable messages
as well as cheap talk.
3.6.1.1 Verifiable Feedback with Lying Cost and Naive Agents
As the following result shows, under private-verifiable feedback, equilibrium be-
havior is uniquely determined.
Proposition 5. If feedback is private and verifiable, then for any i and θ−i
qi(s|s, θ−i) = 1, qi(∅|f, θ−i) > 0, qi(f |f, θ−i) > 0.
Therefore, in equilibrium, if the agent is successful, then the principal gives
positive feedback, while if he has failed, then those principals with small costs
of withholding information give no feedback while those with large costs report
failure. Proportion of principals who give no feedback increases in the fraction
of naive agents and the extra benefit of letting the agent keep the prior beliefs.
Note that in our model of Section 3.4, which assumed lying is costless, behavior of
the principal when the agent has failed was indeterminate, i.e., sending negative
feedback and no feedback were both compatible with equilibrium. In the current
model, principal’s behavior is unique given his cost of lying. Also note that if there
were no naive agents, then in equilibrium we would not observe any principal who
98 CHAPTER 3
provides no feedback.
Proposition 5 and Bayes’ rule imply that beliefs significantly increase after
positive feedback and decrease after negative feedback, while beliefs after no feed-
back decrease but at a magnitude smaller than beliefs after negative feedback.
Beliefs conditional on success increase and conditional on failure decrease. (See
Appendix C.1 for the calculation of beliefs in this section.)
Equilibrium behavior is also unique in public-verifiable feedback.
Proposition 6. If feedback is public and verifiable, then q(ss|ss) = 1, q(∅|ff) >
0, and q(ff |ff) > 0. If
η2v(a1(p), a2(p), sf) + 2η(1− η)v(a1(p), a2(0), sf) + (1− η)2v(a1(0), a2(0), sf)
> v(a1(1), a2(0), sf) (3.1)
then, q(∅|sf) > 0 and q(∅|fs) > 0. If condition (3.1) does not hold, then there is
an equilibrium in which q(∅|sf) = q(∅|fs) = 0.
This result shows that if both agents are successful, then the principal truth-
fully reports it. If both have failed, then some tell the truth while others give no
feedback. The fraction of principals who provide no feedback increases with the
prior and the proportion of naive agents.
Behavior of the principal when only one of the agents has succeeded depends
on condition (3.1), which is likely to hold if the fraction of naive agents is high
and the agents’ action are complements. Since in our experiment there are strong
complementarities between the agents’ actions, we expect this condition to hold
and hence some principals with types sf and fs to give no feedback. This is
exactly the type of behavior we observe in the data (see Table 3.6).
Therefore, we assume that condition (3.1) holds, in which case Bayes’ rule
implies that beliefs increase after positive feedback and decrease after negative
feedback. Direction of change in beliefs after no feedback is ambiguous, but they
decrease less than they do in private-verifiable feedback. If beliefs about the other
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agent is uniform, then average beliefs conditional on failure is smaller than the
prior but it is not clear whether beliefs conditional on success is greater than the
prior.
In summary, we have the following predictions:
Prediction 4. If lying is costly and some agents are naive, then in verifiable
feedback:
1. If feedback is private, beliefs increase conditional on success and decrease
conditional on failure. If feedback is public, beliefs decrease conditional
on failure but the magnitude of change is smaller than it is under private
feedback;
2. Beliefs increase after positive feedback and decrease after negative feedback.
If feedback is private, beliefs also decrease after no feedback;
3. Beliefs after negative feedback are smaller than beliefs after no feedback;
4. If feedback is public, beliefs do not depend on the feedback provided to the
other agent;
5. If feedback is private, all principals report truthfully to the agent who suc-
ceeds while some report truthfully and some give no feedback to the agent
who fails. If feedback is public, all principals report truthfully if both agents
succeed, while some tell the truth and some give no feedback if one of the
agents fails.
Our empirical findings verify prediction 4.1 (see Figure 3.1) as well as 4.2 and
4.3 (see Figure 3.2), except that the decrease in beliefs after no feedback is not
statistically significant in private feedback. Note that prediction 4.3 is novel in
the new model and follows from the existence of naive agents. Also note that
in the data, beliefs after no feedback increase in public-verifiable feedback, which
cannot be explained with our original model. In the model with lying costs, this
could happen if each agent assigns a disproportionately high likelihood to the
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event that he has succeeded and the other has failed, i.e., agent 1 believes that
the state is sf while agent 2 believes that it is fs. Finally, while prediction 4.5
is verified (see Tables 3.5 and 3.6), 4.4 is rejected (see Figure 3.3a and Table 3.2
columns (4) and (5)). Overall, empirical observations are very close to theoretical
predictions except that in the data beliefs are somewhat more pessimistic if own
positive feedback is accompanied by positive feedback to the other agent.
3.6.1.2 Unverifiable Feedback with Lying Cost and Naive Agents
The most significant difference between the models with and without lying costs
appears under unverifiable feedback. In particular, and unlike the original model,
the model with lying costs and naive agents uniquely pins down the principal’s be-
havior under private-unverifiable feedback. If the agent is successful, the principal
sends positive feedback and if he has failed, then those with high costs of lying and
withholding information report truthfully, those with small costs of lying report
success, and those with larger costs of lying but small costs of withholding give
no feedback.
Proposition 7. If feedback is private and unverifiable, then for any i and θ−i
qi(s|s, θ−i) = 1, qi(s|f, θ−i) > 0, qi(∅|f, θ−i) > 0, qi(f |f, θ−i) > 0.
Equilibrium behavior under public-unverifiable feedback may not be unique.
However, if v is separable, i.e., v(a, θ) > v(a′, θ) implies v(a, θ′) > v(a′, θ′), then
the following is true.
Proposition 8. If v is separable and feedback is public and unverifiable, then
q(ss|ss) = 1, q(ss|θ) > 0 for some θ 6= ss and qi(θ|θ) > 0 for all θ.
A natural extension of the private-unverifiable feedback equilibrium to public
case along the lines suggested by Proposition 8 is the following: (1) Type ss sends
ss; (2) Type ff sends ss, ∅∅, or ff ; (3) Type sf sends ss, s∅, or sf ; (4) Typefs
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sends ss, ∅s, or fs. This is exactly the type of behavior we observe in the data.
Therefore, we assume that this is the equilibrium that our subjects play.
Using Bayes’ rule to derive the beliefs, we have the following prediction.
Prediction 5. If lying is costly and some agents are naive, then in unverifiable
feedback:
1. Beliefs conditional on success are smaller than those in private-verifiable
feedback;
2. Beliefs after positive feedback are smaller than those in verifiable feedback;
3. Beliefs decrease after negative and no feedback at a magnitude similar to
those in verifiable negative feedback;
4. Beliefs after positive feedback are smaller if the other agent receives positive
feedback as well, while beliefs after negative feedback are not affected by
the feedback to the other agent;
5. All principals report truthfully to the agent who succeeds but, to the agent
who fails, some principals report success, some no information and some
failure.
Our empirical findings verify predictions 5.1 (see Figure 3.1) and 5.2. Pre-
diction 5.3 is not supported because the decrease in beliefs after negative or no
feedback is smaller compared with verifiable feedback (see Figure 3.2). Except for
a few outliers, Tables 3.5 and 3.6 give strong support to 5.5. Perhaps most remark-
ably, item 5.4 is strongly supported (see Figure 3.3b and Table 3.2 columns (4)
and (5)). Note that this prediction is novel to the new model and follows from the
fact that feedback (s, f) is given only by the principal who observed (s, f) whereas
(s, s) is given by types (s, s), (s, f), (f, s), and (f, f). Therefore, a Bayesian agent
1 who receives feedback (s, f) is sure that he succeeded, while if he receives feed-
back (s, s), then he assigns a positive probability that he failed. Finally, the new
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model, as well as the original one, predicts the private-verifiable feedback to be
the most informative mechanism, which is supported by our findings.
Overall, the model fits the data quite well, and in some respects better than
the original model, but there are still two deviations of the model’s predictions
from what we observe in the data: (1) Agents interpret other agent’s success
pessimistically even in verifiable feedback; (2) Agents do not interpret negative or
no feedback as pessimistically as they should, particularly in private-unverifiable
feedback.
3.6.2 Are Agents Bayesian?
Suppose that agents know (or predict) the strategy employed by the principals
in our experiment and use Bayes’ rule to update their beliefs. How would their
beliefs change upon observing feedback? How do actual beliefs compare with such
Bayesian beliefs?
In order to answer these questions, we estimate the principals’ strategy using
the data in Table 3.5 and 3.6 and then use each agents’ pre-feedback beliefs,
the feedback they received, and Bayes’ rule to calculate post-feedback beliefs.29
Before we start presenting our findings, we should stress that we are subjecting
the agents to quite a stringent test. A perfect fit between the actual and Bayesian
beliefs requires not only that they use Bayes’ rule correctly to update their beliefs
but also that they predict the principals’ strategy perfectly.
Figure 3.5 plots the average change in actual and Bayesian beliefs in each
treatment conditional on the actual outcome of the agent. We can see that the
direction of change is the same in actual and Bayesian beliefs, except under un-
verifiable feedback when the actual outcome is failure. Also, compared with the
Bayesian case, overall information transmission is much weaker when the actual
29In calculating principals’ strategy we eliminated some outliers in tables 3.5 and 3.6: in
private-verifiable, row SF column No Info,Info; in private-unverifiable, row FS column SNo; in
public-unverifiable, row SS column NoS, row FS columns SF and SNo, row SF columns FF and
NoF.
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state is failure.30
Figure 3.6 plots average change in actual and Bayesian beliefs in response to
feedback. We again see that the direction of change in beliefs is the same in ac-
tual and Bayesian beliefs (except those in public-verifiable and private-unverifiable
treatments after no feedback). This figure also supports our conclusion from the
previous section that agents do not interpret negative or no feedback as pessimisti-
cally as they should, especially when they are unverifiable.
Finally, we compare the change in beliefs in response to the other agent’s feed-
back in public-unverifiable feedback. As Figure 3.7 shows, as long as the direction
of change in the beliefs are concerned, agents on average act in a Bayesian man-
ner. However, and as we have discovered before, they seem to interpret positive
feedback to the other agent more pessimistically than is justified by Bayesian
updating alone.
30We should note that the scale of the graphs in 3.5a and 3.5b are different because agents
update their beliefs by amounts that are much smaller than the theoretical ones. For example,
under truthful feedback, Bayes’ rule requires that beliefs go up to 1 after success and down to 0
after failure, whereas in reality they go up to 0.77 and down to 0.57, respectively. This is simply
because in the theoretical model beliefs refer to the probability that they have been successful in
the task they have just finished, while in the experiment they measure the probability with which
they believe they will be successful in the next task. We expect the latter to be strictly increasing
in the former but not necessarily identical with it. Also note that numbers in Figure 3.5a are
slightly different than those in Figure 3.1. This is because we had to drop a few observations for
which we could not apply Bayes’ rule in calculating beliefs. In order to maintain comparability
between the actual and Bayesian beliefs we also dropped those observations in calculating the
average change in actual beliefs. These comments also apply to the the other graphs in this
section.
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Bayesian Belief 0.198∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.022) (0.022)










N 386 386 386
χ2 67.137 213.684 232.519
R2 0.205 0.544 0.545
GLS Regressions, standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
In Table 3.8, we present regression results which show that Bayesian updating
plays a significant role in the formation of actual beliefs and explains about 20% of
their total variation. We also see that, together with the prior, Bayesian updating
explains about half of the total variation in the posterior beliefs. Furthermore, the
relationship between actual and Bayesian beliefs do not depend on the feedback
mechanism in a significant way.
Overall, we conclude that agents’ beliefs are consistent with the strategy em-
ployed by the principals and Bayesian updating, except that they respond to
negative or no feedback more optimistically and interpret positive feedback to the
other agent more pessimistically than they should. However, Bayesian updating
does not explain the entire variation in beliefs. This could be due to agents’ inabil-
ity to correctly anticipate the principal’s strategy, their naiveté, or other biases




In this paper, we employ a theoretical model and data from a laboratory exper-
iment to examine the role of verifiability and privacy in strategic interim perfor-
mance feedback. Our baseline theoretical model predicts that information about
agents’ performances can be credibly revealed only when the performance infor-
mation is verifiable and, furthermore, private-verifiable feedback is the most in-
formative mechanism. These predictions are strongly supported by our empirical
analysis.
However, the baseline model cannot account for some interesting features of
the data: (1) many principals tell the truth even when they believe this may
hurt them; (2) agents do not interpret “no feedback” as pessimistically as they
should; and (3) positive feedback is interpreted less optimistically if the other
agent has also received positive feedback, and this effect is stronger in the case of
public-unverifiable than in the case of public-verifiable feedback. We then analyze
a model with individual-specific lying costs and naive agents, and show that it
can account for many of these findings. We also find that while many agents do
take into account the principal’s strategic behavior to form beliefs in a Bayesian
fashion, some are naive and act in a non-Bayesian manner, particularly when
informed about other agents’ feedback. From a more practical point of view, we
conclude that credible communication of interim performance requires verifiability
and it is best to keep feedback private.
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A.1 Tables and Figures
Figure A.1: Same-sex votes
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Figure A.2: Opposite-sex votes
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Figure A.3: Comparison of Vote Distributions over Gender Treatment and Control
Groups (with exclusion of candidates)
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Figure A.4: Comparison of Female and Male Vote Distributions over Gender
Treatment and Control Groups (with the exclusion of candidates)
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Table A.1: Voting decision with respect to Historical Proximity of the candidates
both in main and extension experiments (with the exclusion of candidates)
Closer Candidate
Main experiment Extension experiment
Overall Treatment Control Treatment only
Vote Male Female Equal Male Female Equal Male Female Equal Male Female Equal
Male Candidate 145 59 8 84 29 6 61 30 2 121 56 19
(72.86) (29.65) (36.36) (70.59) (28.43) (31.58) (76.25) (30.93) (66.67) (77.07) (26.79) (55.88)
Female Candidate 54 140 14 35 73 13 19 67 1 36 153 15
(27.14) (70.35) (63.64) (29.41) (71.57) (68.42) (23.75) (69.07) (33.33) (22.93) (73.21) (44.12)
Number of votes for each candidate, percentages in parentheses
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Table A.2: Model (1.1)- Historical proximity (with the exclusion of candidates)
Logit
(robust std. errors)
Dependent var: (1) (2) (3)
Vote for Candidate B (Male candidate) Control Treatment Overall
1(DDhistorical > 0) 0.302*** 0.420*** 0.313***
(0.106) (0.083) (0.095)
DDhistorical*1(DDhistorical > 0) 0.003 -0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
DDhistorical*1(DDhistorical < 0) 0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Gender Treatment X 1(DDhistorical > 0) 0.093
(0.114)
Gender Treatment X (DDhistorical*1(DDhistorical > 0)) -0.006*
(0.004)
Gender Treatment X (DDhistorical*1(DDhistorical < 0)) 0.002
(0.002)
N 180 240 420
χ2 25.184 27.431 52.590
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
GLS Regressions for the impact of distances to the voting behavior
Gender Treatment X 1(DDhistorical > 0), Gender Treatment X (DD ∗ 1(DDhistorical > 0))
and Gender Treatment X (DD ∗ 1(DDhistorical < 0)) are the interaction terms of variables
with the gender treatment.
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Table A.3: Switching behavior in Conformity Stage both in main and extension
experiments (with the exclusion of candidates)
Logit
(robust std. errors)
Main experiment Extension experiment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent var: Switch Switch Switch Switch Switch Switch
Gender treatment 0.013 0.013 0.009
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Minority 0.173*** 0.165*** 0.114*** 0.059** 0.059** 0.024
(0.026) (0.025) (0.043) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026)
Female 0.052* 0.008 -0.003 -0.034
(0.027) (0.041) (0.021) (0.029)
Minority X Female 0.077 0.072
(0.055) (0.044)
Period YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 420 420 420 400 400 400
χ2 42.814 44.571 48.430 13.674 13.690 14.976
Standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
GLS Regressions for the analysis of the switch behavior
Average marginal effects are presented in the table.
Table A.4: Comparison of Switching Behavior among Minority Voters in Confor-










Standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
GLS Regressions for the analysis of the switch behavior
Average marginal effects are presented in the table.
Imprecision Treatment = 1 if Imprecision treatment
0 if Conformity Treatment
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A.2 Treatments
The other two treatments implemented in the experiment are as following:
• Imprecision treatment
The only difference from the conformity treatment is that each subject re-
ceives an imprecise signal about the candidates’ risk preferences. Below the
investment decision information, the following message is displayed:
“Note that the precision of the investment decision information of candidates
is x%.”
The precision of the provided information is determined randomly for each
subject. For example if the appointed precision level is 70% as in Figure
A.10, then 7 out of 10 decisions of both candidates made in individual stage
are averaged.
The aim of this treatment is to create an information asymmetry across
voters. Therefore, if participants switch their vote under this treatment,
then it is both about pure taste and social learning. Comparing the results
of this treatment with the conformity treatment reveals the impact of social
learning.
• Public treatment
Different from conformity treatment, the final votes is publicly shown with
the id of the participant within the group (see Figure A.11). Note that the
announced participant id is independent of their id within the experiment in
order to conserve the anonymity. However, to create a public environment,
I keep group id constant over 3 periods of public stage so that group mem-
bers are allowed to keep track of other voters. Therefore, a more flexible
anonymity principal is employed in this experiment.
Hence, in comparison with conformity stage, the change in propensity to
conform shows the impact of public announcement. Also this treatment
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allows me to observe a potential impact of the gender composition of group.
A.3 Instructions of Main and Extension Experi-
ments and Survey
A.3.1 Instructions of Main Experiment
Thank you for considering participating in this economics experiment. The exper-
iment you are going to take part is about economic decision making. Throughout
the session, you are expected to make allocation decisions regarding an investment
task and some additional decisions which will be explained later on and that will
influence your earning. You will earn ₤2.5 for your participation. In addition to
this participation fee, your earnings in the experiment will depend on your deci-
sions and chance. The rules explained below are accurate and your payment will
be determined in accordance with them.
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. After the rules are explained,
you are free to quit before the experiment starts. Your decisions during the ex-
periment will not be matched with your real identity, rather they will be recorded
under an anonymous subject number. Note that communication of any kind is
prohibited during the experiment. Please make sure your mobile phones are on
silent and away.
The main experiment consists of five periods. Within each period, there are
several rounds: ten rounds in period 1 and three rounds in each subsequent period
(22 rounds in total). There will be further explanation at the beginning of each
period. At the end of the experiment, one out of 22 rounds will be randomly
selected and the payoff in that round will determine your earnings. There will
also be a final additional period in which your earning will be counted as a bonus.
Payments will be made privately in cash at the end of the experiment.
During the experiment, all amounts will be expressed in ECU (“experimental
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currency unit”): 1 ECU equals ₤0.04 (i.e. 4p).
Different rules will apply in each of the five periods. Just before each period,
the rules of the corresponding period will be explained in detail.
The decisions you need to make will now be explained. Once you understand
the general task, the instructions for each of the five periods will be explained
period by period.
General Rules
Imagine that you are an investment manager in a financial firm. In every
financial period, you must decide how to split the assets of the firm between two
investment options. Your earning depends on your allocation decision over these
two options. At the beginning of each round, you start with 100 ECU. You need
to choose the share X1 to allocate to option 1 and the share of X2 to allocate to
option 2:
• Option 1: The riskless option, e.g. investing in a bond, which secures the
allocated amount with probability 1. So if you invest X1, you get X1 at the
end of that round.
• Option 2: The risky option, e.g. investing in a stock, that yields k ∗ X2
with probability 1
2
and 0 otherwise. Here k is the multiplier for risky option
which will be chosen randomly from [1.5,3] at the beginning of each round.
So in other words, if the stock performs well, you get your allocated money
as multiplied whereas you lose your money when the stock performs badly.
You will choose how much to allocate to Option 2, which can be any
amount between nothing (0) and all of your assets (100). Whatever you
do not allocate to Option 2 is assigned to Option 1.
Example: k=2.00. Let’s consider you chose X2=60 ECU. This means you put
40 ECU to riskless option. Your earnings will be formed as:
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Riskless option: You will receive 40 token for sure,
Risky option: You will receive 120 token (60*2.00), if the risky option is successful
(50% of chance)
or 0 token (you might lose your 60 token), if the risky option is failed
(50% of chance)
So the total return of your investment will be either 40 token or 160 token.
Stage 1(period 1)
This stage involves 10 rounds of performing the investment task for randomly
chosen k values. Your screen will be like in Figure A.5.
[Screen-shot of investment task is attached at the back of the information form.]
In the last round (round 10), you will make the investment decision for a list of
k values rather than a single one. The k value will be randomly chosen from these
specific values and your corresponding choice will be evaluated as in the previous
9 rounds. Figure A.6 shows the screen you will see for round 10. Before you start
performing the investment tasks, you need to complete the following form on your
screen.
[Participants fill the form that acquire information about gender and age.]
Do you have any question?
Stage 2
[The instructions in this stage (in each period) is shown on the screen of the
participants and read outloud by the researcher.]
General Instructions
In this stage, you will play each period within a group. Note that each period
has three rounds. At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly allocated
to a group of 7 people. Your payoff will depend on the decision made by a group
leader who will be elected by your group. Note that the rounds will be independent
and the groups will be newly formed at the beginning of each round.
Period 2
The computer will choose two candidates from your group, referred to as Can-
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didate A and B for confidentiality reasons. You will observe a randomly chosen
round of investment decisions made by both candidates in the previous stage.
With the given information, you will vote for the candidate you prefer as the
group leader. Figure A.7(a) and A.7(b) [Figure A.7(c) and A.7(d)] are the exam-
ples of the screenshots you will see.
[Note that the stated figures in the instructions are for gender treatment ses-
sions, whereas the figures in brackets are for gender control sessions.]
After the voting process, the candidate who receives the most votes will be the
leader of the group and will perform the investment task (again with a randomly
chosen k) on behalf of the group.
The payoff of all group members will be computed based on the decision of
the elected leader.
Note that candidates will be allowed to vote as well.
While the leader makes the investment decision for the group, the rest of the
group members(members who are not candidate) are expected to guess how much
the candidates allocated to risky option under specific k-values in round 10(see
Figure A.8(a) [Figure A.8(b)]).
One of the k-values will be randomly chosen. If your guess for that k-value is
within +3 and -3 interval of the candidate’s actual allocation, your guess will be
correct. For each correct guess (for each candidate), you will earn a 5 ECU bonus.
Let’s consider candidate allocated 60 for the chosen k. If your guess is in the
interval [57,63], your guess will be correct.
At the end of the experiment, your total bonus in the chosen round will be
added to your payoff from that round.




In this period, there will be a poll before the actual voting. The poll results
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will be shown to all voters in terms of vote shares, then each voter will cast an
actual vote. (see Figure A.9(a) [Figure A.9(b)])
Note that your vote in the poll and actual voting are equally important since
one of them will be randomly chosen and considered as your final vote.
As in the previous rounds, the elected leader will make the investment decision
on behalf of the group. You will then follow the same procedure as in period 2.




In this period, the process will be the same as in period 3. However, unlike in
the previous periods, you will observe the average X2 decisions of both candidates
with a certain precision level (see Figure A.10(a) [Figure A.10(b)]).
In this example, the voter receives “70% precise information” which means that
randomly 7 out of 10 decisions of both candidates are averaged.
This precision level will be randomly chosen for each voter, and will vary within
group. Therefore some voters will receive more precise information than others.
You will then follow the same procedure as in period 3.




In this period, the process will be the same as in period 3. However, rather
than revealing vote shares after the poll, each vote will be observed separately in a
list presenting all votes of group members. Also the information of the candidates
will include only one random round as in the period 3. Therefore, there won’t
be any variation on the precision levels across group members(see Figure A.11(a)
[Figure A.11(b)).
You will appointed with a voter ID which is different than your participant ID.
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Your voter ID will not change over the three periods so that each voter’s decision
will be traceable by others. If you want, you can take notes on the paper provided
on your desk.
You will then follow the same procedure as in period 3.




Now you have additional series of investment decisions from which your earn-
ings will be counted as a bonus to your overall earnings. You will be asked to
make ten decisions in which each decision is a paired choice between Gamble A
and Gamble B.
Consider we have a ten sided die with each face numbered from 1 to 10. After
you have made all of your choices, the computer will generate the outcomes of two
rolls of the die, first to select one of the ten decisions to be used, and second to
determine what your payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for the particular
decision selected.
Even though you make ten decisions, only one of them will be selected. There-
fore each decision has an equal chance to affect your final payoff.
Let’s look at the first decision case in the Figure A.12. Here in Gamble A you
have 1 out of 10 chances to win 45 ECU and 9 out of 10 chances to win 30 ECU.
If the outcome of the second roll is 1, then you will earn 45 ECU. If the outcome
is between 2 and 10, you will earn 30 ECU.
Please choose the gamble you preferred for each decision case. If the options
appear as selected, please change them according to your preferences.
[Additional stage starts]
Survey
The experiment is over. There is a short survey. After you finish it, please
remain seated. Your payment in an envelope will be brought to your workspace.
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Thank you for your participation.
Figure A.5: Investment decision
Figure A.6: Investment decision at round 10
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Figure A.7: Voting screen
(a) In gender treatment group- Non-candidate (b) In gender treatment group- Candidate
(c) In gender control group- Non-candidate (d) In gender control group- Candidate
Figure A.8: Guessing screen
(a) In gender treatment group (b) In gender control group
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Figure A.9: Poll results
(a) In gender treatment group (b) In gender control group
Figure A.10: Imprecision stage screen
(a) In gender treatment group (b) In gender control group
Figure A.11: Public stage screen
(a) In gender treatment group (b) In gender control group
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Figure A.12: Holt-Laury task
A.3.2 Instructions of Extension Experiment
[Note that the instructions of the extension experiment and main experiment are
same until stage 2 .]
Stage 2
[The instructions in this stage (in each period) is shown on the screen of the
participants and read outloud by the researcher.]
General Instructions
In this stage, you will play each period within a group. Note that each period
has four rounds. At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly allocated
to a group of 7 people. Your payoff will depend on the decision made by a group
leader who will be elected by your group. Note that the rounds will be independent
and the groups will be newly formed at the beginning of each round.
Period 2
The computer will choose two candidates from your group, referred to as Can-
didate A and B for confidentiality reasons. You will observe a randomly chosen
round of investment decisions made by both candidates in the previous stage.
With the given information, you will vote for the candidate you prefer as the
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group leader. Figure A.7(a) and A.7(b) are the examples of the screenshots you
will see.
After the voting process, a voter from the group will randomly be picked
as “decisive voter” by computer. The candidate who received vote of the decisive
voter will be leader of the group. Note that everyone in the group has equal chance
to be picked as decisive voter. The elected leader will perform the investment task
on behalf of the group. The payoff of all group members will be computed based
on the decision of the elected leader.
While the leader makes the investment decision for the group, the non-candidate
group members are expected to guess how much the candidates allocated to risky
option under specific k-values in round 10(see Figure A.8).
One of the k-values will be randomly chosen. If your guess for that k-value is
within +3 and -3 interval of the candidate’s actual allocation, your guess will be
correct. For each correct guess (for each candidate), you will earn a 5 ECU bonus.
Let’s consider candidate allocated 60 for the chosen k. If your guess is in the
interval [57,63], your guess will be correct.
At the end of the experiment, your total bonus in the chosen round will be
added to your payoff from that round.




In this period, there will be a poll before the actual voting. The poll results
will be shown to all voters in terms of vote shares, then each voter will vote again.
(see Figure A.9(a))
Note that your vote in the poll and actual voting are equally important since
one of them will be randomly chosen and considered as your final vote. The final
vote of the decisive voter will determine the leader.
You will then follow the same procedure as in previous period.
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In this period, the process will be the same as in previous period. However,
unlike in the previous periods, you will observe several rounds of investment in-
formation rather than a single round. The number of rounds each group member
observes will be randomly chosen for each voter, and will vary within group. As an
example, consider the appointed number of rounds you are allowed to observe is 4
(out of 10) as in Figure A.13. You will see the investment decisions of both can-
didates in random 4 rounds of the first stage. Meanwhile, another member/voter
in your group will observe 8 rounds as in Figure A.14. Therefore some voters will
observe more rounds than others. You will then follow the same procedure as in
previous periods.




The experiment is over. There is a short survey. After you finish it, please
remain seated. Your payment in an envelope will be brought to your workspace.
Thank you for your participation.
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Figure A.13: Voting screen in Period 4
Figure A.14: Voting screen of another voter in Period 4
A.3.3 Post-experiment Survey
1. Are you a student or a staff?
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2. Please identify your department or school.
3. Please indicate your year.
4. What is your ethnic group?
5. Please identify your annual personal income. (If you are not working, please
specify the amount of your budget.)
6. How many brothers and sisters do you have?
7. How many of your siblings are female?
8. Where were you born in relation to your sibling(s)? Click on the button
that best descibes your birth order.




B.1 Tables and Figures
Table B.1: Beliefs among Each Type of Leaders
NO INFO INFO
Type Belief of Leader klow khigh klow khigh
Selfish Prob(same risk behavior) 0.207*** 0.268*** 0.153*** 0.082***
Prob(more risk-averse) 0.415*** 0.329*** 0.408*** 0.337***
Prob(more risk-seeking) 0.378*** 0.402*** 0.439*** 0.582***
Other-regarding Prob(same risk behavior) 0.278*** 0.222*** 0.077** 0.102***
Prob(more risk-averse) 0.355*** 0.300*** 0.474*** 0.333***
Prob(more risk-seeking) 0.367*** 0.478*** 0.449*** 0.564***
Selfish/Other-regarding Prob(same risk behavior) 0.150* 0.100 0.167 0.333**
Prob(more risk-averse) 0.600*** 0.250** 0.417*** 0.333**
Prob(more risk-seeking) 0.250** 0.650*** 0.417*** 0.333**
140 APPENDIX B
Table B.2: Model (2.1) for Other-regarding and Selfish Leaders
Dependent var: Other-regarding leaders Selfish leaders
∆(group, individual) Overall klow khigh Overall klow khigh
1(Prra≥0) 3.278 4.550 -1.999 -0.291 -2.312 1.130
(2.855) (3.198) (4.727) (2.767) (4.372) (3.081)
PrraX1(Prra ≥ 0) -0.340∗∗∗ -0.070 -0.331∗ -0.342∗∗∗ -0.414∗∗ -0.229∗
(0.120) (0.174) (0.179) (0.117) (0.175) (0.136)
PrraX1(Prra < 0) 0.804∗∗∗ 0.865∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗ 0.136 0.171 0.134
(0.166) (0.199) (0.298) (0.084) (0.115) (0.105)
INFOX(1(Prra≥0)) 3.892 3.278 7.875∗ -1.465 1.023 -0.597
(2.862) (3.405) (4.226) (2.976) (4.671) (3.240)
INFOX(PrraX1(Prra ≥ 0)) -0.392∗∗∗ -0.761∗∗∗ -0.344∗ 0.197 0.120 0.151
(0.133) (0.181) (0.197) (0.151) (0.241) (0.164)
INFOX(PrraX1(Prra < 0)) -0.075 -0.255∗ 0.198 0.394∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.155) (0.279) (0.090) (0.122) (0.116)
Constant 2.025 -1.248 5.778 7.945 8.404 6.176
(4.794) (5.066) (6.996) (5.644) (7.214) (6.725)
Session YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 336 168 168 360 180 180
χ2 230.843 177.737 105.396 101.676 47.569 63.124
Standard errors in parentheses
GLS Regressions for the impact of group period on riskiness
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
B.2 Treatments
• Conformity treatment: Differently than from baseline, there is a poll
before actual voting. After the poll shares revealed to everyone, subjects are
allowed to revise their votes. Note that the voting decision of the individual
is randomly chosen from either the poll or the actual voting decisions in
order to incentivize the decisions in poll stage.
The new version of the other treatment:
• Imprecision treatment: The problem in this treatment seems the failure
to create an “imprecise” environment. In the previous design, the amount
of information is averaged according to the chosen precision level for each
voter. The idea was creating an information asymmetry across voters in
order to observe whether they regard the poll results as a signal about the
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candidate’s risk behavior. Therefore to introduce information asymmetry,
the amount of information provided will vary across voters. Rather than
averaging as in the old design, I plan to provide the information as a list.
For example, consider the precision level is appointed as 40% for the voter.
The voter will receive the risky allocation information of both candidates
made in 4 previous rounds, as presented in Figure B.1 1.
Figure B.1: The screenshot of Imprecision treatment
B.3 Instructions, Quiz and Survey
B.3.1 Instructions
The experiment you are going to take part is about economic decision making.
Throughout the session, you are expected to make allocation decisions regarding
an investment task and some additional decisions which will be explained later on
and that will influence your earning. You will earn ₤2.50 for your participation.
In addition to this participation fee, your earnings in the experiment will depend
1Note that there are 10 rounds in individual stage.
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on your decisions and chance. The rules explained below are accurate and your
payment will be determined accordance with them.
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. After the rules are explained,
you are free to quit before the experiment starts. Your decisions during the ex-
periment will not be matched with your real identity, rather they will be recorded
under an anonymous subject number. Note that communication of any kind is
prohibited during the experiment. Please make sure your mobile phones are on
silent and away.
The main experiment consists of five periods. Within each period, there are
several rounds: ten rounds in period 1 and four rounds in each subsequent period
(26 rounds in total). There will be further explanation at the beginning of each
period. At the end of the experiment, one out of 26 rounds will randomly be
selected and the payoff in that round will determine your earnings. Payments will
be made privately in cash at the end of the experiment.
During the experiment, all monetary activities will be done with tokens where
1 token equals to ₤0.04 (i.e. 4p).
Different rules will apply in each of the five periods. Just before each period,
the rules of the corresponding period will be explained in detail.
The decision you need to make will now be explained. Once you understand
the general task, the instructions for each of 5 periods will be explained period by
period.
General Rules
Imagine that you are an investment manager in a financial firm. In every
financial period, you must decide how to split the assets of the firm between two
investment options. Your earning depends on your allocation decision over these
two options. At the beginning of each round, you start with 100 tokens. You need
to choose the share X1 to allocate to option 1 and the share of X2 to allocate to
option 2:
• Option 1: The riskless option, e.g. investing in a bond, which secures the
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allocated amount with probability 1. So if you invest X1, you get X1 at the
end of that round.
• Option 2: The risky option, e.g. investing in a stock, that yields k ∗ X2
with probability 1
2
and 0 otherwise. Here k is the multiplier for risky option
which will be chosen randomly from [1.5,3] at the beginning of each round.
So in other words, if the stock performs well, you get your allocated money
as multiplied whereas you lose your money when the stock performs badly.
You will be asked how much you want to allocate to Option 2 which
can be any amount between nothing (0) and all of your assets (100).
Whatever you do not allocate to Option 2 is assigned to Option 1.
Example: k=2.00. Let’s consider you chose X2= 60 token. This means you
put 40 token to riskless option. Your earnings will be formed as:
Riskless option: You will receive 40 token for sure,
Risky option: You will receive 120 token (60*2.00), if the risky option is successful
(50% of chance)
or 0 token (you might lose your 60 token), if the risky option is failed
(50% of chance)
So the total return of your investment will be either 40 token or 160 token.
Stage 1(period 1)
This stage involves 10 rounds of performing the investment task for randomly
chosen k values. Your screen will be like in Figure B.2.
[Screen-shot of investment task will be attached at the back of information
form.]
In the last round (round 10), you will make investment decisions for a list of
k values rather than a single one. Each investment in this list is independent of
each other: For each k-value, you have 100 tokens initially. Your investment for
round 10 will be randomly chosen from those four investment decisions on the list.
144 APPENDIX B
Remember that every decision has an equal chance of being selected for payment.
Figure B.3 shows the screen you will see for round 10.
Now there is a short quiz to test your understanding of the task before we start
the experiment. After each question, you will observe the explained solution of it.
So if you are hesitant about the answer, please read the solution carefully. Note
that your answers in the quiz will not affect your earnings from the experiment.
Rather, it is aimed to improve your understanding of the task. It is important
for you to understand the task since your decision on it will affect your earnings.
Therefore, please raise your hand if anything is unclear in the quiz.
[Quiz starts. For more details about the quiz, please see Appendix 2.]
If you don’t have any question about the instructions explained until now, we
start the experiment. Please fill the form correctly in the first screen appeared
and then continue to the experiment.
[Participants fill the form that acquire information about gender and age.]
Stage 2
[The instructions in this stage (in each period) is shown on the screen of the
participants and read outloud by the researcher.]
General Instructions
In this stage, you will play each period within a group. Note that each period
has three rounds. At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly appointed
to a group of 7 people. Your payoff will depend on the decision made by a group
leader who will be elected by your group. Note that the rounds will be independent
and the groups will be newly formed at the beginning of each round.
Period 2
The computer will choose two candidates from your group, referred to as Can-
didate A and B for confidentiality reasons. The non-candidates will observe a
randomly chosen round of investment decisions made by both candidates in the
previous stage with an icon that represents candidate’s gender. The candidates,
on the other hand, will observe a screen that only state their status and which
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candidate they are. With the given information, you will vote for the candidate
you prefer as the group leader. In Figure B.4 and Figure B.5, you can see examples
of non-candidate and candidate screens.
[Screen-shot of voting process is shown on the screens of each subject.]
After the voting process, the candidate who receives the most votes will be the
leader of the group and will perform the investment task on behalf of the group.
The payoff of all group members will be computed based on the decision of
the elected leader (see Figure B.6 for the leader’s investment screen).
After the leader makes the investment decision for the group, all group mem-
bers are expected to guess how much the candidates allocated to risky option
under specific k-values in round 10. Candidates (both leader and non-leader) are
also expected to guess the other candidate’s investment decisions (see Figure B.7
and Figure B.8 for the non-candidate and candidate guess screens).
One of the k-values will be randomly chosen. If your guess for that k-value
is within +3 and -3 interval of the candidate’s actual allocation, your guess will
be correct. For each correct guess (for each candidate), you will earn a 5 token
bonus.
Let’s consider candidate allocated 60 token to risky option for the chosen k.
If your guess is in the interval [57,63], it will be correct.
At the end of the experiment, your total bonus in the chosen round will be
added to your payoff from that round.




In this period, the process will be same as in the previous period. However,
candidates will also observe the information about both of the candidates. In
Figure B.4 and Figure B.9 , you can see examples of non-candidate and candi-
date screens. As in previous period (period 2), the elected leader will make the
146 APPENDIX B
investment decision for the group. You are also expected to guess candidates’
risky allocations in round 10 of the first stage (see Figure B.7 and Figure B.10
for the examples of non-candidate and candidate guess screens). The same rules
will apply on the evaluation of guesses and the distribution of the bonus for each
correct guess.




In this period, there will be a poll before the actual voting. The poll results
will be shown to all voters in terms of vote shares, then each voter will cast an
actual vote. (see Figure B.11)
Note that your vote in the poll and actual voting are equally important since
one of them will be randomly chosen and considered as your final vote.
You will then follow the same procedure as in previous period.




In this period, the process will be the same as in period 4. However, unlike in
the previous periods, you will observe several rounds of investment information
rather than a single. The number of rounds each group member observes will
be randomly chosen for each voter, and will vary within group. As an example,
consider the appointed number of rounds you are allowed to observe is 4 (out of
10) as in Figure B.12. You will see the investment decisions of both candidates
in random 4 rounds of the first stage. Meanwhile, another member/voter in your
group will observe 8 rounds as in Figure B.13. Therefore some voters will observe
more rounds than others. You will then follow the same procedure as in previous
periods.
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If you have any questions please raise your hand. If you don’t, you can click
‘Continue’.
[Period starts.]
Figure B.2: Investment decision
Figure B.3: Investment decision at round 10
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Figure B.4: Voting screen of the non-candidate both in NO INFO and INFO
treatments
Figure B.5: Voting screen of the candidate in NO INFO treatment
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Figure B.6: Investment screen of the leader
Figure B.7: Guess screen of non-candidates both in NO INFO and INFO treat-
ments
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Figure B.8: Guess screen of candidates in NO INFO treatment
Figure B.9: Voting screen of the candidate in INFO treatment
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Figure B.10: Guess screen of the candidate in INFO treatment
Figure B.11: Poll screen in Period 4
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Figure B.12: Voting screen in Period 5
Figure B.13: Voting screen of another voter in Period 5
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B.3.2 Quiz
1. Suppose that the chosen risky multiplier is 2.30. For the corresponding
multiplier, you allocated 60 token of your endowment to the risky option.




Answer: Allocation to riskless option= 100 token – Allocation to risky
option. Therefore (a) 40 token is the correct answer.
2. At the end of this round, how much token could you earn with that allocation
(both risky and riskless investment)? Please choose all suitable.








The return of riskless option: 40 token
The return of risky option: 60*2.30= 138 token, if the risky option is successful
(50% of chance)
0 token, if the risky option is failed
(50% of chance)
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Risky option is Successful Risky option is Failed
Riskless option 40 40
Risky option 138 0
Total 178 40
So the possible total returns from your allocation are either 40 token or 178
token. The correct answers are (b) and (e).
3. In the previous round the chosen risky multiplier was 2.30. This round, the
risky multiplier is 2.80. How does this affect the return and the risk of the
option?
(a) Both the risk and the return of the option increases.
(b) The risk increases but the return of the option stays same.
(c) The risk doesn’t change, but the return of the option increases.
(d) Neither the risk nor the return of the option changes.
Answer: The risky multiplier is only related to the return of the risky
option. The risk of the option is same since the success/ failure probability
of the risky option is same across rounds.
Consider you allocated the same amount of tokens to the risky option with
the new multiplier. Remember that for k=2.30, you allocated 60 token and
the possible returns were 40 tokens and 178 tokens.
For k= 2.80:
The return of riskless option: 40 token
The return of risky option: 60*2.80= 168 token, if the risky option is successful
(50% of chance)
0 token, if the risky option is failed
(50% of chance)
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Risky option is Successful Risky option is Failed
Riskless option 40 40
Risky option 168 0
Total 208 40
Therefore the risk stays same, but with a higher risky multiplier the return
of the option increases. So the correct answer is (c).
B.3.3 Post-experiment Survey
1. Are you a student or a staff?
2. Please identify your department or school.
3. Please indicate your year.
4. What is your ethnic group?
5. Please identify your annual personal income. (If you are not working, please
specify the amount of your budget.)
6. How many brothers and sisters do you have?
7. How many of your siblings are female?
8. Where were you born in relation to your sibling(s)? Click on the button
that best descibes your birth order.
9. Please rate the difficulty of the experiment from 1 to 5 (1: easy- 5:hard).
10. Is being elected as a leader affected your investment decision? (If you haven’t
been elected as a leader, would being elected affect your investment?)






C.1 Proofs and Supporting Results
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose, for contradiction, that there is an equilibrium
in which µi (ρi (θi, θ−i)) puts probability less than one on type θi. If θi = s, then
principal with type (s, θ−i) can deviate and report s to agent i while keeping her
report to the other agent unchanged. This increases agent i’s beliefs and hence
his action, without changing the other agent’s action, and benefits the principal.




, for some θ′−i, must be
sending µi (ρi (f, θ−i)) with positive probability. This implies that µi (ρi (f, θ−i))
puts probability less than one on θi = s as well. But then principal with type θ′
can deviate and report s to agent i while keeping her report to the other agent
unchanged. This increases agent i’s beliefs and benefits the principal.
Proof of Proposition 2. We will first show that ρ(s, s) = (s, s) in any equilibrium.
Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists a θ 6= (s, s) such that ρ(θ) = ρ(s, s).
This implies that µii(ρ(s, s)) < 1 for some i = 1, 2. But then, type (s, s) has a
profitable deviation to r = (s, s). Therefore, we conclude that ρ(s, s) = (s, s) in
any equilibrium. Suppose now that ρ(f, f) = (f, f). If ρ(s, f) 6= ρ(f, s), then
there is full information revelation. If ρ(s, f) = ρ(f, s) = ∅, then type (f, f) has a
profitable deviation to ∅. Suppose, alternatively, that ρ(f, f) = ∅ but ρ(s, f) 6= ∅.
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If ρ(f, s) 6= ∅ as well, then there is full information revelation. If ρ(f, s) = ∅, then
type (f, s) has a profitable deviation. Similarly, if ρ(f, f) = ∅ but ρ(f, s) 6= ∅.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose, for contradiction, that agent i learns something
about his own type from the principal’s equilibrium report. In other words, sup-
pose that there exist i, θ and θ′ such that µii (ρi(θ)) > µii (ρi(θ′)). This implies
that αi (ρi(θ)) > αi (ρi(θ′)). But then, principal with type θ′ can deviate and re-
port ρi(θ) to agent i while keeping her report to the other agent unchanged. This
increases agent i’s action, without changing the other agent’s action, and benefits
the principal.
Proof of Proposition 4. It is easy to construct a completely uninformative equi-
librium.1 It is also easy to see that there is no equilibrium in which the agents
receive full information. In fact, we can show that type (f, f) must always send
the same feedback with some other type. Because, otherwise, at least one of
the agents must have beliefs that put positive probability on s after some mes-
sage r and type (f, f) would have a profitable deviation to r. In order to prove
that ρ(s, s) = ρ(f, f), suppose, for contradiction, that ρ(f, f) 6= ρ(s, s). Then,
the previous argument implies that ρ(f, f) = ρ(f, s) or ρ(f, f) = ρ(s, f). Sup-
pose first that ρ(f, f) = ρ(f, s). This implies that ρ(s, f) = ρ(s, s) since other-
wise type (s, f) has a profitable deviation to ρ(s, s). But this implies that type
(f, f) has a profitable deviation to ρ(s, s). We obtain a similar contradiction if
ρ(f, f) = ρ(s, f).
Proof of Proposition 5. Fix i and θ−i and let θ = (s, θ−i). For any r ∈M−i(θ)
v(ai(1), a−i(µ−i(r)), s, θ−i) ≥ v(ai(µSi (∅)), a−i(µ−i(r)), s, θ−i).
Therefore, no feedback does not increase the payoff for type s but it has a cost,
1This is well known in the literature: in a cheap-talk game, there is always a babbling
equilibrium.
C.1. PROOFS AND SUPPORTING RESULTS 159
which implies that qi(s|s, θ−i) = 1. Now let θ = (f, θ−i). For any r ∈M−i(θ),
(1− η)v(ai(µSi (∅)), a−i(µ−i(r)), f, θ−i) + ηv(ai(p), a−i(µ−i(r)), f, θ−i)
> v(ai(0), a−i(µ−i(r)), f, θ−i),
and hence there exists a positive measure of principals with small enough costs
c(∅, r|f, θ−i) who prefer sending no information. This implies that qi(∅|f, θ−i) > 0
and µSi (∅) = 0. Since there is also a positive measure of principals who always
tell the truth, we also have qi(f |f, θ−i) > 0.
Beliefs in private-verifiable feedback with lying cost and naive agents: Bayes’ rule
implies that beliefs of the sophisticated agents are µSi (s) = 1, µSi (f) = 0, µSi (∅) =
0 while average beliefs are µi(s) = 1, µi(f) = 0, µi(∅) = ηp. Average beliefs
conditional on state are µi(θi = s) = 1 and


















Proof of Proposition 6. Since µi(ss) = 1 and sending no information is costly,
q(ss|ss) = 1. Since there are some naive agents and principals with small costs of
not telling the truth as well as those with large costs, q(∅|ff) > 0 and q(ff |ff) >
0. The left hand side of (3.1) is equal to the worst payoff that type sf expects from
sending ∅. Therefore, if this condition holds, then there will be some principals
who will find sending ∅ profitable. If it does not hold, then there is an equilibrium
in which q(∅|sf) = q(∅|fs) = 1, which is supported with beliefs µSi (∅) = 0.
Beliefs in public-verifiable feedback with lying cost and naive agents: Beliefs are
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given by µSi (s,m−i) = 1, µSi (f,m−i) = 0 for all m−i and
µS1 (∅) =
q(∅|sf)p(sf)
q(∅|sf)p(sf) + q(∅|fs)p(fs) + q(∅|ff)p(ff)
µS2 (∅) =
q(∅|fs)p(fs)
q(∅|fs)p(fs) + q(∅|sf)p(sf) + q(∅|ff)p(ff)
Note that beliefs of agent 1 after no feedback decrease (i.e., are smaller than the








In particular, this is the case in a symmetric equilibrium where q(∅|sf) = q(∅|fs)
and beliefs about the other agent is uniform, i.e., p(ss) = p(sf) and p(fs) = p(ff).
Average beliefs are µi(s,m−i) = 1, µi(f,m−i) = 0 for all m−i and µi(∅) = (1 −
η)µSi (∅) + ηp. Also, note that beliefs after no information are larger than those
under private-verifiable feedback. Average beliefs conditional on the actual state
are






[q(sf |sf) + q(∅|sf)µ1(∅)]















Proof of Proposition 7. Fix i and θ−i, let θ = (s, θ−i) and r−i be the message
sent to agent −i. Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists ri 6= s such that
qi(ri|s, θ−i) > 0. This implies that
v(ai(µi(ri)), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), s, θ−i) > v(ai(µi(s)), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), s, θ−i),
for otherwise type s would not find sending ri optimal. Therefore, ai(µi(ri)) >
C.1. PROOFS AND SUPPORTING RESULTS 161
ai(µi(s)) and hence for all r−i
v(ai(µi(ri)), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i) > v(ai(µi(s)), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i).
Since cost of ri is smaller than cost of s for type f , this implies that qi(s|f, θ−i) = 0.
By assumption, there exist s types whose lying costs are so large that they tell
the truth, i.e., qi(s|s, θ−i) > 0 . Therefore, µSi (s) = 1, which contradicts
v(ai(µi(ri)), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), s, θ−i) > v(ai(µi(s)), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), s, θ−i).
Also, by assumption, there exist f types whose lying costs are so large that they
tell the truth, i.e., qi(f |f, θ−i) > 0. This implies that µSi (f) = 0. Now, suppose,
for contradiction, that qi(s|f, θ−i) = 0. This implies that µSi (s) = 1 and hence for
any r−i
v(ai(1), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i) > v(ai(0), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i).
Assume first that qi(∅|f, θ−i) = 0 so that qi(f |f, θ−i) = 1. Since
F (v(ai(1), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i) > v(ai(0), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i)) > 0
deviation to s is profitable for some principals with small enough costs csr−i|fθ−i ,
contradicting qi(f |f, θ−i) = 1. Assume now that qi(∅|f, θ−i) > 0 so that µSi (∅) = 0.
Expected payoff to s is greater than the expected payoff to f and ∅, i.e.,
x = v(ai(1), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i)− v(ai(0), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i) > 0
y = v(ai(1), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i)− (1− η)v(ai(0), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i)
− ηv(ai(µi(p)), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i) > 0
162 APPENDIX C
which imply that F (x) > 0 and G(y) > 0. These imply that for some principals
reporting s is strictly better than reporting f and ∅, contradicting qi(s|f, θ−i) = 0.
Note that qi(s|s, θ−i) = 1 and qi(f |f, θ−i) > 0 imply µSi (s) > p. Suppose, for
contradiction, that qi(∅|f, θ−i) = 0. Then
x = (1−η)v(ai(µSi (∅)), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i)+ηv(ai(µi(p)), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i)
− v(ai(0), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i) > 0
and hence F∅r−i|fθ−i(x) > 0, i.e., there exist principals for whom ∅ is better than
f . Also
G (v(ai(1), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i)− v(ai(0), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i)|r−i, θ−i) < 1
implies that there exist principals for whom
(1−η)v(ai(µSi (∅)), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i)+ηv(ai(µi(p)), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i)−c∅r−i|fθ−i
> (1−η)v(ai(µSi (s)), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i)+ηv(ai(1), a−i(µ−i(r−i)), f, θ−i)−csr−i|fθ−i
so that they prefer ∅ to s. This proves that qi(∅|f, θ−i) > 0.
Beliefs in private-unverifiable feedback with lying cost and naive agents: Bayes’
rule implies that beliefs of the sophisticated agents are µSi (f) = 0, µSi (∅) = 0
µS1 (s) =
p(ss) + p(sf)
p(ss) + p(sf) + p(fs)q1(s|fs) + p(ff)q1(s|ff)
µS1 (s) =
p(ss) + p(fs)
p(ss) + p(fs) + p(sf)q2(s|sf) + p(ff)q2(s|ff)
while average beliefs are µi(s) = (1−η)µSi (s) +η, µi(f) = 0, µi(∅) = ηp. Average
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beliefs conditional on state are µi(θi = s) = µi(s) and




































Note that µSi (s) > p and hence µi(s) > p.
Proof of Proposition 8. Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists r 6= ss such
that q(r|ss) > 0. Then v(a(µ(r)), ss) > v(a(µ(ss)), ss), which implies that
v(a(µ(r)), θ) > v(a(µ(ss)), θ) for all θ. But then no type would find it optimal to
send ss. Since there are some ss types who send ss because of high lying costs,
this implies that µi(ss) = 1 for i = 1, 2. This, however, shows that ss induces the
highest beliefs and actions and hence all types ss should send ss, a contradiction.
For small costs of lying this also implies that some other type must also send ss.
Finally, there exist principals with high enough lying costs who always tell the
truth.
Beliefs in public-unverifiable feedback with lying cost and naive agents: The strat-
egy is given by
q(ss|ss) = 1
q(ss|sf) ∈ (0, 1), q(s∅|sf) ∈ (0, 1), q(sf |sf) = 1− q(ss|sf)− q(s∅|sf) > 0
q(ss|fs) ∈ (0, 1), q(∅s|fs) ∈ (0, 1), q(fs|fs) = 1− q(ss|fs)− q(∅s|fs) > 0
q(ss|ff) ∈ (0, 1), q(∅∅|ff) ∈ (0, 1), q(ff |ff) = 1− q(ss|ff)− q(∅∅|ff) > 0
164 APPENDIX C
Bayes’ rule implies that beliefs are given by
µS1 (ss) =
p(ss) + p(sf)q(ss|sf)
p(ss) + p(sf)q(ss|sf) + p(fs)q(ss|fs) + p(ff)q(ss|ff)
µS2 (ss) =
p(ss) + p(fs)q(ss|fs)
p(ss) + p(fs)q(ss|fs) + p(sf)q(ss|sf) + p(ff)q(ss|ff)
µS1 (sf) = 1, µ
S
2 (fs) = 1, µ
S
1 (fs) = 0, µ
S
2 (sf) = 0
µS1 (s∅) = 1, µS2 (∅s) = 1, µS1 (∅s) = 0, µS2 (s∅) = 0
µSi (∅∅) = 0, µSi (ff) = 0, µSi (∅f) = free, µSi (f∅) = free
µ1(ss) = η + (1− η)µS1 (ss)
µ2(ss) = η + (1− η)µS2 (ss)
µ1(sf) = 1, µ2(fs) = 1, µ1(fs) = 0, µ2(sf) = 0
µ1(s∅) = 1, µ2(∅s) = 1, µ1(∅s) = ηp, µ2(s∅) = ηp
µi(∅∅) = ηp, µi(ff) = 0,
µ1(∅f) = ηp+ (1− η)µS1 (∅f), µ2(∅f) = (1− η)µS2 (∅f)
µ1(f∅) = (1− η)µS1 (f∅), µ2(f∅) = ηp+ (1− η)µS2 (f∅)
Beliefs as a function of own feedback are given by
µS1 (s) =
p(ss) + p(sf)[q(ss|sf) + q(sf |sf)]
















1 (∅s) = 0
C.1. PROOFS AND SUPPORTING RESULTS 165
µ1(s) = η + (1− η)µS1 (s)
µ1(f) = 0
µ1(∅) = ηp
Average beliefs conditional on state are














[q(ss|sf)µ1(ss) + 1− q(ss|sf)]
µ1(θ = f) =
p(fs)
p(fs) + p(ff)














C.2 Instructions, Quiz, and Survey
C.2.1 Instructions
2Welcome. Thank you for participating in our study, which is about economic
decision making. During the study, you will be asked to solve a set of questions
and make decisions regarding your performance. You will earn 10 TL for your
participation. Besides this show-up fee, your earnings in the experiment will
depend on your performance, your decisions and chance. There is no misleading
or deception in this study. The rules that we will state are completely correct and
your payment will be determined accordingly. Payments will be made privately
and in cash at the end of the experiment. Your decisions during the experiment
will be recorded under a subject number and will never be matched with your
identifying information.
The experiment consists of 5 periods and within each period there are 2 rounds.
At the end, one round out of the 10 rounds will be randomly selected and your
earnings will be determined according to your payoff in that chosen round. During
the experiment, all monetary earnings will be denoted in ECU (“experimental
currency unit”), where 1 ECU equals 0.06 TL.
For each of the 5 periods, there will be different rules. We will now explain
the decision task which you will encounter in all rounds. Specific instructions that
pertain to each of the 5 periods will be explained just before that period starts.
General Rules
At the beginning of the experiment, participants will be randomly assigned to
one of the roles of “Principal” and “Agent”. The roles will be fixed throughout the
experiment. Now, we are going to explain the rules that will be implemented for
agents.
2Original instructions were in Turkish and are available upon request. Note that verbal
instructions were supplemented with graphical slides to ease understanding. These are also
available upon request. The instructions given here are for the following treatment order
configuration: Truthful, Private-Verifiable, Public-Verifiable, Private-Unverifiable and Public-
Unverifiable feedback.
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Agents:




One of these will be assigned to you randomly. In the addition task, you are asked
to solve questions involving the addition of 4 or 5 two-digit numbers in 120 sec.
(e.g. 11+ 48+ 96+24=?). In the verbal task, you are asked to solve in 120 sec.
the following type of questions:
• General knowledge questions (geography, literature, sports...). For example:
– Which country has the capital city of Ankara?
– Who is the writer of the novel Crime and Punishment?
• Verbal classification questions. For example:
– Which word does not belong to the group?
– Which of the following has the relationship between Tea:Sugar?
• Number-word matching questions. Here we assign each letter to a number
and ask the following type of question:
– ALI= 123
– ILE= 324
– AILE=? (where the answer is AILE= 1324.)
For each period, a “target score” will be determined for each type of task (addition
and verbal), independently and separately. You will work on only one type of task
in the two rounds of a period. The outcome will be determined as follows: if the
number of correct answers is:
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• higher than or equal to the target score, Success,
• lower than the target score, Failure.
The target score will be kept fixed throughout the two rounds of the same period.
That is, your number of correct answers in both rounds within the same period
will be compared with the same target score. You will not be informed about the
target score.
The payoffs to success and failure in the 1st round are as follows:
If you are successful (you scored at least as high as the target score), you will
earn 300 ECU. If you have failed (you scored less than the target score), you will
earn 100 ECU.
After the first round, you have two options for the second round. You can
either choose to base your 2nd round payoff on your second-round performance,
or leave it to a chance mechanism. As an agent:
• If you perform in the second round,
– You will perform the same type of task as in the first round.
– If you are successful in the second round (meet/pass the target score)
you will get 300 ECU,
– If you fail in the second round (fall below the target score) you will get
100 ECU.
• If the chance mechanism is implemented in the second round,
– You will not perform in the 2nd round.
– You will earn 300 ECU with X% chance, and 100 ECU with (100 −
X)%.
You will make this performance/chance mechanism decision by answering the
following question:
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What is the minimum % chance of winning in the chance mechanism (X), that
will make you willing to leave your second-round payoff to the chance mechanism
rather than your own performance?
In other words, you will state for what winning chances you will choose to base
your payoff on your own performance and for what winning chances you prefer
the chance mechanism. How you make this decision is related to how confident
you are about your success in the second round. Consider the following example:
Suppose that someone thinks there is a 80% chance of succeeding in the 2nd
performance task. In this case, this person would need the chance mechanism to
give at least an 80% chance of winning, to be convinced to leave his/her payoff
to chance. This is because he/she has higher expected earnings from performing
in the 2nd round (as opposed to picking the chance mechanism), if there is a less
than 80% chance of winning in the chance mechanism.
The probability of winning in the chance mechanism (X) will be determined
randomly by the computer. If you choose the performance mechanism at the
stated chance probability, then you will perform in the second round. Otherwise,
your payoff will depend on the chance mechanism (you will earn 300 ECU with
probability X% and 100 ECU with probability (100−X)%).
Groups:
In each period, 3-person groups that consist of one principal and two agents
will be formed. At the beginning of each period, groups will be reshuﬄed and
formed again. The two agents in the same group will always perform different
type of tasks (if one does addition the other does verbal) and will be evaluated
according to different target scores.
Principals:
Participants in the role of principals will not perform any task. However, they
will be able to see whether each agent in their group has been successful or not
on their screen.
The payoffs of principals are as follows (valid for all periods):
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1st round of each period: A fixed payoff of 100 ECU
2nd round of each period: The payoff will depend on agents’ decisions and
performances.
Return of agent i to principal in the second round (returni):
• If the agent performed in the second round: returni= Number of correct
answers in the second round * 20 ECU
• If the agent did not perform (if the chance mechanism was implemented):
returni= 0 ECU
Payoff function of the principal for the second round= 50ECU (constant pay-
off)+ min(return1, return2), where return1 and return2 refer to the returns from
agent 1 and agent 2, respectively.
[Examples were graphically shown on slides. They are available upon request.]
Therefore if at least one of the agents chooses the chance mechanism, the
principal will not earn a payoff from the agents’ performance. So in order to
receive a payoff from agents’ performance, both of the agents must perform in the
second round.
Now, we have a short quiz about the rules we have just explained. Your answers
will not affect your earnings. Rather, they are aimed to check your understanding
of the rules. Please do not hesitate to ask questions if there is any part you do
not understand.
[Quiz: see Section C.2.2]
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Part I (Truthful Feedback):
As explained before, 3-person groups, consisting of 1 principal and 2 agents,
will be formed.
Agents will observe their performance outcome (Success/Failure) before mak-
ing their second (post-feedback) performance/chance decision. This feedback will
be sent by the computer and it will certainly be correct information. Agents will
make the performance/chance mechanism decision twice: before and after they
receive the feedback on their performance outcome (Success or Failure). One of
the two (pre-feedback and post-feedback) stated minimum probabilities will be
randomly chosen and used to determine whether the agent will perform or not in
the 2nd stage.
The timeline for the agents will be as follows [shown graphically on slides]
1. (1st round) Task will be performed.
2. The decision about performance/chance mechanism for the 2nd round will
be made.
3. Feedback about the 1st round outcome will be given (Success/Failure).
4. The pre-feedback performance/chance decision can be changed or kept the
same.
5. One of the pre- and post-feedback decisions will be randomly chosen. The
stated minimum will be compared to the (randomly chosen) chance proba-
bility X and either the performance or the chance mechanism will be applied
in the 2nd round accordingly.
6. (2nd round) If the performance mechanism is implemented: The same type
of task as in the first round will be performed and your earnings will de-
pend on whether you succeed or not (300 ECU/100 ECU). If the chance
mechanism is implemented: There will be no performance. 300 ECU with
probability X and 100 ECU with probability (100−X) will be earned.
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As agents, the feedback provides you with information about your performance.
It can help you evaluate your performance with respect to the target score. Note
that the difficulty of the questions might be different between rounds.
Principals will see the 1st-round performance outcomes of the two agents in
their group. Principals will also be asked to guess, for each agent, the required
minimum winning chance (%) to use the chance mechanism instead of performing
in the 2nd stage, as stated by that agent. That is, the principals will guess at
which winning probabilities in the chance mechanism each agent will enter/stay
out. This guess concerns the post-feedback entry decisions of each agent. If
the principal’s guess is within ± 5 percentage points of the agent’s actual stated
minimum winning chance, he/she will earn 10 ECU extra (for each successful
guess). At the end of the experiment, these extra earnings in the chosen round
will be added to the payoff from that round.
Do you have any questions?
Part II (Private Verifiable Feedback):
In this part, agents may receive feedback about their performance outcome
from the principal. Any information that is sent by the principal has to be true.
However, the principal also has the option to withhold the information, i.e. not
send any message.
The messages from principal will be privately sent. In other words, principals
can choose different messages (either the true outcome or no information) for
different agents and agents will only see the message the message sent to them,
not to the other agent.
As in the previous part, agents make a pre-feedback and post-feedback de-
cision, and one is randomly chosen to be implemented. Principals are asked to
guess the required minimum winning probabilities in the chance mechanism (%),
stated by the agents post-feedback. The same rules apply for bonus calculation.
[Screenshots of the principal and the agent decision screens were shown on the
slides. They are available upon request.]
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Do you have any questions?
Part III (Public Verifiable Feedback):
In this part, agents may receive feedback about their performance outcome
from the principal. Any information that is sent by the principal has to be true.
However, the principal also has the option to withhold information.
The messages from the principal will be publicly sent, meaning that both
agents can see the set of messages. The principal can choose to send either truthful
information to both of the agents or no information to either.
If the principal chooses to send the information, the agents will see the message
sent to the other agent along with their own. Note that the other agent performs
another type of task and is evaluated with a different target score. Therefore, the
other agent’s outcome is independent of yours. However, the message sent to the
other agent might provide you with information about the principal’s strategy.
As in the previous part, agents make a pre-feedback and post-feedback de-
cision, and one is randomly chosen to be implemented. Principals are asked to
guess the required minimum winning probabilities in the chance mechanism (%),
stated by the agents post-feedback. The same rules apply for bonus calculation.
[Screenshots of the principal and the agent decision screens were shown on the
slides. They are available upon request.]
Do you have any questions?
Part IV (Private Unverifiable Feedback):
In this part, agents may receive feedback about their performance outcome
from the principal. Information sent by the principal does not need to be true.
The principal also has the option to withhold information.
The principal will observe the actual performance of the two agents and after
that, will choose to send one of the following messages: “Success”, or “Failure” or
“No Information”.
The messages from the principal will be privately sent. In other words, princi-
pals can choose different messages for agents and agents will only see the message
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about their own performance.
As in the previous part, agents make a pre-feedback and post-feedback de-
cision, and one is randomly chosen to be implemented. Principals are asked to
guess the required minimum winning probabilities in the chance mechanism (%),
stated by the agents post-feedback. The same rules apply for bonus calculation.
[Screenshots of the principal and the agent decision screens were shown on the
slides. They are available upon request.]
Do you have any questions?
Part V (Public Unverifiable Feedback):
In this part, agents will receive feedback about their performance outcome
from the principal. Information sent by the principal does not need to be true.
The principal also has the option to withhold information.
The principal will observe the actual performance of the two agents and after
that, will choose to send one of the following messages: “Success”, or “Failure” or
“No Information”.
The messages from the principal will be publicly sent, meaning that agents
will see the message sent to the other agent along with their own. Note that the
other agent performs another type of task and is evaluated with a different target
score. Therefore, other agent’s outcome is independent of yours. However, the
message sent to other agent might provide you with information about principal’s
strategy.
As in the previous part, agents make a pre-feedback and post-feedback de-
cision, and one is randomly chosen to be implemented. Principals are asked to
guess the required minimum winning probabilities in the chance mechanism (%),
stated by the agents post-feedback. The same rules apply for bonus calculation.
[Screenshots of both the principal and the agent screen were shown on the
slides. They are available upon request.]
Do you have any questions?
Survey:
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Now you will be asked to answer several questions that will come up on your
screen. Thank you again for your participation.
C.2.2 Quiz
1. Assume that you state a 60% chance of being successful in the 2nd stage,
and the computer picks the winning probability in the chance mechanism
as 55%. Which of the following is true?
(a) My probability of earning 300 ECU is 55% and my payoff is independent
of my performance.
(b) My payoff is 300 ECU if I am successful and 100 ECU otherwise.
2. Assume that you state a 30% chance of being successful in the 2nd stage,
and the computer picks the winning probability in the chance mechanism
as 55%. Which of the following is true?
(a) My probability of earning 300 ECU is 55% and my payoff is independent
of my performance.
(b) My payoff is 300 ECU if I am successful and 100 ECU otherwise.
3. Suppose Person A stated 80% as the minimum winning probability that
makes her leave her payoff to chance, while Person B stated 45% for the
same decision. Which of those people is more self-confident about their
success in the 2nd period?
(a) A
(b) B
C.2.3 Post-experiment Survey Questions
1. How old are you?
2. What is your gender?
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3. Which year of your degree program are you in?
4. What is your major/faculty?
5. What is your current GPA?
6. Were the rules of the experiment clear and understandable? Please answer
on a scale of 1 to 10: 1= not understandable at all, 10= extremely under-
standable.
7. How difficult was the addition task? Please answer on a scale of 1 to 5: 1=
not difficult at all, 5= extremely difficult.
8. How difficult was the verbal task? Please answer on a scale of 1 to 5: 1=
not difficult at all, 5= extremely difficult.
9. As agents, when you were making the decision about performance/chance
mechanism, was the thought of “if I don’t do the performance task in the
2nd period, I will get bored” a factor in your decision? (Yes/No)
10. Disregarding the monetary payoff it brings, how important was it personally
for you to be “Successful” (to score higher than the target score)? Please
answer on a scale of 1 to 5: 1=“Not important at all”, 2= “Not important”,
3= “Neither important nor unimportant”, 4=“Important”, 5= “Extremely
important”
